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Abstract
Primates are able to rapidly, accurately and effortlessly perform the computationally
difficult visual task of invariant object recognition - the ability to discriminate be-
tween different objects in the face of high variation in object viewing parameters and
background conditions. This ability is thought to rely on the ventral visual stream,
a hierarchy of visual cortical areas culminating in inferior temporal (IT) cortex. In
particular, decades of research strongly suggests that the population of neurons in
IT supports invariant object recognition behavior. However, direct causal evidence
for this decoding hypothesis has been equivocal to date, especially beyond the spe-
cific case of face-selective sub-regions of IT. This research aims to directly test the
general causal role of IT in invariant object recognition. To do so, we first character-
ized human and macaque monkey behavior over a large behavioral domain consisting
of binary discriminations between images of basic-level objects, establishing behav-
ioral metrics and benchmarks for computational models of this behavior. This work
suggests that, in the domain of basic-level core object recognition, humans and mon-
keys are remarkably similar in their behavioral responses, while leading models of
the visual system significantly diverge from primate behavior. We then reversibly
inactivated individual, millimeter-scale regions of IT via injection of muscimol while
monkeys performed several interleaved binary object discrimination tasks. We found
that inactivating different millimeter-scale regions of primate IT resulted in different
patterns of object recognition deficits, each predicted by the local region's neuronal
selectivity. Our results provide causal evidence that IT directly underlies primate
object recognition behavior in a topographically organized manner. Taken together,
these results establish quantitative experimental constraints for computational models
of the ventral visual stream and object recognition behavior.
Thesis Supervisor: James J. DiCarlo
Title: Peter de Florez Professor of Neuroscience,
Head, Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences
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List of Figures
1-1 (a) Schematic illustrating the computational crux of object recogni-
tion. For an example task (discriminating between a car and non-car
objects), identity-preserving variability in viewpoint parameters such
as position, pose and size leads to drastically different visual inputs.
(b) The ventral visual stream, schematized as a hierarchy of visual cor-
tical areas (VI, V2, V4, IT). (Both panels are adapted from [DiCarlo
et al., 2012]). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
1-2 Adapted from [Jazayeri and Afraz, 2017]: schematic of three different
experiments inferring correlational and causal dependencies between
measured variables. Blue arrows correspond to correlational depen-
dencies between two variables, where neither variable is experimentally
controlled. Red arrows correspond to inferred causal dependencies,
where a dependent variable is linked to an experimentally controlled
variable. In (c), the experimentally controlled variable (randomized
stimulation) is assumed to be equivalent to the internal variable A. . 36
11
2-1 Two example images for each of the 24 basic-level objects, sampled
from the test set (each row corresponds to a group of eight objects). To
enforce true object recognition behavior (rather than image matching)
and tackle the invariance problem, we generated thousands of natural-
istic images, each with one foreground object, by rendering a 3D model
of each object with randomly-chosen viewing parameters (2D position,
3D rotation and viewing distance) and placing that foreground object
view onto a randomly-chosen, natural image background . . . . . . . 44
2-2 Behavioral paradigm (for Monkey M). Each trial was initiated when
the monkey held gaze fixation on a central fixation point for 200ms,
after which a square test image (spanning 60 of visual angle) appeared
at the center of gaze for 100ms. Immediately after extinction of the
test image, two choice images, each displaying the canonical view of
a single object with no background were shown to the left and right
(see Methods). Test and choice images are shown to scale. The mon-
key was allowed to freely view the response images for up to 1500ms,
and responded by holding fixation over the selected image for 700ms.
Monkey Z performed the exact same tasks, but used touch to initiate
trials and indicate its choice (see Methods). Successful trials were re-
warded with juice, and incorrect choices resulted in time-outs of 1.5 to
2.5 seconds. .. ..... ... ..... . ..... . . . . .. . . .. . . 45
12
2-3 Performance relative to the human pool for 16 objects (shown as col-
ored dots; the mean over objects is shown as a solid black line) for
monkey M and P. C) Average performance relative to the human pool
of two monkeys and 15 unique individual humans subjects with suffi-
cient longitudinal data on the same tasks (mean SE over subjects).
Monkeys rapidly learned each new object, while humans performed at
a high initial performance, and exhibited no change in performance as
a function of (unsupervised) experience with the objects. The TEST
marker indicates monkeysO relative performance on held-out test im-
ages, following all behavioral training. D) Top panel: Generalization
to novel images. Pooling data from both monkeys, the first-trial per-
formance of 2400 test images (mean SE) versus the corresponding
Euclidean pixel distance to the nearest training image; black line de-
notes linear regression. The overall performance, including all subse-
quent exposures to test images, is shown on the left (at zero distance).
Bottom panel: Overlap between training and test image sets. The
distribution of distances of test images to the nearest trained image is
shown relative to actual training images (black line), and to OidealO
generalization surrogate training images (green line). . . . . . . . . . 46
2-4 Pattern of behavioral performances for the pooled human and pooled
monkey. Each 24x24 matrix summarizes confusions of all 2-way tasks:
the color of bin (i,j) indicates the unbiased performance (dO) of the
binary recognition task with objects i,j. Objects have been re-ordered
based on a hierarchical clustering of human confusion patterns to high-
light structure in the matrix. We observe qualitative similarities in the
confusion patterns. For example, (camel, dog) and (tank, truck) are
two often confused object pairs in both monkeys and humans. . . . . 48
13
2-5 B) Comparison of d' estimates of all 276 tasks (mean SE as esti-
mated by bootstrap, 100 resamples) of the pooled human with that
of the pooled monkey (top panel), and a low-level pixel representation
(bottom panel). C) Quantification of consistency as noise-adjusted cor-
relation of d' vectors. The pooled monkey shows patterns of confusions
that are highly correlated with pooled human subject confusion pat-
terns ( = 0.78). Importantly, low-level visual representations do not
share these confusion patterns (pixels: 0.37; V1+: 0.52). Furthermore,
a state-of-the-art deep convolutional neural network representation was
highly predictive of human confusion patterns (CNN2013: 0.86), in
contrast to an alternative model of the ventral stream (HMAX: 0.55).
The dashed lines indicate thresholds at p = 0.1, 0.05 confidence for
consistency to the gold standard pooled human, estimated from pairs
of individual human subjects. D) Comparison of d' estimates of all 276
tasks (mean SE as estimated by bootstrap, 100 resamples) between
the two m onkeys. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
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2-6 Accounting for inter-subject variability. For each of three groups of
eight objects, the absolute performance and consistency of individual
human subjects, individual monkeys, and machine features are shown.
Error bars for consistency relative to pooled human (mean SD) are
shown for individual monkeys and machine features for each group
(error bars for monkeys are not visible in object group 2 due to small
variability). The shaded grey areas indicate the distribution of per-
formance/consistency over individual human subjects (mean SD).
There is significant inter-subject variability: individual human sub-
jects are on average not perfectly correlated with the pooled human
(average consistency 0.74, 0.77, 0.68 for the three groups). As a result,
monkeys are statistically indistinguishable from individual human sub-
jects in their correlation to the human pool. In contrast, low-level vi-
sual representations were falsified on both performance and consistency
grounds for two out of three groups of objects. . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3-1 Time course of example behavioral trial (zebra versus dog) for human
psychophysics. Human behavior was measured using the online Ama-
zon MTurk platform, which enabled the rapid collection over 1 million
behavioral trials from 1472 human subjects. Monkey behavior was
measured using a novel custom home-cage behavioral system (Mon-
keyTurk), which leveraged a web-based behavioral task running on a
tablet to test many monkey subjects simultaneously in their home en-
vironment. DCNN models were tested on the same images and tasks
as those presented to humans and monkeys by extracting features from
the penultimate layer of each visual system model and training back-
end multi-class logistic regression classifiers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
15
3-2 (A) One-versus-all object-level (B.01) signatures for the pooled human
(n:=1472 human subjects), pooled monkey (n=5 monkey subjects),
and several DCNNIC models. Each B.01 signature is shown as a 24-
dimensional vector using a color scale; each colored bin corresponds to
the system's discriminability of one object against all others that were
tested. The color scales span each signature's full performance range,
and warm colors indicate lower discriminability. (B) Direct comparison
of the B.01 signatures of a pixel visual system model (top panel) and
a DCNNIC visual system model (Inception-v3, bottom panel) against
that of the human B.01 signature. (C) Human-consistency of B.01
signatures, for each of the tested model visual systems. The black and
gray dots correspond to a held-out pool of five human subjects and a
pool of five macaque monkey subjects respectively. The shaded area
corresponds to the primate zone, a range of consistencies delimited by
the estimated human-consistency of a pool of infinitely many monkeys. 72
3-3 One-versus-other object-level (B.02) signatures for pooled human, pooled
monkey, and several DCNNIC models. Each B.02 signature is shown
as a 24x24 symmetric matrices using a color scale, where each bin (i,j)
corresponds to the system's discriminability of objects i and j. Color
scales similar to (A). (E) Human-consistency of B.02 signatures for
each of the tested model visual systems. Format is identical to (C). . 73
16
3-4 (A) Schematic for computing B.I1n. First, the one-versus-all image-
level signature (B.I1) is shown as a 240-dimensional vector (24 ob-
jects, 10 images/object) using a color scale, where each colored bin
corresponds to the system's discriminability of one image against all
distractor objects. From this pattern, the normalized one-versus-all
image-level signature (B.I1n) is estimated by subtracting the mean per-
formance value over all images of the same object. This normalization
procedure isolates behavioral variance that is specifically image-driven
but not simply predicted by the object. (B) Normalized one-versus-all
object-level (B.Iln) signatures for the pooled human, pooled monkey,
and several DCNNIc models. Each B.I1n signature is shown as a
240-dimensional vector using a color scale, formatted as in (A). (C)
Human-consistency of B.I1n signatures for each of the tested model
visual system s. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
3-5 (D) Normalized one-versus-other image-level (B.12n) signatures for pooled
human, pooled monkey, and several DCNNIC models. Each B.12n sig-
nature is shown as a 240x24 matrix using a color scale, where each bin
(i,j) corresponds to the system's discriminability of image i against dis-
tractor object j. (E) Human-consistency of B.12n signatures for each
of the tested model visual systems. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
17
3-6 Effect of subject pool size and DCNN model modifications on con-
sistency with human behavior. (A) Accounting for natural subject-to-
subject variability. For each of the four behavioral metrics, the human-
consistency distributions of monkey (blue markers) and model (black
markers) pools are shown as a function of the number of subjects in
the pool (mean SD, over subjects). The human consistency increases
with growing number of subjects for all visual systems across all be-
havioral metrics. The dashed lines correspond to fitted exponential
functions, and the parameter estimate (mean t SE) of the asymptotic
value, corresponding to the estimated human-consistency of a pool of
infinitely many subjects, is shown at the right most point on each
abscissa. (B) Model modifications that aim to rescue the DCNNIc
models. We tested several simple modifications (see Methods) to the
most human-consistent DCNNIc visual system model (Inception-v3).
Each panel shows the resulting human-consistency per modified model
(mean t SD over different model instances, varying in random filter
initializations) for each of the four behavioral metrics. . . . . . . . . . 80
3-7 Analysis of unexplained human behavioral variance. (A) Residual sim-
ilarity between all pairs of human visual system models. The color of
bin (i,j) indicates the proportion of explainable variance that is shared
between the residual signatures of visual systems i and j. For ease of
interpretation, we ordered visual system models based on their archi-
tecture and optimization procedure and partitioned this matrix into
four distinct regions. (B) Summary of residual similarity. For each of
the four regions in (a), the similarity to the residuals of Inception-v3
(region 2 in (A)) is shown (mean SD, within each region) for all im-
ages (black dots), and for images that humans found to be particularly
difficult (gray dots, selected based on held-out human data). . . . . . 81
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3-8 Dependence of primate and DCNNIC model behavior on image at-
tributes. (A) Example images with increasing attribute value, for each
of the four pre-defined image attributes (see Methods). (B) Depen-
dence of performance (B.I1n) as a function of four image attributes,
for humans, monkeys and a DCNNIC model (Inception-v3). (C) Pro-
portion of explainable variance of the residual signatures of monkeys
(black) and DCNNJc models (blue) that is accounted for by each of
the pre-defined image attributes. Error-bars correspond to SD over
trial re-sampling for monkeys, and over different models for DCNNIC
m odels. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
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4-1 : (a) Behavioral paradigm. The list shows all tested pairwise object dis-
crimination tasks between five objects, interleaved trial-by-trial. Each
trial was initiated when the monkey acquired and held gaze fixation
on a central fixation point for 200ms, after which a test image (8x8 de-
grees of visual angle in size) appeared at the center of gaze for 100ms.
After extinction of the test image, two choice images, each displaying
a single object in a canonical view with no background, were immedi-
ately shown to the left and right. One of these two objects was always
the same as the object that generated the test image (i.e. the correct
choice), and its location (left or right) was randomly chosen on each
trial. The monkey was allowed to freely view the choice images for
up to 10OOms, and indicated its final choice by holding fixation over
the selected image for 700ms. Animals were rewarded with small juice
rewards for successfully completing each trial. After the end of each
trial, another fixation point before the next test image appeared. (b)
Visual images. Two (out of hundreds) example images per object, for
each of the five objects and for both image sets, are shown. Stimuli
consisted of naturalistic synthetic images of 3D objects rendered un-
der high view-uncertainty and overlaid on a naturalistic background.
We additionally generated a dataset consisting of texture-less images
of the same objects. For the purpose of the current work, we treat
both of these image sets as equivalent, namely as images of the same
five objects under study. (c) Control behavior. Each matrix shows the
control behavioral performance over binary object recognition tasks,
for each monkey and image set type. To reliably measure performance
for each task within a single behavioral session, we sub-selected six of
these ten tasks for most experiments. For a subset of experiments in
one animal (monkey P, experiment 2), we tested all 10 binary tasks. 108
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4-2 (a) Example inactivation experiment. For an example inactivation ex-
periment, the behavioral performance for each of six tasks is shown.
Each panel shows the relative behavioral performance (mean SE,
obtained by bootstrap resampling over trials) for each of three consec-
utive behavioral sessions (pre-control, inactivation, and post-control;
see Methods). Performance is shown relative the average of pre- and
post-control performances, which we use as a measure of control behav-
ior (see Methods); the dark and light shaded areas correspond to one
and two SE respectively of this measure. We observe a strong and sig-
nificant deficit for some tasks (i.e. chair versus dog, chair versus plane,
and dog versus bear) but not others (elephant versus bear, dog versus
elephant). (b) For the example inactivation site in IT in (a), the be-
havioral deficits are summarized relative to the average control perfor-
mance on the right panel (mean SE over trials). (c) N more example
inactivation sites in IT in both monkeys, each with their anatomical
locations and resulting behavioral deficits over tasks. Formatting as in
2A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
4-3 : (a) Behavioral deficits for all inactivation sites and all tasks in both
monkeys as a scatter of control performance and inactivation perfor-
mance, showing a significant decrease in performance corresponding
to points under the unity line (dashed line). (b) Summary of behav-
ioral deficits. The red bars show the magnitude of inactivation deficit,
for all tasks and for all inactivation sites. The blue bars correspond
to otherwise identical experiments but without muscimol inactivation.
Inactivation of local regions of IT resulted in highly reliable behav-
ioral deficits, which were selective over visual space (i.e. contralateral-
biased) and selective over tasks (red bars). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
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4-4 (a) The heat map shows the task weight vectors for each of the 25
inactivation sites, with brighter colors corresponding to larger relative
task deficits, highlighting that inactivation of different sites resulted
in different non-uniform, or relatively sparse, deficit weight pattern.
The average weight pattern over all inactivation sites (right column)
is largely uniform. (b) Inactivation of local regions in IT leads to
significantly non-uniform deficits (SI = 0.71 0.05; mean SE over
sites), as quantified by the sparsity of task weight vectors. . . . . . . 113
4-5 (a) Topographical organization. The similarity of behavioral deficit
patterns, quantified as a noise-adjusted correlation, between pairs of
injection sites is plotted as a function of the anatomical distance be-
tween sites. This relationship shows that inactivation deficits are highly
replicable; the noise-adjusted correlation between behavioral deficit
patterns of neighboring inactivation sites was at ceiling. Moreover,
the similarity between any two inactivation deficits was monotonically
related to their anatomical distance. Light blue points scatter all pairs.
Binned values, with log-spaced sampling of tissue distance, are shown
in dark blue (mean SE). A simple exponential model significantly
explained this relationship (see inset). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
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4-6 (a) Local neurophysiology. For an example muscimol inactivation site,
the location of injection co-registered with local electrophysiology record-
ing sites is shown overlaid on a coronal MRI slice. For each the
eight neighboring physiology sites, the mean multi-unit visual response
aligned to stimulus onset is shown. The stimulus consisted of images of
each of the five object categories, and the stimulus duration (0-100ms)
is shown with a gray bar. Neuronal sites, while heterogeneous, each
exhibit reliable object preferences. (b) To determine whether the ob-
served behavioral deficits are predicted by local neuronal activity, we
constructed and tested a number of decoder models that transform
these response patterns into predictions of behavioral deficits. The
predictions from each of these models, as well as the true (measured)
behavioral deficit, are shown for the example inactivation site in (a).
Note that larger deficits correspond to more negative (i.e. smaller) val-
ues of Ad'. (c) The predictive power of each of these readout models is
shown as the noise-adjusted correlation between predicted and actual
behavioral deficits, for all relevant sites (with available local physiology
on the same images). Of the models that we tested, the most consistent
readout model was the local neuronal selectivity. . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
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5-1 (a) The top panel shows a photograph of LED array, a 5x5 grid with 24
LEDs and one thermal sensor. The LED array is designed to be chron-
ically implanted directly onto the cortical tissue, by suturing the thin
silicone encapsulation onto the dura mater, as illustrated in the bot-
tom panel. (b) Light power output for individual LEDs as a function
of the input intensity (controlled via input voltage). The horizontal
line corresponds to average power output of optrodes that have suc-
cessfully yielded behavioral effects in monkeys. (c) Spatial density of
light power on the horizontal plane, at a transverse distance of < 1mm
from the surface of the LED. Given that light delivered from LEDs is
not collimated, the spatial spread of light power over the horizontal
plane is relatively large (~ 2.5mm) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
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5-2 (a) Behavioral paradigm for luminance discrimination task. Each trial
of the behavioral task consisted of a fixation period, during which one
(or none) of the LEDs were preemptively activated on a random propor-
tion of trials. Following fixation, two sample stimuli (Gaussian blob of
1 size, varying in luminance) were briefly presented at random radially
opposite locations in the visually field. The task required the subject to
make a saccade to a target location defined by the brighter of the two
sample stimuli. The location and relative luminance of the stimuli was
randomly assigned for each trial. By varying the relative luminance of
the two sample stimuli, we systematically varied the task difficulty. (b)
The time course of the behavioral paradigm. The LED activation was
timed to completely overlap the stimulus-related activity in Vi. (c)
Each of the four discs correspond to the part of the peripheral visual
field that was tested with this behavioral paradigm. The color of a
given location (x,y) corresponds to the proportion of choices into a 10
pooling region centered at (xy). Each panel corresponds to the relative
stimulus luminance (also called signal) in a 1 pooling region centered
at (xy). As expected, the proportion of choices into a spatial region
increases with increasing signal. (d) Photo of surgical implantation of
two LED arrays over VI cortex on the right hemishere. . . . . . . . 139
5-3 (a) Behavioral effects, corresponding to shifts of the subjects' psycho-
metric curve, on luminance discrimination task from optogenetic sup-
pression using acute optrodes (example session). Psychometric curves
for the Behavioral effects were localized in a target ROI (contralateral
lower visual field) by fitting a Gaussian model. For the . . . . . . . . 141
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5-4 (a) Behavioral effects on luminance discrimination task from optoge-
netic suppression using chronically implanted LED array, for an ex-
ample LED condition. The grid schematic (top right) shows which
LEDs were activated for this condition. The white circle overlaid on
the effect map corresponds to the localized effect, from fitting a Gaus-
sian model. (b) Over all tested LED conditions, the amplitude of the
localized effect, computed as the gain parameter of a Gaussian model
fit, is significantly greater when localized effects are optimized within
a target region of interest (ROI) as compared to a control region. . . 142
5-5 (a) Behavioral paradigm for object discrimination task. The list shows
all ten tested pairwise object discrimination tasks, interleaved trial-by-
trial. Each trial was initiated when the monkey acquired and held gaze
fixation on a central fixation point for 200ms, after which a test image
(6x6 degrees of visual angle in size) appeared at the center of gaze
for 100ms. After extinction of the test image, two choice images, each
displaying a single object in a canonical view with no background, were
immediately shown to the left and right. One of these two objects was
always the same as the object that generated the test image (i.e. the
correct choice), and its location (left or right) was randomly chosen on
each trial. The monkey was allowed to freely view the choice images
for up to 10OOms, and indicated its final choice by holding fixation over
the selected image for 700ms. Animals were rewarded with small juice
rewards for successfully completing each trial. On each trial, one (or
none) of the LEDs were preemptively activated on a random proportion
of trials, timed to overlap with the feed-forward visual response in IT.
(b) Photo of surgical implantation of one LED arrays over IT cortex
on the left hemishere; STS corresponds to superior temporal sulcus. 144
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5-6 (a) Focusing on the first half of trials, the pattern of contralateral be-
havioral deficits (in units of d') over ten core object recognition tasks,
for the checkerboard LED condition. The shaded region corresponds
to the null distribution (obtained by randomly shuffling stimulation
and control trials), while the colored dot corresponds to the observed
deficit. (b) For the LED condition in (a), the global deficit (averaged
over all tasks) for all, ipsilateral and contralateral stimuli. We report
a significant global deficit for contralateral stimuli, but don't have the
power to infer significant deficits on ipsilateral stimuli, or a difference
in the deficit magnitude between ipsilateral and contralateral stimuli.
(c) Patterns of deficits over ten core object recognition tasks, for each
of the tested LED conditions. Each pattern is plotted as a heat maps
where darker colors correspond to larger deficits, averaged over trials.
The insets on the left of each heat map indicate which LED was acti-
vated. As in (a), these data correspond to the first half of trials for each
behavioral session. (d) Corresponding to the deficit patterns shown in
(c), the global deficit, averaged over all tasks and all LED conditions,
is shown on the left panel. In contrast, the right panel shows the corre-
sponding global deficit for the second half of trials for each behavioral
session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Visual object recognition
A conjecture: the computational goal of the brain is to perceive the world and act
upon it. In the process, the brain gives rise to the mind, an emergent property that
is both intractably ill-defined and infuriatingly interesting. To gain understanding of
the origins and mechanisms of the mind-understanding that goes beyond the limits
of introspection-it has been helpful to first reduce it into operationally defined ob-
servable phenomena. To this end, our conscious subjective experience can be reduced
into observable behaviors encompassed in domains of perception, memory, decision-
making, etc., which together achieve the aforementioned goal of perceiving the world
and acting upon it. Visual object recognition is one of those behaviors.
Visual object recognition refers to the ability to assign labels (e.g. identity, cat-
egory, etc.) to objects in visual stimuli. While this behavior may seem arbitrary
and contrived, the motivation to study the neural mechanisms underlying it are two-
fold. In primates (including humans), this ability-and more broadly, the ability to
perceive affordances in environments [Gibson, 1979]-is crucial for survival and well-
being. Threat detection, resource detection, navigation, and social interactions are
all behaviors that depend significantly on this perceptual ability. As such, primates
have evolved to rapidly and accurately recognize objects in visual images. Inter-
estingly, this behavior introspectively appears to be reflexive or relatively effortless,
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which can mislead one to infer that the underlying neural computations are rela-
tively straight-forward. An infamous early attempt at solving this problem is the
Summer Vision Project [Papert, 1966], which was "an attempt to use our summer
workers effectively in the construction of a significant part of a visual system. ...
The final goal is OBJECT IDENTIFICATION which will actually name objects by
matching them with a vocabulary of known objects." Needless to say, this problem
was not solved that one summer in 1966, and five decades of significant efforts on
this problem have only recently yielded progress in approaching human abilities in
some visual object recognition tasks [Krizhevsky et al., 20121. Indeed, the problem
of object recognition is inherently ill-posed, given that any three-dimensional object
can project nearly infinitely many 2D images on the retina, under variations in pose,
position, size, articulation, illumination, and background context. Figure 1-1A illus-
trates this problem for an example task (discriminating between a car and non-car
objects, in the face of viewpoint variability). Invariance to such identity-preserving
image transformations is thought to be the computational crux of this problem, and
this invariant object recognition has traditionally been challenging for artificial vision
systems [Ullman, 2000, Pinto et al., 20081. Taken together, the ecological importance
of this visual ability and the relative ease with which it is solved by the primate brain
motivate a quantitative understanding of the neural mechanisms underlying primate
invariant object recognition behavior.
For the purpose of this work, we define quantitative understanding of the neural
mechanisms underlying visual object recognition as uncovering a model that reca-
pitulates observed all relevant neural and behavioral phenomena in this behavioral
domain. The choices for what is "relevant" are numerous, open to debate, and likely
depend on the end goals of this understanding (e.g. building artificial intelligence,
restoring or augmenting human abilities, etc.). To gain traction towards this ambi-
tious goal, we focus on a subset of invariant recognition behaviors that capture the
computational crux described above. To this end, core invariant object recognition is
operationally defined as the ability to identify objects under high view uncertainty
in visual images in the central visual field during a single, natural viewing fixation
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[DiCarlo et al., 2012]. We further restricted our behavioral domain to discriminations
between basic-level object categories [Rosch et al., 1976]. This reduced behavioral
domain aims to captures the primates' perceptual abilities at a glance, a coarse yet
surprisingly rich perceptual experience that is a foundation for more sophisticated vi-
sual abilities. We do not claim this to be an exhaustive characterization of all possible
visual object recognition behaviors, but rather a good starting point for that greater
goal. With this operationally defined behavioral domain in hand, we ask: how does
the primate brain support basic-level core object recognition behavior?
1.2 The ventral visual stream
Early lesion studies in humans and monkeys implicate the ventral visual stream in
object recognition behavior [Holmes and Gross, 1984, Horel et al., 1987, Biederman
et al., 1997]. Given remarkable anatomical and functional homologies between mon-
keys and humans [Mantini et al., 2012, Orban et al., 2004], much of the literature
reviewed here examines the ventral visual stream in macaque monkeys. The ventral
visual stream consists of a series of visual cortical areas that are located along the
ventral surface of the macaque monkey brain [Miyashita, 1993, Gross, 1994, Rolls,
2000]. Analogously, the dorsal visual stream consists of corresponding cortical series
along the dorsal surface, and these two streams are thought to support distinct visual
behaviors, caricatured as perception for recognition (ventral stream) and for guidance
of actions (dorsal stream) [Goodale and Milner, 1992].
The ventral visual stream, schematized in Figure 1-1B, consists of primary visual
cortex (V1), and subsequent extrastriate ventral visual cortical areas V2, V4 and infe-
rior temporal (IT) cortex. When light impinges on the retina, this visual information
is transduced into neuronal activity and relayed via the lateral geniculate nucleus
(LGN) of the thalamus to these visual cortical areas. While this cortical network is
highly recurrent, it can be approximated as a stacked hierarchy of cortical regions
(VI -+ V2 -+ V4 - IT) [Felleman and Van Essen, 19911. The visual input is trans-
formed at each of these cortical stages, creating subsequently more complex visual
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representations. Individual neurons in a given cortical area are thought to compute
local image features, and together tile the visual field. Across cortical regions, neu-
rons reflect increasingly more explicit representations of behaviorally relevant image
properties [Rust and DiCarlo, 2010]. For instance, neurons in VI appear to compute
relatively simple edge-like local features parameterized by local contrast, spatial fre-
quency and orientation [Hubel and Wiesel, 1962, Hubel and Wiesel, 1968]; V2 and
V4 are thought to compute conjunctions of these, exhibiting selectivity to complex
shapes [Hegd6 and Van Essen, 2000] and curvatures [Pasupathy and Connor, 2002];
neurons in IT cortex, which exhibit remarkable tolerance to changes in viewing pa-
rameters (e.g. position, scale, and pose), appear to be selective to particular object
categories [Bruce et al., 1981, Logothetis et al., 19951.
A B V2
"car": 6t44t .. V
Not"car":
etinaN
Figure 1-1: (a) Schematic illustrating the computational crux of object recognition.
For an example task (discriminating between a car and non-car objects), identity-
preserving variability in viewpoint parameters such as position, pose and size leads
to drastically different visual inputs. (b) The ventral visual stream, schematized as
a hierarchy of visual cortical areas (V1, V2, V4, IT). (Both panels are adapted from
[DiCarlo et al., 2012]).
We refer to the question of how neuronal responses are produced from the exter-
nal visual input as the encoding problem. A key goal in systems neuroscience is to
construct encoding models, computational models that predict the activity of neu-
rons in response to any/all visual input. To date, the phenomena described above
have constrained encoding models of the ventral stream to a class of hierarchical deep
convolutional neural networks (DCNNs) that reflect local features tiling the visual
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field (via a convolutional structure) and that are hierarchically computed with op-
erations that mimic tolerance and selectivity building (conjunctions and pooling).
DCNNs are currently the leading encoding models of the ventral visual stream [Seib-
ert et al., 2016, Cadieu et al., 2014, Khaligh-Razavi and Kriegeskorte, 2014, Yamins
et al., 2014, Guclu and van Gerven, 2015, Cichy et al., 2016, Hong et al., 2016, Seibert
et al., 2016, Cadena et al., 2017, Wen et al., 2017].
We refer to the question of how neuronal responses are read out to support be-
havior as the decoding problem. As stated above, decades of research suggest that the
ventral visual stream, and in particular IT cortex, is necessary for object recognition
behavior [Holmes and Gross, 1984, Horel et al., 1987, Biederman et al., 1997, Logo-
thetis and Sheinberg, 1996, Tanaka, 1996, Rolls, 2000, DiCarlo et al., 2012]. This
decoding hypothesis is qualitatively supported by observations of individual neurons'
selectivity to object identity and category, with remarkable tolerance to nuisance
viewpoint parameters [Kobatake and Tanaka, 1994, Ito et al., 1995, Logothetis et al.,
1995, Booth and Rolls, 1998, DiCarlo et al., 2012]. More quantitatively, this decoding
hypothesis is supported by observations that a linear readout from the population of
neurons in IT not only matches overall primate behavioral performance [Hung et al.,
2005, Zhang et al., 2011] but also predicts primate behavioral patterns of performance
across different object recognition tasks [Sheinberg and Logothetis, 1997, de Beeck
et al., 2001, Majaj et al., 2015], suggesting that IT is a good neural correlate of
primate recognition behavior.
1.3 Statement of problem
Decades of research have yielded key insights into how visual stimuli are represented
in the brain (encoding problem) and how these representations may support object
recognition behavior (decoding problem). Here, our goal was to uncover if and how
activity in IT causally supports basic-level core object recognition behavior.
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1.3.1 Inferring causal dependencies
We first review the definition of inferred causal and correlational dependencies, il-
lustrated in Figure 1-2 [Jazayeri and Afraz, 2017]. One can experimentally measure
associations between phenomena X, Y. Associations measured without any interven-
tion (specifically, without experimental randomization of one variable, X) are referred
to as correlational dependencies (see Figure 1-2A). Such associations are consistent
with a causal link between the measured phenomena (i.e. X causes Y), but could
also reflect epiphenomenal processes in the absence of causation, e.g. whereby a third
confounding variable drives both measured (i.e. Z causes both X and Y). Recent re-
search in several behavioral domains has exposed discrepancies between correlational
dependencies and directly tested causal dependencies [Katz et al., 2016, Liu and Pack,
2017], suggesting potential epiphenomenal mechanisms and highlighting the need to
directly test causal hypotheses.
In contrast, causal dependencies can be inferred by linking a dependent variable
to an experimentally controlled variable (see Figure 1-2B,C). Note that the distinction
between correlation and causal is not simply whether there is experimental control of a
variable, but rather what dependence is inferred. For example, direct manipulation of
visual input to the retinae while measuring both neuronal activity in IT and behavior
allows one to infer causal dependencies between visual inputs and neuronal activity in
IT, as well as between visual inputs and behavior, but not between neuronal activity
in IT and behavior.
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Figure 1-2: Adapted from [Jazayeri and Afraz, 20171: schematic of three different
experiments inferring correlational and causal dependencies between measured vari-
ables. Blue arrows correspond to correlational dependencies between two variables,
where neither variable is experimentally controlled. Red arrows correspond to in-
ferred causal dependencies, where a dependent variable is linked to an experimentally
controlled variable. In (c), the experimentally controlled variable (randomized stim-
ulation) is assumed to be equivalent to the internal variable A.
An important caveat to this definition is that inferred causal dependences often
link a dependent variable (Y) to a latent variable (X') that is assumed to be equivalent
to the experimentally controlled variable (X). For example, in Figure 1-2C, the exper-
imentally manipulated variable (randomized stimulation) is assumed to be equivalent
to the latent variable (A), thus enabling the inference of a causal dependence between
A and behavior. However, if the randomized stimulation was not specific to random-
izing variable A, or was not successful at randomizing variable A, such an inference
would no longer be supported. This caveat is especially important given the crude
nature of our neural perturbation tools (e.g. electrical micro-stimulation of clusters
of neurons can cause inadvertent stimulation of axons of passage), and suggests that
inferred dependencies fall on a continuum rather than two discrete categories of cor-
relational and causal. Thus, we propose the following definition: the confidence of
inferred causal dependencies between measured phenomena X', Y depends on the
(estimated) equivalence between the experimentally controlled variable X and the
inferred causal variable X'.
1.3.2 The causal role of IT in core object recognition
We now apply this framework to testing the following decoding hypothesis: IT cortex
is a necessary part of the brain's neural network that underlies core recognition be-
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havior - or, stated in other words, core object recognition behavior causally depends
on IT cortex. As described above, it has been shown that the population of neurons
in IT is a good neural correlate of primate recognition behavior [Sheinberg and Lo-
gothetis, 1997, de Beeck et al., 2001, Majaj et al., 2015]. In these experiments, the
experimentally controlled variable (visual images shown to the retinae) is not equiv-
alent to neuronal activity in IT. Indeed, while visual images may reliably drive IT
activity, they likely drive other confounding variables (e.g. any other visually driven
brain area). Thus, inferred dependencies from such an experiment are consistent with,
but do not unequivocally support a causal dependence of the measured behavior on
neural activity in IT.
To date, the most successful direct manipulations of IT have exclusively targeted
at millimeter-scale clusters of face-selective neurons in IT [Afraz et al., 2006, Afraz
et al., 2015, Moeller et al., 2017, Sadagopan et al., 20171. These results suggest
that these IT sub-regions are necessary for at least some basic- and subordinate-
level face recognition behaviors. However, results from direct manipulations of IT
in general visual recognition behavior have been equivocal at best. Lesions of IT
sometimes suggest the necessity of IT for visual behaviors [Cowey and Gross, 1970,
Manning, 1972, Holmes and Gross, 1984, Biederman et al., 1997, Buffalo et al., 2000]
but the resulting behavioral deficits are often contradictory (with often no lasting
visual deficits) [Dean, 1974, Huxlin et al., 2000] and at best modest (e.g. 10-15%
drop in performance for large-scale bilateral removal of IT when a complete loss of
performance would have been 40%) [Horel et al., 1987, Matsumoto et al., 2016].
Thus, it is still unclear if IT is necessary for general core object recognition behavior.
Moreover, even if IT cortex is indeed necessary for all core object recognition tasks,
it is unclear how that assumed causal role is organized. To answer these questions,
we tackle a number of specific aims, summarized below.
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1.3.3 Organization of thesis
Aim 1: Behavioral benchmark of human core object recognition behavior.
In this aim, we set out to establish systematic behavioral benchmarks on which to
test models of human object recognition. In Chapter 2, we established a scalable be-
havioral paradigm for testing the object recognition abilities of humans and monkeys
on hundreds of different object discrimination tasks. Using this behavior, we were
able to systematically benchmark the macaque monkey as a model of human visual
processing, justifying this animal model for studying high level vision. In Chapter
3, we significantly scaled up our behavioral experiments to test the limits of state-
of-the-art DCNNs. We systematically compared the behavioral responses of these
models with the behavioral responses of humans and monkeys, at the resolution of
individual images, over thousands of experimental conditions. Using high-resolution
behavioral metrics, we found that all tested ANN models significantly diverged from
primate behavior. Going forward, these high-resolution, large-scale primate behav-
ioral benchmarks could serve as direct guides for discovering better ANN models of
the primate visual system.
Aim 2: Test the causal role of IT in core object recognition behavior.
In Chapter 4, we reversibly inactivated individual, arbitrarily sampled millimeter-
scale regions of IT via local injection of muscimol while monkeys performed a battery
of binary core object discrimination tasks, interleaved trial-by-trial. First, our results
provide direct causal evidence for the role of IT in basic-level core object recognition.
Going beyond a qualitative answer, we found that inactivating different millimeter-
scale regions of primate IT resulted in different patterns of object recognition deficits,
each predicted by the local region's neuronal selectivity. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first study to demonstrate the necessity of IT cortex for a wide range
of general core object recognition behaviors with behaviorally critical topographic
organization.
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Aim 3: Novel technology for optogenetic experiments in primates
In Chapter 5, we tested a novel tool for optogenetic experiments in primates, a chroni-
cally implantable array of LEDs. Chronic tools such as this may be promising avenues
for high-throughput behavioral experiments with time-delimited perturbation of neu-
ral activity. We first characterized the LED arrays' photometric properties for use
in-vivo. Following this, we tested the LED arrays in two different behavioral experi-
ments, each testing the causal role of a visual cortical area in an established behavioral
task. Our data provide a report of preliminary findings with guides for improvements,
both technological and experimental.
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Chapter 2
Comparison of Object Recognition
Behavior in Human and Monkey
To understand the neural mechanisms underlying high-level vision in humans, it has
been necessary to study various animal models, where fine grained mechanistic access
is available. To this end, the rhesus monkey is the most widely used animal model of
human visual processing. However, it is not known if invariant visual object recogni-
tion behavior is quantitatively comparable across monkeys and humans. To address
this question, we first defined and systematically compared the object recognition
behavior of monkeys with that of humans. To date, several mammalian species have
shown promise as animal models for studying the neural mechanisms underlying high-
level visual processing in humans. In light of this diversity, making tight comparisons
between non-human and human primates is particularly critical to further the field's
goal of translating knowledge gained from animal models to humans. To the best of
our knowledge, this' is the first systematic attempt at comparing a high-level visual
behavior of humans and macaque monkeys.
1The contents of this chapter are adapted from a published journal article [Rajalingham et al.,
2015].
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2.1 Introduction
Humans are able to rapidly, accurately and effortlessly perform the computationally
difficult visual task of invariant object recognition - the ability to discriminate be-
tween different objects in the face of high variation in object viewing parameters and
background conditions [DiCarlo et al., 2012]. However, it is still unclear how the hu-
man brain supports this behavior. To uncover the neuronal mechanisms underlying
human visual processing, it has been necessary to study various animal models in-
cluding non-human primates, felines and rodents [Hubel and Wiesel, 1962, Van Essen,
1979, Zoccolan et al., 2009]. In particular, the rhesus macaque monkey, an Old World
primate that diverged from humans approximately 25 million years ago [Kumar and
Hedges, 1998], is one of the most widely used animal models of high-level human vi-
sual perception [Mishkin et al., 1983, Tanaka, 1996, Minamimoto et al., 2010, Kravitz
et al., 2011, Grill-Spector and Weiner, 2014]. There exist strong anatomical and func-
tional correspondences of visual cortical areas between humans and monkeys [Orban
et al., 2004, Mantini et al., 2012, Miranda-Dominguez et al., 20141. Thus, it has long
been assumed that high-level visual behaviors and underlying neural substrates are
comparable between monkey and human. However, humans have capacities not found
in monkeys, and their brains differ in important ways [Passingham, 2009]. To date,
the limits of the similarity in high-level visual behaviors of macaques and humans are
unknown as no effort has been made to systematically compare rhesus macaque mon-
keys with humans in invariant object recognition. In light of recent work showing that
rodent models of visual processing display the qualitative ability to perform invariant
shape discrimination [Zoccolan et al., 2009], making tight, quantitative comparisons
between monkeys and humans is especially critical in determining the best use of
non-human primates to further the field's goal of translating knowledge gained from
animal models to humans.
To do this, we here systematically compared the behavior of two macaque mon-
keys with that of normal human subjects on an invariant object recognition paradigm.
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Our goal was to make direct measurements of object recognition ability, over a very
large number of recognition tasks, always under conditions of high object view vari-
ation (a.k.a. "invariant" object recognition). We focused on "core invariant object
recognition" -rapid and reliable recognition during a single, natural viewing fixation
[DiCarlo and Cox, 2007, DiCarlo et al., 2012], operationalized as images presented in
the central 100 of the visual field for durations under 200ms. We further restricted our
behavioral domain to "basic-level" object categories, as defined by [Rosch et al., 1976].
We do not claim this to be an exhaustive characterization of all possible visual object
recognition behaviors, but rather a good starting point for that greater goal. Mon-
keys easily learn such tasks and, after testing 276 such object recognition tasks, our
results show that rhesus monkey and human behavior are largely indistinguishable,
and that both species are easily distinguishable from low-level visual representations
asked to perform the same 276 tasks. These results show that rhesus monkeys are a
very good - and perhaps quantitatively exact - model of human invariant object
recognition abilities, and they are consistent with the hypothesis that monkeys and
humans share a common neural representation that directly underlies those abilities.
2.2 Results
As motivated in the Introduction, our primary goal was to directly compare the be-
havioral abilities of humans and monkeys over a large battery of basic-level invariant
object discrimination tasks. Discrimination tasks spanned a set of 24 basic-level ob-
jects; Figure 2-1 shows a complete list of all 24 objects, with two example images
(out of hundreds) per object. Each invariant object discrimination task consisted of
a binary match-to-sample, where subjects were forced to categorize naturalistic syn-
thetic images, of objects presented under high view uncertainty and on a randomized
background, (see Figure 2-2).
In sum, the comparisons presented here (Figs. 3 and 4) are based on data obtained
from a pool of 605 human subjects (69,000 total trials) and two monkey subjects
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Figure 2-1: Two example images for each of the 24 basic-level objects, sampled from
the test set (each row corresponds to a group of eight objects). To enforce true object
recognition behavior (rather than image matching) and tackle the invariance problem,
we generated thousands of naturalistic images, each with one foreground object, by
rendering a 3D model of each object with randomly-chosen viewing parameters (2D
position, 3D rotation and viewing distance) and placing that foreground object view
onto a randomly-chosen, natural image background
(106,844 total trials; see Methods). The monkey data pool only includes behavioral
trials collected after the monkey learned all 24 objects. This corresponds to a total of
250 human behavioral trials for each of the 276 tasks, and a total of 362-417 monkey
trials for each task.
44
Human subje
Fixation ....... ..
(500mslOOms) Test Image
(looms) Choice Screen
(1000ms) Monkey M Monkey Z
Figure 2-2: Behavioral paradigm (for Monkey M). Each trial was initiated when the
monkey held gaze fixation on a central fixation point for 200ms, after which a square
test image (spanning 6 of visual angle) appeared at the center of gaze for 100ms.
Immediately after extinction of the test image, two choice images, each displaying
the canonical view of a single object with no background were shown to the left
and right (see Methods). Test and choice images are shown to scale. The monkey
was allowed to freely view the response images for up to 1500ms, and responded by
holding fixation over the selected image for 700ms. Monkey Z performed the exact
same tasks, but used touch to initiate trials and indicate its choice (see Methods).
Successful trials were rewarded with juice, and incorrect choices resulted in time-outs
of 1.5 to 2.5 seconds.
2.2.1 Learning
As described in the Methods, monkeys rapidly learned each new object. While we do
not know the humans' or the monkeys' prior lifetime experiences with these objects
or related image statistics, we reasoned that, following monkey training, both species
might be in a comparable lifetime training regime. To assess this, we examined the
effects of experience in both humans and monkeys by tracking the performance of
individual human and monkey subjects as a function of the number of exposures to
each object. Figure 2-3A,B show each monkey's performance, relative to the human
pool, when presented with 16 novel objects; both monkeys were able to reach high
performance relatively quickly (~1000 - 2000 image presentations). Figure 2-3C di-
rectly compares both monkeys to individual humans subjects on the exact same tasks
(n = 15 human subjects with sufficient longitudinal data). Unlike monkeys, individ-
ual human subjects initially behaved at a high level of performance, and exhibited no
increase in performance as a function of exposures to objects, suggesting that humans
have prior experience with similar objects.
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Figure 2-3: Performance relative to the human pool for 16 objects (shown as colored
dots; the mean over objects is shown as a solid black line) for monkey M and P. C)
Average performance relative to the human pool of two monkeys and 15 unique indi-
vidual humans subjects with sufficient longitudinal data on the same tasks (mean
SE over subjects). Monkeys rapidly learned each new object, while humans performed
at a high initial performance, and exhibited no change in performance as a function of
(unsupervised) experience with the objects. The TEST marker indicates monkeysO
relative performance on held-out test images, following all behavioral training. D)
Top panel: Generalization to novel images. Pooling data from both monkeys, the
first-trial performance of 2400 test images (mean SE) versus the corresponding
Euclidean pixel distance to the nearest training image; black line denotes linear re-
gression. The overall performance, including all subsequent exposures to test images,
is shown on the left (at zero distance). Bottom panel: Overlap between training and
test image sets. The distribution of distances of test images to the nearest trained
image is shown relative to actual training images (black line), and to OidealO gener-
alization surrogate training images (green line).
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Following training, monkeys maintained high performance when tested on novel
images of these previously learned objects (see Figure 2-3C, "TEST" marker). Im-
portantly, this generalization was immediate, with comparable high performance on
the very first trial of a new image for both monkeys. Furthermore, the generalization
performance did not depend on the similarity of test images to previously seen train-
ing images (see Figure 2-3D top panel, Methods). Indeed, monkeys maintained high
behavioral performance even for the subset of test images that were nearly as far from
the training images as they would have been if we had completely restricted training
with each single axis of variation (see Methods). Finally, subsequent exposures to
these test images did not further increase behavioral performance (see Figure 2-3D,
zero distance marker). Taken together, these results suggests that monkeys were not
simply memorizing previously learned images, and that they could generalize to sig-
nificantly different images of the same object, even when the training images only
sparsely sample the view space of the object. Importantly, while it is impossible to
guarantee or expect that humans and monkeys have identical lifetime experience, we
find that, once monkeys were trained, further experience had no observable effect on
the behavioral performance of either species.
2.2.2 Human consistency
The difficulty of each of the 276 invariant object discrimination tasks was determined
by measuring the unbiased performance (d') of monkeys/humans. That performance
metric is shown for all 276 tasks in Figure 2-4A. We refer to these data as the "pat-
tern of behavioral performance" for pooled human (605 subjects, 69,000 trials) and
pooled monkey (2 subjects, 106,844 trials). Note that these matrices are not standard
confusion matrices, but they are closely related in that they express the pairwise dif-
ficulty (confusion) of each pair of objects. Objects in Fig 2-4A have been re-ordered
based on a hierarchical clustering of human error patterns to highlight structure in
the matrix. Since difficulty is measured via unbiased performance in discriminating
pairs of objects, matrices are symmetric by construction. We noted high qualitative
47
similarities in these patterns of performance (Fig. 2-4A, compare pooled human and
pooled monkey). For example, (camel, dog) and (tank, truck) are two examples of
object pairs that are often confused by humans and monkeys alike.
Pooled Human Pooled Monkey
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Figure 2-4: Pattern of behavioral performances for the pooled human and pooled
monkey. Each 24x24 matrix summarizes confusions of all 2-way tasks: the color
of bin (i,j) indicates the unbiased performance (dO) of the binary recognition task
with objects i,j. Objects have been re-ordered based on a hierarchical clustering of
human confusion patterns to highlight structure in the matrix. We observe qualitative
similarities in the confusion patterns. For example, (camel, dog) and (tank, truck)
are two often confused object pairs in both monkeys and humans.
To quantify the similarity of these patterns of behavioral performance, we took
the "pooled human" pattern as the gold standard. We first compared the pooled mon-
key pattern by computing the noise-adjusted correlation of the 276 d' values (termed
"human-consistency" see Methods). We found this number to be 0.78 +0.007 (Figure
2-4B, top panel). Using the same human gold standard and the same methods, we
also computed the consistency of each monkey, a low-level pixel representation (Fig-
ure 2-5A, bottom panel), and computer vision representations (Figure 2-5B). Both
monkeys show patterns of confusions that are highly correlated with ''pooled human"~
confusion patterns (Monkey M: 0.80 +0.009; Monkey Z: 0.66 0.005). Importantly,
low-level visual representations do not share these patterns of behavioral performance
(pixels: 0.37 0.003; V1+: 0.52 0.004). Of the two high-performing computer vi-
sion image representations, we found that from the top layer of a state-of-the-art deep
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convolutional neural network model optimized for invariant object recognition perfor-
mance was highly predictive of human confusion patterns (CNN2013: 0.86 0.006),
in contrast to an earlier, alternative model of the ventral stream (HMAX: 0.55 0.004).
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Figure 2-5: A) Comparison of d' estimates of all 276 tasks (mean SE as estimated
by bootstrap, 100 resamples) of the pooled human with that of the pooled monkey
(top panel), and a low-level pixel representation (bottom panel). B) Quantification
of consistency as noise-adjusted correlation of d' vectors. The pooled monkey shows
patterns of confusions that are highly correlated with pooled human subject confusion
patterns ( = 0.78). Importantly, low-level visual representations do not share these
confusion patterns (pixels: 0.37; V1+: 0.52). Furthermore, a state-of-the-art deep
convolutional neural network representation was highly predictive of human confusion
patterns (CNN2013: 0.86), in contrast to an alternative model of the ventral stream
(HMAX: 0.55). The dashed lines indicate thresholds at p = 0.1,0.05 confidence for
consistency to the gold standard pooled human, estimated from pairs of individual
human subjects. C) Comparison of d' estimates of all 276 tasks (mean SE as
estimated by bootstrap, 100 resamples) between the two monkeys.
2.2.3 Natural subject-to-subject variation
While both monkeys' patterns of behavioral performance were highly consistent with
the pooled human pattern, they were not perfectly correlated (i.e. the consistency
value is not 1.0). We asked if this reflected a true species difference between human
and monkey behavior or whether it might be explained by within-species subject
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variability. To do so, 16, 16 and 12 separate MTurk subjects were recruited to char-
acterize individual human subject behavior on three groups of eight objects. Firstly,
we observed that there is significant inter-subject variability in the tested human
population; the median consistency of behavioral patterns between pairs of individ-
ual humans subjects is only 0.76. Consequently, individual human subjects are on
average not perfectly correlated with the "pooled human". Figure 2-5 shows both ab-
solute performance (percent correct) and consistency (relative to the "pooled human")
of individual human subjects, individual monkeys, and low-level machine features on
the three tested groups of eight objects. Note that these data account for only 30%
(3*28/276) of all tasks presented in Figure 2-4. The solid and dashed line indicate
the mean SD performance/consistency of individual human subject population; for
the three groups of eight objects, the mean consistency ( SD) of individual human
subjects were 0.74 0.18, 0.77 0.11, 0.68 0.18. Importantly, this variability is
sufficiently small to reject some representations. Indeed, low-level visual representa-
tions that model the retina and primary visual cortex fall outside the distribution of
consistency over human subjects for two out of three groups of objects (Figure 2-5;
V1+: p = 0.30, 0.03, 0.03; pixels: p = 0.17,0.02, 0.03; Fisher's exact test for the three
groups of objects respectively). However, both monkeys remain statistically indistin-
guishable from individual human subjects in their consistency to the "pooled human"
(monkey M: p = 0.4, 0.21, 0.22; monkey Z: p = 0.16, 0.22, 0.27 for the three groups;
Fisher's exact test). Additionally, the CNN2013 model could not be falsified in any of
the three groups of objects (p = 0.38, 0.35, 0.36 for the three groups of objects respec-
tively) while HMAX was rejected in one of the three groups (p = 0.26, 0.07, < 0.01
respectively).
We next asked whether inter-subject variability might also explain the imperfect
consistency of the pooled monkey relative to the "pooled human" (see Figure 2-4C).
To account for the small sample size of monkeys (n = 2), we randomly sampled pairs
of individual human subjects, and measured the consistency relative to the "pooled
human" of their pooled behavioral data. This process was repeated 50 times for each
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Figure 2-6: Accounting for inter-subject variability. For each of three groups of eight
objects, the absolute performance and consistency of individual human subjects, in-
dividual monkeys, and machine features are shown. Error bars for consistency rela-
tive to pooled human (mean t SD) are shown for individual monkeys and machine
features for each group (error bars for monkeys are not visible in object group 2
due to small variability). The shaded grey areas indicate the distribution of perfor-
mance/consistency over individual human subjects (mean i SD). There is significant
inter-subject variability: individual human subjects are on average not perfectly cor-
related with the pooled human (average consistency 0.74, 0.77, 0.68 for the three
groups). As a result, monkeys are statistically indistinguishable from individual hu-
man subjects in their correlation to the human pool. In contrast, low-level visual
representations were falsified on both performance and consistency grounds for two
out of three groups of objects.
of the three groups of eight objects to obtain a distribution of consistency of n = 2
pooled human subjects. Figure 2-4C shows the p = 0.1 and p = 0.05 confidence
thresholds of this distribution (dashed lines). The pooled monkey cannot be rejected
relative to this distribution, i.e. the pooled monkey's patterns of performance are
statistically indistinguishable from patterns of similarly sampled pools of human sub-
jects.
We also estimated biases in object confusion patterns using the criterion index c
(see Methods). We found this measure was significantly less replicable across subjects:
the median consistency of bias (c) between pairs of individual humans subjects was
0.40, compared to 0.76 for consistency of unbiased performance (d'), suggesting that
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biases are significantly less meaningful behavioral signatures on which to compare
humans and monkeys.
2.3 Discussion
Previous work has revealed quantitative similarity of humans and macaque mon-
key behavior in low-level visual behaviors [De Valois et al., 1974a, De Valois et al.,
1974b, Vogels and Orban, 1990, Vazquez et al., 2000, Kiorpes et al., 2008, Gagin et al.,
2014], suggesting that an understanding of the neural mechanisms underlying those
tasks in macaques will directly translate to humans. However, such correspondences
for high-level visual behaviors such as view-invariant object recognition have not been
demonstrated. While many studies have shown that monkeys can learn to perform
tasks based on object shape [Mishkin et al., 1983, Minamimoto et al., 2010, Okamura
et al., 2014], this is taken by some as evidence of the powerful learning abilities of
monkeys in experimenter-chosen tasks, rather than a tight correspondence with hu-
mans in their behavioral patterns in object discrimination abilities. In this study, we
systematically compared the basic-level core object recognition behavior of two rhe-
sus macaque monkeys with that of human subjects. Our results show that monkeys
not only match human performance, but show a pattern of object confusion that
is highly correlated with "pooled human" confusion patterns, and that individual
monkey subjects are statistically indistinguishable from the population of individual
human subjects. Importantly, these shared patterns of basic-level object confusions
are not shared with low-level visual representations (pixels, Vl+).
We characterized average human population and individual human subject be-
havior using high-throughput online psychophysics on Amazon's Mechanical Turk
system. This method allowed us to efficiently gather datasets of otherwise unattain-
able sizes, and has previously been validated by comparing results obtained from
online and in-lab psychophysical experiments [Crump et al., 2013]. In particular,
patterns of behavioral performance on object recognition tasks from in-lab and on-
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line subjects were equally reliable and virtually identical [Majaj et al., 2015]. While
we did not impose experimental constraints on subjects' acuity, and we can only in-
fer likely gaze position, the observed high performance and highly reliable confusion
patterns suggest that this sacrifice in exact experimental control is a good trade off
for the very large number of tasks (276) that could be tested.
We characterized monkey object recognition behavior from two subjects using
two different effector systems. This modest sample size is typical for systems neu-
roscience experiments, given the cost and difficulty of monkey psychophysics. As a
result, it is unclear whether the differences observed between monkeys (consistency
between monkeys: 0.80) reflect true inter-subject variability, or are due to differences
in effector system. Monkey Z's overall performance (83.4%) was lower than monkey
M's (89.2%) and, for an equal number of confusions, confusion patterns from monkey
Z were significantly less reliable than those from monkey M (p < 0.001, two-sample t-
test). These differences suggest additional variance ("noise") in monkey Z's behavioral
data, potentially due to less gaze control than monkey Z, that may partly account
for the differences in behavioral patterns between monkeys. However, this additional
behavioral variance did not significantly impact the result; each monkey subject was
highly correlated with the human pool, and statistically indistinguishable from indi-
vidual humans.
Additionally, it is possible that we failed to observe a significant difference be-
tween monkeys and humans due to a lack of statistical power from a sample of just
two monkeys. In principle, one cannot prove that there is absolutely no difference
between monkeys and humans, as ever-increasing power would be required for the
testing of an ever-smaller proposed difference. Here, we showed that our behavioral
tests do have sufficient power to falsify other models (pixels, V1+) as matching hu-
man core object recognition behavior, but failed to falsify monkeys as a model of that
domain of human behavior. Testing additional monkeys on this behavioral domain,
or additional behavioral tests beyond this domain may, in principle, reveal differences
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between monkey and human object recognition behavior.
We argue that the observed results are not due to overtraining of animals. Mon-
keys were trained using a standard operant conditioning paradigm to report object
identity in visual images. Objects were novel to monkeys prior to behavioral train-
ing. When presented with these novel objects, monkeys were able to reach high-level
performance relatively quickly (see Figure 2-3A-C). Furthermore, by sampling from a
large pool of images, we were able to ensure that monkeys were exposed to any given
image at most once per behavioral session on average. Finally, we collected behavioral
data on a set of held-out images (test set, 100 images/object) after monkeys were fully
trained to criterion on all tasks. Importantly, both monkeys successfully generalized
to these new images of previously learned objects; performance on the very first trial
of a new image was high for both monkeys (Monkey M: 88%, Monkey Z: 85%), and
the first-trial performance was not predicted by the similarity of test images to pre-
viously seen training images (see Figure 2-3D). As a result, the measured patterns
of behavioral performance reflect the monkeys' ability to discriminate between pairs
of basic-level objects, rather than memorized or overtrained behavior. Importantly,
humans, while not explicitly trained on these images, likely get significant prior ex-
perience with similar objects over the course of their lifetimes. We observed that
individual humans perform at a high initial performance, and exhibit no change in
performance as a function of (unsupervised) exposure to objects (see Figure 2-3C),
suggesting that humans are already well "trained" on these tasks. In sum, while it is
impossible to guarantee or expect that humans and monkeys have identical lifetime
experience, we find that, once monkeys were trained, further experience has little to
no effect on the patterns of behavioral performance of either species. We note that
this does not imply that monkeys and humans learn new objects at a similar rate,
only that their steady state patterns of behavior are highly comparable.
Object categories consisted of basic-level objects with a single object instance (a
single 3D model) per category. Consequently, our results do not speak to monkeys'
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ability to generalize across multiple object instances within semantic categories, but
are instead constrained to judgments of visual similarity of 3D objects. Species dif-
ferences at the category level are possible. Similarly, past studies have debated about
differences in the specificity of the "face-inversion effect" between macaque monkeys
and chimpanzees/humans [Bruce, 1982, Vermeire and Hamilton, 1998, Parr, 20111.
Our results do not rule out the possibility of such species differences for subordinate
level object recognition behaviors. Future work with semantic object categories or
subordinate-level object recognition tasks would thus be important for discerning the
limits of the species comparison over all of object recognition behavior.
The observed similarities in monkey and human object recognition behavior are
consistent with comparative functional imaging of macaque and human brains that
reveal strong species homologies of visual cortical areas [Orban et al., 2004], particu-
larly object-selective regions, based on activity correlations [Mantini et al., 2012] and
connectivity [Miranda-Dominguez et al., 20141. While strict anatomical homologies
may be imperfect due to evolution-driven reorganization, functional measures reveal
a near-perfect conservation of the ventral visual stream, a hierarchy of visual cortical
areas thought to directly underlie object recognition behavior, between macaque mon-
key and human [Mantini et al., 2012]. In particular, the neuronal representations of
object categories in the end-stage of the ventral stream are matched between monkey
and human [Kriegeskorte et al., 2008]. Taken together, the anatomical, physiological
and behavioral similarities between monkeys and humans are consistent with the hy-
pothesis that monkeys and humans share similar neural representations underlying
the visual perception of basic-level objects.
Recent advances in machine learning have uncovered high-performing representa-
tions for object recognition using deep convolutional neural network models [LeCun
et al., 2015]. Interestingly, these computational models rival the primate brain for
core object recognition behavior [Cadieu et al., 2014] and accurately predict neural
responses of high-level visual cortical representations of monkey [Yamins et al., 2014]
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and humans [Khaligh-Razavi and Kriegeskorte, 2014]. Here, we report that monkey
and human behavioral patterns were well predicted by a state-of-the-art deep convo-
lutional neural network model (CNN2013), in contrast to alternative models of the
ventral stream (HMAX) and low-level control models (pixels, V1+). Taken together,
these results suggest that current high-performing deep convolutional neural network
models may accurately capture the shared representation that directly underlies core
basic-level object recognition in both humans and monkeys.
To conclude, systematic comparisons of animal model and human behavior are, to
date, largely lacking in the domain of invariant visual object recognition. Here, we in-
vestigated whether this behavior is quantitatively comparable across rhesus monkeys
and humans. Our results show that monkeys and humans are statistically indistin-
guishable on a large battery of basic-level visual object recognition tasks, suggesting
that rhesus monkeys and humans may share a neural "shape" representation that di-
rectly underlies object perception, and supporting the use of the monkey as a closely
matched model system for studying ventral stream visual processing and object rep-
resentation in humans.
2.4 Methods
2.4.1 Visual images
We examined "basic-level" object recognition behavior by generating images of a set
of 64 objects that we previously found to be highly reliably labeled by independent
human subjects, based on the definition proposed by [Rosch et al., 1976]. From this
set, three groups of eight objects were sampled for this study; the selection of these
24 objects was random, but biased towards groups of objects which exhibited reli-
able confusion patterns in humans (see Fig. 1 for a full list of those 24 basic-level
objects). To enforce true object recognition behavior (rather than image matching),
several thousand naturalistic images, each with one foreground object, were generated
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by rendering a 3D model of each object with randomly-chosen viewing parameters
(2D position, 3D rotation and viewing distance) and placing that foreground object
view onto a randomly-chosen, natural image background. To do this, each object
was first assigned a canonical position (center of gaze), scale (~ 20) and pose, and
then its viewing parameters were randomly sampled uniformly from the following
ranges for object translation ([-3, 3]' in both h and v), rotation ([-180, 180]' in
all three axes) and scale ([xO.7, x1.7]. Backgrounds images were sampled randomly
from 3D HDR images of indoor and outdoor scenes obtained from Dosch Design
(www.doschdesign.com). As a result, these images require any visual recognition sys-
tem (human, animal or model) to tackle the "invariance problem," the computational
crux of object recognition, as it is highly challenging for low-level visual representa-
tions [Ullman and Humphreys, 1996, Pinto et al., 2008]. Using this procedure, we
generated 2400 "test" images (100 images per object) at 1024x1024 pixel resolution
with 256-level grayscale and with square apertures for human psychophysics, monkey
psychophysics and model evaluation. A separate set of 4800 "training" images (200
images per object) were generated with the same procedure with circular apertures
to initially train the monkeys. Figure 2-1 shows example test images for each of the
24 basic-level objects.
To quantify the overlap between training and test image sets, we computed the
pixel Euclidean distance of each test image to the nearest training image of the
same object. For this analysis, training and test images were re-rendered on gray
backgrounds to measure background-independent distances, and resized to 64 x 64
pixel resolution. The resulting distance distribution was compared to that computed
from simulated "ideal" generalization conditions. We rendered six different surrogate
training image sets, each with identical generative parameters to the background-less
training images except for one of the six viewpoint parameters held at its mean value.
These sparsely sampled training images simulated six different experimental condi-
tions wherein subjects would not have been exposed to variations in one parameter
during the training stage, but later tested on full variation images. From these newly
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generated training images, we computed the corresponding "ideal" pixel Euclidean
distances of each test image to the nearest training image of the same object. We
found that the distribution of background-independent distances of actual test images
from actual training image sets was only slightly less than the corresponding distribu-
tion across the simulated ideal generalization conditions (3.4% and 3.7% increase in
median and maximum distances respectively for the simulated conditions; see Figure
2-3D, bottom panel). This suggests that our 4800 training images did not sample
the image space too "densely", but rather of comparable sparsity as if we had entirely
held back particular types of viewpoint variations.
2.4.2 Human Behavior
All human behavioral data presented here were collected from 638 human subjects
on Amazon's Mechanical Turk (MTurk) performing 276 interleaved, basic-level, in-
variant, core object recognition tasks. Each task consisted of a binary discrimination
between pairs of objects from the 24 objects considered. Subjects were instructed
to report the identity of the foreground object in each presented image, from two
given choices. Because those two choices were provided after the test image and all
276 tasks were randomly interleaved (trial-by-trial), subjects could not deploy feature
attentional strategies specific to each task to process the test images. Each trial ini-
tiated with a central black point for 500ms, followed by 100ms presentation of a test
image. The test image contained one foreground object presented under high varia-
tion in viewing parameters and overlaid on a random background, as described in the
Visual Images section (above). Immediately after extinction of the test image, two
choice images, each displaying a single object in a canonical view with no background,
were shown to the left and right. One of these two objects was always the same as
the object that generated the test image (i.e. the correct choice), and its location
(left or right) was randomly chosen on each trial. After mouse clicking on one of the
choice images, the subject was given another fixation point before the next stimulus
appeared. No feedback was given; subjects were never explicitly trained on the tasks.
Under assumptions of typical computer ergonomics, we estimate that images were
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presented at 6 - 8' of visual angle in size, and response images were presented at
6 - 8' of eccentricity.
The online Mechanical Turk platform enables efficient collection of reliable, large-
scale psychophysical data, and has been validated by comparing results obtained from
online and in-lab psychophysical experiments [Crump et al., 2013]. In particular, a
previous study from our group directly compared the patterns of behavioral perfor-
mance on invariant object recognition tasks of in-lab and online subjects. In brief,
human subjects were tested in a controlled in-lab setting on eight-alternative forced
choice core object recognition tasks, at both basic and subordinate levels. A total of
10, 15, and 22 subjects each performed 600 trials of basic-level object categorization,
car identification and face identification tasks respectively. Pooling trials from all
subjects, the in-lab human behavioral data was highly reliable ( = 0.95 0.024;
median SE). A separate set of 104 human subjects from Amazon's Mechanical Turk
performed trials of the same tasks, resulting in similarly reliable pooled online human
data (p = 0.97 0.023; median SE). Accounting for noise, the behavioral patterns
of in-lab and online human subjects were virtually identical ( = 0.98, see Analysis
section) [Majaj et al., 2015], supporting the use of MTurk for characterizing human
core object recognition behaviors. Following the methods of that prior work, we here
did not perform eye tracking of online human subjects to measure or control their
gaze. Instead, subjects were cued to the location of image presentation with a fixation
cue. Subjects detected as obviously guessing were banned from further experiments
and the corresponding data were excluded from further analyses (less than 1% of
subjects were eliminated). To do this, we quantified this guessing behavior using a
choice entropy metric, which measured how well a subject's current trial response
was predicted by the previous trial response. For all remaining subjects, we did not
observe any significant differences in performance between the first and last halves
of behavioral trials (p = 0.49, t-test), suggesting subjects did not undergo substan-
tial learning. Overall, subjects achieved high performance on all behavioral tasks
(88.35% 5.6%, mean SD, n = 276 tasks).
59
Most of the human psychophysical subjects were used to characterize "pooled
human" behavior. Specifically, data from 605 MTurk subjects each performing a rel-
atively small number of trials (mean of 114 trials/subject) were aggregated to obtain
a highly reliable estimate of "pooled human" object recognition performance on each
task. Each subject only performed a subset of the tasks (mean of 67 tasks/subject).
All trials of all of these subjects (69,000 trials in total, 250 trials/task) were pooled
together to characterize "pooled human" behavior.
A separate set of human subjects was used to characterize the variability in in-
dividual human subject behavior. Specifically, these MTurk subjects performed a
relatively large number of trials of binary object recognition tasks over groups of only
eight of the 24 objects (note: 8 objects generates 28 unique binary tasks). Each
individual human subject performed trials for all of those 28 tasks. To ensure that
sufficiently many trials were collected from each individual subject for reliable mea-
surement of his or her pattern of behavioral performance, we used a pre-determined
criterion for reliability, defined as split-half internal consistency (see Analysis section)
significantly greater than 0.5 (p < 0.05, one-tailed t-test). We then attempted to re-
peatedly recruit each subject until his or her total pool of data reached this reliability
criterion. Of 80 unique subjects that performed this task, 33 were successfully re-
recruited a sufficient number of times to reach the reliability criterion on at least one
group of objects (five of these subjects performed tasks in two different groups, and
three subjects performed in all three groups). In total, we collected data from 16, 16,
and 12 subjects for each of three groups of eight objects (mean of 3,003 trials/subject
within each group).
Humans, while not explicitly trained on these images, likely get extensive expe-
rience with similar objects over the course of their lifetime. To investigate the effect
of experimental experience on behavior, we measured the performance of individual
human subjects as a function of the number of presentations per object. To allow di-
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rect comparison with monkeys, this analysis was constrained to the 16 objects in the
second and third groups for which corresponding monkey "training" data were also
available. Figure 2-3C shows the relative performance, quantified as a Turing ratio
(human subject one-versus-all d'), of individual humans subjects with sufficienthuman pool
longitudinal data on these tasks (defined as >150 trials/object, 15 unique human
subjects). We observe that individual humans perform at a high initial performance,
and exhibit no change in performance as a function of (unsupervised) experience with
the objects, suggesting that humans are already well trained on these tasks.
2.4.3 Monkey Training and Behavior
Monkey behavioral data on the exact same object recognition tasks were collected
from two adult male rhesus macaque monkeys (Macaca mulatta) weighing 6 kg (mon-
key M) and 12 kg (monkey Z). All procedures were performed in compliance with
National Institutes of Health guidelines and the standards of the MIT Committee on
Animal Care and the American Physiological Society. To ensure that our behavioral
tests were tapping a sensory representation (i.e. did not depend on the reporting
effector), we tested one monkey (M) using saccade reports (gaze tracking) and the
other monkey (Z) using reaching reports (touch screen).
Monkey M: Prior to behavioral training, a surgery using sterile technique was
performed under general anesthesia to implant a titanium head post to the skull.
Following head-post implant surgery, Monkey M was trained on a match-to-sample
paradigm under head fixation and using gaze as the reporting effector. Eye position
was monitored by tracking the position of the pupil using a camera-based system (SR
Research Eyelink II). Images were presented on a 24" LCD monitor (1920 x 1080 at
60 Hz; Acer GD235HZ) positioned 42.5 cm in front of the animal. At the start of each
training session, the subject performed an eye-tracking calibration task by saccading
to a range of spatial targets and maintaining fixation for 800 ms. Calibration was
repeated if drift was noticed over the course of the session. Figure 2-2B illustrates the
behavioral paradigm. Each trial was initiated when the monkey acquired and held
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gaze fixation on a central fixation point for 200ms, after which a test image appeared
at the center of gaze for 100ms. Trials were aborted if gaze was not held within 20.
After extinction of the test image, two choice images, each displaying a single object
in a canonical view with no background, were immediately shown to the left and right
(each centered at 60 of eccentricity along the horizontal meridian; see Fig. IB). One
of these two objects was always the same as the object that generated the test image
(i.e. the correct choice), and its location (left or right) was randomly chosen on each
trial. The monkey was allowed to freely view the choice images for up to 1500ms,
and indicated its final choice by holding fixation over the selected image for 700ms.
During initial training, the monkey typically visually explored both objects before
making a selection, but quickly transitioned to selecting its choice covertly in that it
often directed its first saccade in the direction of the final choice.
Monkey Z performed the same task using a touch screen - other than the dif-
ferences noted below, the task was identical to Monkey M. Monkey Z underwent no
surgical procedures, and was instead seated head-free in front of a 15" LCD touch-
screen (1024 x 768 at 60 Hz, ELO Touch 1537L) at a distance of 34.2cm. The subject
interacted with the task by touching the screen with his left hand through an opening
in the primate chair. Monkey Z initiated each trial by touching a fixation point 40
below the center of the screen for 250 ms, which triggered the presentation of the
test image at the center of the screen (i.e. this ensured that the hand and finger
rising from below did not occlude any of the test image). After the appearance of the
choice images, the monkey indicated its choice by touching the selected image. Gaze
was not controlled or measured in Monkey Z, but we instead assumed that touch
point acquisition would correspond to gaze being directed at the screen. Because
the test image screen location was fixed over trials and the test image content was
required for successful reward, we assumed that the animal's gaze would be reliably
directed at the center of each test image. This assumption is supported by the finding
that Monkey Z showed a very similar pattern of performance as Monkey M (Fig. 3D).
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The images were sized so that they subtended 6 x 6' for each monkey. Realtime
experiments for all monkey psychophysics were controlled by open-source software
(MWorks Project http://mworks-project.org/). Animals were rewarded with small
juice rewards for successfully completing each trial, and received time-outs of 1.5 to
2.5 seconds for incorrect choices. Animals were trained to work with each group of
eight objects to criterion, defined as a stable pattern of behavioral performance over
at least four behavioral sessions, before moving on to the next group. For the first
group, both monkeys were exposed to images with gradually increasing variation in
viewing parameters (pose, position and viewing distance) over several behavioral ses-
sions. For each subsequent group of eight objects, animals were immediately exposed
to full variation images, and reached high performance in 1000-2000 image presen-
tations per object (~10 - 15 behavioral sessions). Figure 2-3 shows the monkeys'
performance relative to the human pool, quantified as a Turing ratio ( d' pmonkey
human pool'
one-versus-all d'), for each of these 16 objects. When presented with these novel
objects, monkeys were able to reach high-level performance relatively quickly (see
Figure 2-3A,B). Following training of all binary tasks in each group of eight objects,
animals were trained to criterion on the remaining pairs of objects. Once animals
reached criterion on all 276 possible binary object recognition tasks, complete be-
havioral data was collected in a fully-interleaved manner, first using training images
and subsequently switching to held-out test images. Importantly, monkeys immedi-
ately generalized to new images of previously learned objects, with comparable high
performance on the very first trial of a new image for both monkeys (Monkey M:
88%, Monkey Z: 85%). Furthermore, the monkeys' performance on the first trial
of novel test images was not dependent on the test image's similarity to previously
seen training images (see Methods - Visual Images section). We observed no sig-
nificant negative correlation between first-trial performance of test images and their
background-independent distance to the nearest training images (r = 0.036, p = 0.07
and r = 0.010, p = 0.63 for monkey M and Z respectively), as shown in the top
panel of Figure 2-3D (mean SE, pooling both monkeys). Subsequent exposures to
these test images did not further increase behavioral performance (Figure 2-3D, zero
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distance marker). Taken together, this suggests that monkeys did not rely simply on
the similarity to previously seen images. Furthermore, the object confusion patterns
were found to be largely independent of the image set; the consistency (computed as
a noise-adjusted correlation, see Analysis section) between confusion patterns of the
training and test image sets was = 0.9566 0.0253 and 0.9489 0.0157 (mean
SD, for monkey M and Z respectively). Thus, complete behavioral data collected in a
fully interleaved manner from both images sets were pooled. A total of 106,844 trials
were collected from both monkeys (51,096 from Monkey M and 55,748 from Monkey
Z) and used for the analyses below.
2.4.4 Machine Behavior
We tested different machine systems on our 276 tasks by computing each machine's
feature population output for each of our images, and using trained classifiers to make
behavioral choices based on the test images.
Low-level visual representations of pixel and V1+ [Pinto et al., 2008] features
were used as control models. These features approximate the representations of the
retina and primary visual cortex respectively. High-performing feature representa-
tions from state-of-the-art computer vision models were also tested for comparison.
HMAX ([Riesenhuber and Poggio, 1999, Serre et al., 20071 is a model inspired by the
tolerance and selectivity properties of the ventral visual stream. We used the publicly
available FHLib implementation [Mutch and Lowe, 2008]. We trained the model on
5760 synthetic images of 3D objects drawn from eight natural categories (animals,
boats, cars, chairs, faces, fruits, planes and tables; see [Yamins et al., 2014] that did
not overlap with the 24 objects used in this study. CNN2013 refers to a model based
on a state-of-the-art deep convolutional neural network model [Zeiler and Fergus,
2014]. Using an architecture and learning parameters based on [Zeiler and Fergus,
2014], we trained a deep convolutional neural network for 15 epochs on images drawn
from the ImageNet 2013 challenge set, adjusting the learning rate in accordance with
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the heuristics described in this publication. We used a publicly available implemen-
tation [Wan et al., 2013], itself based on CudaConvnet [Krizhevsky et al., 20121 that
allowed for dropout regularization. Training the model took two weeks on a Tesla
K40 GPU, provided by NVIDIA.
For each machine representation, features were extracted from the same images
that were presented to humans and monkeys. As with humans and monkeys, each
machine representation was tested on the same 276 interleaved binary object recogni-
tion tasks. For each machine feature representation, performance on each binary task
was measured using two-fold cross validation using a maximum correlation classifier,
repeated 50 times over permutations of classifier training and testing data partitions.
2.4.5 Analysis
Behavioral metric and behavioral consistency
For each of the 276 binary object recognition tasks, we estimated an unbiased mea-
sure of performance using a sensitivity index d' [Macmillan, 1993]: d' = Z(HitRate) -
Z(FalseAlarmRate), where Z(.) is the inverse of the cumulative Gaussian distribu-
tion. Hit rates and false alarm rates were computed at the resolution of objects,
pooling over all trials and images of each object. All d' estimates were constrained
to a range of [0,5]. Bias was estimated using a criterion index c [Macmillan, 19931:
c = 0.5 * (Z(HitRate) + Z(FalseAlarmRate)). We here refer to the 276-dimensional
vector of d' values over all binary object recognition tasks as the "pattern of behav-
ioral performance" (b).
The reliability (a.k.a. internal consistency) of behavioral data was computed as
the Spearman correlation between patterns of behavioral performance patterns com-
puted on separate halves of the data (random split-halves of trials); this process was
repeated across 100 draws. Since this estimate is measured using only half of the
data, the Spearman-Brown prediction formula [Brown, 1910, Spearman, 1910] was
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applied to allow for comparisons to correlations measured using all trials.
Consistency between different behavioral patterns bl, b2 was then computed as a
noise-adjusted rank correlation between patterns of behavioral performances (d' or c
vectors):
-~ Pbl,b2
VPbl,bl X Pb2,b2
where Pbl,b2 is the raw Spearman rank correlation, and Pbl,bl, Pb2,b2 are the Spearman-
Brown corrected internal consistency estimates of each behavioral pattern. Our ra-
tionale for using a noise-adjusted correlation measure for consistency is to account
for variance in the behavioral patterns that arises from "noise", i.e. variability that is
not replicable by stimulus object identity [DiCarlo and Johnson, 1999, Johnson et al.,
2002]. We obtained a distribution of consistency values using the 100 resampled esti-
mates of internal consistencies of each behavioral pattern (i.e. from the 100 random
draws of split-halves of trials of bi, b2).
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Chapter 3
Comparison of visual object
recognition behavior of humans,
monkeys, and state-of-the-art deep
artificial neural networks
A primary neuroscience goal is to uncover neuron-level mechanistic models that quan-
titatively explain this behavior by predicting primate performance for each and every
image. Recently, specific feed-forward deep convolutional artificial neural networks
(ANNs) models have dramatically advanced our quantitative understanding of the
neural mechanisms underlying primate core object recognition. In this work', we
tested the limits of those ANNs by systematically comparing the behavioral responses
of these models with the behavioral responses of humans and monkeys, at the res-
olution of individual images. Using these high-resolution metrics, we found that
all tested ANN models significantly diverged from primate behavior. Going forward,
these high-resolution, large-scale primate behavioral benchmarks could serve as direct
guides for discovering better ANN models of the primate visual system.
'The contents of this chapter are adapted from a journal article in preparation [Rajalingham
et al., 2018].
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3.1 Introduction
Primates-both human and non-human--can typically recognize objects in visual
images at a glance, even in the face of naturally occurring identity-preserving trans-
formations such as changes in viewpoint. This view-invariant visual object recognition
ability is thought to be supported primarily by the primate ventral visual stream [Di-
Carlo et al., 2012]. A primary neuroscience goal is to construct computational models
that quantitatively explain the neural mechanisms underlying this ability. That is, our
goal is to discover artificial neural networks (ANNs) that accurately predict neuronal
firing rate responses at all levels of the ventral stream and its behavioral output. To
this end, specific models within a large family of deep, convolutional neural networks
(DCNNs), optimized by supervised training on large-scale category-labeled image-
sets (ImageNet) to match human-level categorization performance [Krizhevsky et al.,
2012, LeCun et al., 2015], have been put forth as the leading ANN models of the
ventral stream [Yamins and DiCarlo, 2016]. We refer to this sub-family as DCNNrc
models (IC to denote ImageNet-categorization pre-training), so as to distinguish them
from all possible models in the DCNN family, and more broadly, from the super-family
of all ANNs. To date, it has been shown that DCNNIC models display internal feature
representations similar to neuronal representations along the primate ventral visual
stream [Yamins et al., 2014, Cadieu et al., 2014, Khaligh-Razavi and Kriegeskorte,
2014], and they exhibit behavioral patterns similar to the behavioral patterns of pair-
wise object confusions of primates [Rajalingham et al., 2015]. Thus, DCNNIc models
may provide a quantitative account of the neural mechanisms underlying primate core
object recognition behavior.
However, several studies have shown that DCNNIC models can diverge drastically
from humans in object recognition behavior, especially with regards to particular im-
ages optimized to be adversarial to these networks [Goodfellow et al., 2014, Nguyen
et al., 2015]. Related work has shown that specific image distortions are dispropor-
tionately challenging to current DCNNs, as compared to humans [RichardWebster
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et al., 2016, Dodge and Karam, 2017, Geirhos et al., 2017, Hosseini et al., 20171.
Such image-specific failures of the current ANN models would likely not be captured
by "object-level" behavioral metrics (e.g. the pattern of pairwise object confusions
mentioned above) that are computed by pooling over hundreds of images and thus are
not sensitive to variation in difficulty across images of the same object. To overcome
this limitation of prior work, we here aimed to use scalable behavioral testing meth-
ods to precisely characterize primate behavior at the resolution of individual images
and to directly compare leading DCNN models to primates over the domain of core
object recognition behavior at this high resolution.
We focused on core invariant object recognition-the ability to identify objects
in visual images in the central visual field during a single, natural viewing fixation
[DiCarlo et al., 2012]. We further restricted our behavioral domain to basic-level
object discriminations, as defined previously [Rosch et al., 19761. Within this domain,
we collected large-scale, high-resolution measurements of human and monkey behavior
(over a million behavioral trials) using high-throughput psychophysical techniques-
including a novel home-cage behavioral system for monkeys. These data enabled us
to systematically compare all systems at progressively higher resolution. At lower
resolutions, we replicated previous findings that humans, monkeys, and DCNNIC
models all share a common pattern of object-level confusion [Rajalingham et al.,
2015]. However, at the higher resolution of individual images, we found that the
behavior of all tested DCNNIc models was significantly different from human and
monkey behavior, and this model prediction failure could not be easily rescued by
simple model modifications. These results show that current DCNNIc models do not
fully account for the image-level behavioral patterns of primates, suggesting that new
ANN models are needed to more precisely capture the neural mechanisms underlying
primate object vision. To this end, large-scale high-resolution behavioral benchmarks,
such as those obtained here, could serve as a strong top-down constraint for efficiently
discovering such models.
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3.2 Results
Test Image
(looms)
n=1472 human subjects
Human Behavior (Mechanical Turk)
InputImage
Model Behavior
Choice Screen
(1000ms)
ArduinoJuice reward tube
Tablt n=5 monkey subjects
Monkey Behavior (Monkey-Turk)
Linear classifier
Feature Output Class
Representation Probability
Figure 3-1: Time course of example behavioral trial (zebra versus dog) for human
psychophysics. Human behavior was measured using the online Amazon MTurk plat-
form, which enabled the rapid collection over 1 million behavioral trials from 1472
human subjects. Monkey behavior was measured using a novel custom home-cage be-
havioral system (MonkeyTurk), which leveraged a web-based behavioral task running
on a tablet to test many monkey subjects simultaneously in their home environment.
DCNN models were tested on the same images and tasks as those presented to hu-
mans and monkeys by extracting features from the penultimate layer of each visual
system model and training back-end multi-class logistic regression classifiers.
In the present work, we systematically compared the basic level core object recognition
behavior of primates and state-of-the-art artificial neural network models using a se-
ries of behavioral metrics ranging from low to high resolution within a two-alternative
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forced choice match-to-sample paradigm. The behavior of each visual system, whether
biological or artificial, was tested on the same 2400 images (24 objects, 100 im-
ages/object) in the same 276 interleaved binary object recognition tasks (see Figure
3-1). Each system's behavior was characterized at multiple resolutions (see Behav-
ioral metrics and signatures in Methods) and directly compared to the corresponding
behavioral metric applied on the archetypal human (defined as the average behavior
of a large pool of human subjects tested; see Methods). The overarching logic of this
study was that, if two visual systems are equivalent, they should produce statistically
indistinguishable behavioral signatures with respect to these metrics. Specifically,
our goal was to compare the behavioral signatures of visual system models with the
corresponding behavioral signatures of primates.
3.2.1 Object-level behavioral comparison
We first examined the pattern of one-versus-all object-level behavior (termed "B.01
metric") computed across all images and possible distractors. Since we tested 24
objects here, the B.01 signature was 24 dimensional. Figure 3-2A shows the B.01
signatures for the pooled human (pooling n=1472 human subjects), pooled monkey
(pooling n-5 monkey subjects), and several DCNNJC models as 24-dimensional vec-
tors using a color scale. Each element of the vector corresponds to the system's
discriminability of one object against all others that were tested (i.e. all other 23
objects). The color scales span each signature's full performance range, and warm
colors indicate lower discriminability. For example, red indicates that the tested vi-
sual system found the object corresponding to that element of the vector to be very
challenging to discriminate from other objects (on average over all 23 discrimination
tests, and on average over all images). Figure 3-2B directly compares the B.01 sig-
natures computed from the behavioral output of two visual system models-a pixel
model (top panel) and a DCNNIc model (Inception-v3, bottom panel)-against that
of the human B.01 signature. We observe a tighter correspondence to the human
behavioral signature for the DCNNIc model visual system than for the baseline pixel
model visual system. We quantified that similarity using a noise-adjusted correlation
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(A) One-versus-all object-level (B.01) signatures for the pooled hu-
man (n=1472 human subjects), pooled monkey (n=5 monkey subjects), and several
DCNNIc models. Each B.01 signature is shown as a 24-dimensional vector using a
color scale; each colored bin corresponds to the system's discriminability of one object
against all others that were tested. The color scales span each signature's full perfor-
mance range, and warm colors indicate lower discriminability. (B) Direct comparison
of the B.01 signatures of a pixel visual system model (top panel) and a DCNNIc
visual system model (Inception-v3, bottom panel) against that of the human B.01
signature. (C) Human-consistency of B.01 signatures, for each of the tested model
visual systems. The black and gray dots correspond to a held-out pool of five human
subjects and a pool of five macaque monkey subjects respectively. The shaded area
corresponds to the primate zone, a range of consistencies delimited by the estimated
human-consistency of a pool of infinitely many monkeys.
between each pair of B.01 signatures (termed human-consistency, following (Johnson
et al., 2002]; the noise adjustment means that a visual system that is identical to
the human pool will have an expected human-consistency score of 1.0, even if it has
irreducible trial-by-trial stochasticity; see Methods). Figure 3-2C shows the B.01
human-consistency for each of the tested model visual systems. We additionally
tested the behavior of a held-out pool of five human subjects (black dot) and a pool
of five macaque monkey subjects (gray dot), and we observed that both yielded B.01
signatures that were highly human-consistent (human-consistency = 0.90,0.97 for
monkey pool and held-out human pool, respectively). We defined a range of human-
consistency values, termed the "primate zone" (shaded gray area), delimited by ex-
72
TT
LU
UJ I I.- Co
LU
trapolated human-consistency estimates of large pools of macaques (see Methods,
Figure 3-6). We found that the baseline pixel visual system model and the low-level
V1 visual system model were not within this zone ( = 0.40,0.67 for pixels and
V1 models, respectively), while all tested DCNNIC visual system models were either
within or very close to this zone. Indeed, we could not reject the hypothesis that
DCNNIc models are primate-like (p = 0.54, exact test, see Methods).
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Figure 3-3: One-versus-other object-level (B.02) signatures for pooled human, pooled
monkey, and several DCNNIc models. Each B.02 signature is shown as a 24x24 sym-
metric matrices using a color scale, where each bin (i,j) corresponds to the system's
discriminability of objects i and j. Color scales similar to (A). (E) Human-consistency
of B.02 signatures for each of the tested model visual systems. Format is identical
to (C).
Next, we compared the behavior of the visual systems at a slightly higher level of
resolution. Specifically, instead of pooling over all discrimination tasks for each ob-
ject, we computed the mean discriminability of each of the 276 pairwise discrimination
tasks (still pooling over images within each of those tasks). This yielded a symmetric
matrix that is referred to here as the B.02 signature. Figure 3-3A shows the B.02
signatures of the pooled human, pooled monkey, and several DCNNIc visual system
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models as 24x24 symmetric matrices. Each bin (i,j) corresponds to the system's dis-
criminability of objects i and j, where warmer colors indicate lower performance; color
scales are not shown but span each signature's full range. We observed strong qual-
itative similarities between the pairwise object confusion patterns of all of the high
level visual systems (e.g. camel and dog are often confused with each other by all
three systems). This similarity is quantified in Figure 3-3B, which shows the human-
consistency of all examined visual system models with respect to this metric. Similar
to the B.01 metric, we observed that both a pool of macaque monkeys and a held-out
pool of humans are highly human-consistent with respect to this metric (y = 0.77, 0.94
for monkeys, humans respectively). Also similar to the B.01 metric, we found that
all DCNNIc visual system models are highly human-consistent (p > 0.8) while the
baseline pixel visual system model and the low-level VI visual system model were not
( = 0.41, 0.57 for pixels, V1 models respectively). Indeed, all DCNNIc visual sys-
tem models are within the defined "primate zone" of human-consistency, and we could
not falsify the hypothesis that DCNNIC models are primate-like (p = 0.99, exact test).
Taken together, humans, monkeys, and current DCNNIC models all share similar
patterns of object-level behavioral performances (B.01 and B.02 signatures) that are
not shared with lower-level visual representations (pixels and VI). However, object-
level performance patterns do not capture the fact that some images of an object are
more challenging than other images of the same object because of interactions of the
variation in the object's pose and position with the object's class. To overcome this
limitation, we next examined the patterns of behavior at the resolution of individual
images on a subsampled set of images where we specifically obtained a large number
of behavioral trials to accurately estimate behavioral performance on each image.
Note that, from the point of view of the subjects, the behavioral tasks are identical
to those already described. We simply aimed to measure and compare their patterns
of performance at much higher resolution.
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3.2.2 Image-level behavioral comparison
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Figure 3-4: (A) Schematic for computing B.Iln. First, the one-versus-all image-level
signature (B.I1) is shown as a 240-dimensional vector (24 objects, 10 images/object)
using a color scale, where each colored bin corresponds to the system's discriminabil-
ity of one image against all distractor objects. From this pattern, the normalized
one-versus-all image-level signature (B.Iln) is estimated by subtracting the mean per-
formance (d') value over all images of the same object. This normalization procedure
isolates behavioral variance that is specifically image-driven but not simply predicted
by the object. (B) Normalized one-versus-all object-level (B.I1n) signatures for the
pooled human, pooled monkey, and several DCNNIc models. Each B.I1n signature
is shown as a 240-dimensional vector using a color scale, formatted as in (A). (C)
Human-consistency of B.I1n signatures for each of the tested model visual systems.
To isolate purely image-level behavioral variance, i.e. variance that is not pre-
dicted by the object and thus already captured by the B.01 signature, we computed
the normalized image-level signature. This normalization procedure is schematically
illustrated in Figure 3-4A which shows that the one-versus-all image-level signature
(240-dimensional, 10 images/object) is used to obtain the normalized one-versus-all
image-level signature (termed B.Iln, see Behavioral metrics and signatures). Figure
3-4B shows the B.Iln signatures for the pooled human, pooled monkey, and sev-
eral DCNNIc models as 240 dimensional vectors. Each bin's color corresponds to
the discriminability of a single image against all distractor options (after subtrac-
tion of object-level discriminability, see Figure 3-4A), where warmer colors indicate
lower values; color scales are not shown but span each signature's full range. Fig-
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Figure 3-5: (D) Normalized one-versus-other image-level (B.I2n) signatures for pooled
human, pooled monkey, and several DCNNIC models. Each B.I2n signature is shown
as a 240x24 matrix using a color scale, where each bin (i,j) corresponds to the system's
discriminability of image i against distractor object j. (E) Human-consistency of B.I2n
signatures for each of the tested model visual systems.
ure 3-4C shows the human-consistency with respect to the B.Iln signature for all
tested models. Unlike with object-level behavioral metrics, we now observe a di-
vergence between DCNNrc models and primates. Both the monkey pool and the
held-out human pool remain highly human-consistent (p = 0.77, 0.96 for monkeys, hu-
mans respectively), but all DCNNIC models were significantly less human-consistent
(Inception-v3: # = 0.62) and well outside of the defined "primate zone" of B.Iln
human-consistency. Indeed, the hypothesis that the human-consistency of DCNN10
models is within the primate zone is strongly rejected (p = 6. 16e -8, exact test, see
Methods).
We can zoom in further by examining not only the overall performance for a
given image but also the object confusions for each image, i.e. the additional be-
havioral variation that is due not only to the test image but to the interaction of
that test image with the alternative (incorrect) object choice that is provided after
the test image (see Fig. iB). This is the highest level of behavioral accuracy reso-
lution that our task design allows. In raw form, it corresponds to one-versus-other
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image-level confusion matrix, where the size of that matrix is the total number of
images by the total number of objects (here, 240x24). Each bin (i,j) corresponds to
the behavioral discriminability of a single image i against distractor object j. Again,
we isolate variance that is not predicted by object-level performance by subtracting
the average performance on this binary task (mean over all images) to convert the
raw matrix B.12 above into the normalized matrix, referred to as B.12n. Figure 3-5A
shows the B.12n signatures as 240x24 matrices for the pooled human, pooled monkey
and top DCNNIC visual system models. Color scales are not shown but span each
signature's full range; warmer colors correspond to images with lower performance in
a given binary task, relative to all images of that object in the same task. Figure 3-5B
shows the human-consistency with respect to the B.12n metric for all tested visual
system models. Extending our observations using B.I1n, we observe a similar diver-
gence between primates and DCNNIC visual system models on the matrix pattern of
image-by-distractor difficulties (B.12n). Specifically, both the monkey pool and held-
out human pool remain highly human-consistent (p = 0.75,0.77 for monkeys, humans
respectively), while all tested DCNNJC models are significantly less human-consistent
(Inception-v3: p = 0.53) falling well outside of the defined "primate zone" of B.12n
human-consistency values. Once again, the hypothesis that the human-consistency
of DCNNIC models is within the primate zone is strongly rejected (p = 3.17e - 18,
exact test, see Methods).
3.2.3 Natural subject-to-subject variation
For each behavioral metric (B.01, B02, B.I1n, BI2n), we defined a "primate zone" as
the range of consistency values delimited by human-consistency estimates pM. and
PH, as lower and upper bounds respectively. pm. corresponds to the extrapolated
estimate of the human-consistency of a large (i.e. infinitely many subjects) pool of
rhesus macaque monkeys. Thus, the fact that a particular tested visual system model
falls outside of the primate zone can be interpreted as a failure of that visual system
model to accurately predict the behavior of the archetypal human at least as well as
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the archetypal monkey.
However, from the above analyses, it is not yet clear whether a visual system
model that fails to predict the archetypal human might nonetheless accurately corre-
spond to one or more individual human subjects found within the natural variation of
the human population. Given the difficulty of measuring individual subject behavior
at the resolution of single images for large numbers of human and monkey subjects,
we could not yet directly test this hypothesis. Instead, we examined it indirectly
by asking whether an archetypal model-that is a pool that includes an increasing
number of model "subjects"-would approach the human pool. We simulated model
inter-subject variability by retraining a fixed DCNN architecture with a fixed training
image set with random variation in the initial conditions and order of training images.
This procedure results in models that can still perform the task but with slightly dif-
ferent learned weight values. We note that this procedure is only one possible choice
of generating inter-subject variability within each visual system model type, a choice
that is an important open research direction that we do not address here. From this
procedure, we constructed multiple trained model instances ("subjects") for a fixed
DCNN architecture, and asked whether an increasingly large pool of model "subjects"
better captures the behavior of the human pool, at least as well as a monkey pool.
This post-hoc analysis was conducted for the most human-consistent DCNN archi-
tecture (Inception-v3).
Figure 3-6A shows, for each of the four behavioral metrics, the measured human-
consistency of subject pools of varying size (number of subjects n) of rhesus macaque
monkeys (black) and ImageNet-trained Inception-v3 models (blue). The human-
consistency increases with growing number of subjects for both visual systems across
all behavioral metrics. To estimate the expected human-consistency for a pool of
infinitely many monkey or model subjects, we fit an exponential function mapping
n to the mean human-consistency values and obtained a parameter estimate for the
asymptotic value (see Methods). We note that estimated asymptotic values are not
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significantly beyond the range of the measured data-the human-consistency of a pool
of five monkey subjects reaches within 97% of the human-consistency of an estimated
infinite pool of monkeys for all metrics-giving credence to the extrapolated human-
consistency values. This analysis suggests that under this model of inter-subject
variability, a pool of Inception-v3 subjects accurately capture archetypal human be-
havior at the resolution of objects (B.01, B.02) by our primate zone criterion (see
Figure 3-5A, first two panels). In contrast, even a large pool of Inception-v3 subjects
still fails at its final asymptote to accurately capture human behavior at the image-
level (B.I1n, B.12n) (Figure 3-5A, last two panels).
3.2.4 Modification of visual system models to try to rescue
their human-consistency
Next, we wondered if some relatively simple changes to the DCNNIc visual system
models tested here could bring them into better correspondence with the primate vi-
sual system behavior (with respect to B.Iln and B.12n metrics). Specifically, we con-
sidered and tested the following modifications to the most human-consistent DCNNIC
model visual system (Inception-v3): we (1) changed the input to the model to be more
primate-like in its retinal sampling (Inception-v3+retina), (2) changed the trans-
formation (aka "decoder") from the internal model feature representation into the
behavioral output by augmenting the number of decoder training images or changing
the decoder type (Inception-v3+SVM, Inception-v3 +classifier-train), and (3)
modified all of the internal filter weights of the model (aka "fine tuning") by augment-
ing its ImageNet training with additional images drawn from the same distribution as
our test images (Inception-v3-+synthetic-fine-tune). While some of these modi-
fications (e.g. fine-tuning on synthetic images and increasing the number of classifier
training images) had the expected effect of increasing mean overall performance (not
shown, see Methods), we found that none of these modifications led to a significant
improvement in its human-consistency on the behavioral metrics (Figure 3-5B). Thus,
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Figure 3-6: Effect of subject pool size and DCNN model modifications on consistency
with human behavior. (A) Accounting for natural subject-to-subject variability. For
each of the four behavioral metrics, the human-consistency distributions of monkey
(blue markers) and model (black markers) pools are shown as a function of the number
of subjects in the pool (mean SD, over subjects). The human consistency increases
with growing number of subjects for all visual systems across all behavioral metrics.
The dashed lines correspond to fitted exponential functions, and the parameter esti-
mate (mean SE) of the asymptotic value, corresponding to the estimated human-
consistency of a pool of infinitely many subjects, is shown at the right most point
on each abscissa. (B) Model modifications that aim to rescue the DCNNIC models.
We tested several simple modifications (see Methods) to the most human-consistent
DCNNic visual system model (Inception-v3). Each panel shows the resulting human-
consistency per modified model (mean t SD over different model instances, varying
in random filter initializations) for each of the four behavioral metrics.
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the failure of current DCNNic models to accurately capture the image-level signa-
tures of primates cannot be rescued by simple modifications on a fixed architecture.
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Figure 3-7: Analysis of unexplained human behavioral variance. (A) Residual simi-
larity between all pairs of human visual system models. The color of bin (ij) indicates
the proportion of explainable variance that is shared between the residual signatures
of visual systems i and j. For ease of interpretation, we ordered visual system models
based on their architecture and optimization procedure and partitioned this matrix
into four distinct regions. (B) Summary of residual similarity. For each of the four
regions in (a), the similarity to the residuals of Inception-v3 (region 2 in (A)) is shown
(mean SD, within each region) for all images (black dots), and for images that hu-
mans found to be particularly difficult (gray dots, selected based on held-out human
data).
3.2.5 Looking for clues: Image-level comparisons of models
and primates
Taken together, the results described above suggest that current DCNNIc visual
system models fail to accurately capture the image-level signatures of humans and
monkeys. To further examine this failure in the hopes of providing clues for model
improvement, we examined the image-level residual signatures of all the visual sys-
tem models, relative to the pooled human. For each model, we computed its residual
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signature as the difference (positive or negative) of a linear least squares regression
of the model signature on the corresponding human signature. For this analysis, we
focused on the B.I1n metric as it showed a clear divergence of DCNNIC models and
primates, and the behavioral residual can be interpreted based only on the test images
(whereas B.12n depends on the interaction between test images and distractor choice).
We first asked to what extent the residual signatures are shared between different
visual system models. Figure 3-7A shows the similarity between the residual signa-
tures of all pairs of models; the color of bin (ij) indicates the proportion of explainable
variance that is shared between the residual signatures of visual systems i and j. For
ease of interpretation, we ordered visual system models based on their architecture
and optimization procedure and partitioned this matrix into four distinct regions.
Each region compares the residuals of a "source" model group with fixed architecture
and optimization procedure (five Inception-v3 models optimized for categorization
on ImageNet, varying only in initial conditions and training image order) to a "tar-
get" model group. The target groups of models for each of the four regions are: 1)
the pooled monkey, 2) other DCNNIC models from the source group, 3) DCNNc
models that differ in architecture but share the optimization procedure of the source
group models and 4) DCNNIC models that differ slightly using an augmented opti-
mization procedure but share the architecture of the source group models. Figure
3-7B shows the mean (+SD) variance shared in the residuals averaged within these
four regions for all images (black dots), as well as for images that humans found
to be particularly difficult (gray dots, selected based on held-out human data, see
Methods). First, consistent with the results shown in Figure 3-4, we note that the
residual signatures of this particular DCNNIc model are not well shared with the
pooled monkey (r2 = 0.39 in region 1), and this phenomenon is more pronounced
for the images that humans found most difficult (r2 = 0.17 in region 1). However,
this relatively low correlation between model and primate residuals is not indicative
of spurious model residuals, as the model residual signatures were highly reliable
between different instances of this fixed DCNNIC model, across random training ini-
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tializations (region 2: r2 = 0.79, 0.77 for all and most difficult images, respectively).
Interestingly, residual signatures were still largely shared with other DCNNJC models
with vastly different architectures (region 3: r2 = 0.70, 0.65 for all and most difficult
images, respectively). However, residual signatures were more strongly altered when
the visual training diet of the same architecture was altered (region 4: r2 = 0.57, 0.46
for all and most difficult images respectively, cf. region 3). Taken together, these
results indicate that the images where DCNNIC visual system models diverged from
humans (and monkeys) were not spurious but were rather highly reliable across differ-
ent model architectures, demonstrating that current DCNNIc models systematically
and similarly diverge from primates.
To look for clues for model improvement, we asked what, if any, characteristics
of images might account for this divergence of models and primates. We regressed
the residual signatures of DCNNIc models on four different image attributes (corre-
sponding to the size, eccentricity, pose, and contrast of the object in each image). We
used multiple linear regressions to predict the model residual signatures from all of
these image attributes, and also considered each attribute individually using simple
linear regressions. Figure 3-8A shows example images (sampled from the full set of
2400 images) with increasing attribute value for each of these four image attributes.
While the DCNNIC models were not directly optimized to display primate-like per-
formance dependence on such attributes, we observed that the Inception-v3 visual
system model nonetheless exhibited qualitatively similar performance dependencies
as primates (see Figure 3-8B). For example, humans (black), monkeys (gray) and the
Inception-v3 model (blue) all performed better, on average, for images in which the
object is in the center of gaze (low eccentricity) and large in size. Furthermore, all
three systems performed better, on average, for images when the pose of the object
was closer to the canonical pose (see Figure 3-8B). The similarity of the patterns in
Figure 3-8B between primates and the DCNNIC visual system models is not perfect
but is striking, particularly in light of the fact that these models were not optimized
to produce these patterns. However, this similarity is analogous to the similarity
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in the B.01 and B.02 metrics in that it only holds on average over many images.
Looking more closely at the image-by-image comparison, we again found that the
DCNNIC models failed to capture a large portion of the image-by-image variation. In
particular, Figure 3-8C shows the proportion of variance explained by specific image
attributes for the residual signatures of monkeys (black) and DCNNIc models (blue).
We found that, taken together, all four of these image attributes explained only ~ 10%
of the variance in DCNNIc residual signatures, and each individual attribute could
explain at most a small amount of residual variance (<5% of the explainable vari-
ance). In sum, these analyses show that some behavioral effects that might provide
intuitive clues to modify the DCNNIc models are already in place in those models
(e.g. a dependence on eccentricity). But the quantitative image-by-image analyses
of the remaining unexplained variance (Figure 3-8C) argue that the DCNNic visual
system models' failure to capture primate image-level signatures cannot be further
accounted for by these simple image attributes and likely stem from other factors.
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Figure 3-8: Dependence of primate and DCNNIc model behavior on image attributes.
(A) Example images with increasing attribute value, for each of the four pre-defined
image attributes (see Methods). (B) Dependence of performance (B.I1n) as a function
of four image attributes, for humans, monkeys and a DCNNIC model (Inception-v3).
(C) Proportion of explainable variance of the residual signatures of monkeys (black)
and DCNNIC models (blue) that is accounted for by each of the pre-defined image
attributes. Error-bars correspond to SD over trial re-sampling for monkeys, and over
different models for DCNNIc models.
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3.3 Discussion
The current work was motivated by the broad scientific goal of discovering models that
quantitatively explain the neuronal mechanisms underlying primate invariant object
recognition behavior. To this end, previous work had shown that specific artificial neu-
ral network models (ANNs), drawn from a large family of deep convolutional neural
networks (DCNNs) and optimized to achieve high levels of object categorization per-
formance on large-scale image-sets, capture a large fraction of the variance in primate
visual recognition behaviors [Rajalingham et al., 2015, Jozwik et al., 2016, Kherad-
pisheh et al., 2016, Kubilius et al., 2016, Peterson et al., 2016, Wallis et al., 2017],
and the internal hidden neurons of those same models also predict a large fraction of
the image-driven response variance of brain activity at multiple stages of the primate
ventral visual stream [Seibert et al., 2016, Cadieu et al., 2014, Khaligh-Razavi and
Kriegeskorte, 2014, Yamins et al., 2014, Guclu and van Gerven, 2015, Cichy et al.,
2016, Hong et al., 2016, Seibert et al., 2016, Cadena et al., 2017, Wen et al., 2017].
For clarity, we here referred to this sub-family of models as DCNNIC (to denote
ImageNet-Categorization training), so as to distinguish them from all possible mod-
els in the DCNN family, and more broadly, from the super-family of all ANNs. In
this work, we directly compared leading DCNNIC models to primates (humans and
monkeys) with respect to their behavioral signatures at both object and image level
resolution in the domain of core object recognition. In order to do so, we measured
and characterized primate behavior at larger scale and higher resolution than previ-
ously possible. We first replicate prior work (Rajalingham et al., 2015) showing that,
at the object level, DCNNIC models produce statistically indistinguishable behavior
from primates, and we extend that work by showing that these models also match the
average primate sensitivities to object contrast, eccentricity, size, and pose, a note-
worthy similarity in light of the fact that these models were not optimized to produce
these performance patterns. However, our primary novel result is that, examining
behavior at the higher resolution of individual images, all leading DCNNIc models
failed to replicate the image-level behavioral signatures of primates. An important
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related claim is that rhesus monkeys are more consistent with the archetypal human
than any of the tested DCNN1 c models (at the image-level).
While it had previously been shown that DCNNIC models can diverge from human
behavior on specifically chosen adversarial images [Szegedy et al., 20131, a strength of
our work is that we did not optimize images to induce failure but instead randomly
sampled the image generative parameter space broadly. As such, our results highlight
a general, rather than adversarial-induced, failure of DCNNJC models to fully capture
the neural mechanisms underlying primate core object recognition behavior. Further-
more, we showed that this failure of current DCNNC models cannot be explained by
simple image attributes and cannot be rescued by simple model modifications (input
image sampling, model training, and classifier variations). Taken together, these re-
sults suggest that new ANN models are needed to more precisely capture the neural
mechanisms underlying primate object vision.
With regards to new ANN models, we can attempt to make prospective infer-
ences about future possible DCNNIC models from the data presented here. Based on
the observed distribution of image-level human-consistency values for the DCNNIC
models tested here, we infer that yet untested model instances sampled identically
(i.e. from the DCNN1 c model sub-family) are very likely to have similarly inadequate
image-level human-consistency. While we cannot rule out the possibility that at least
one model instance within the DCNNIC sub-family would fully match the image-level
behavioral signatures, the probability of sampling such a model is vanishingly small
(p < le - 17 for B.12n human-consistency, estimated using exact test using Gaus-
sian kernel density estimation, see Methods, Results). An important caveat of this
inference is that we may have a biased estimate of the human-consistency distribu-
tion of this model sub-family, as we did not exhaustively sample the sub-family. In
particular, if the model sampling process is non-stationary over time (e.g. increases
in computational power over time allows larger models to be successfully trained),
the human-consistency of new (i.e. yet to be sampled) models may lie outside the
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currently estimated distribution. Consistent with the latter, we observed that current
DCNNIC cluster into two distinct "generations" separated in time (before/after the
year 2015; e.g. Inception-v3 improves over AlexNet though both lie outside the pri-
mate zone in Figure 3-4). Thus, following this trend, it is possible that the evolution
of "next-generation" models within the DCNNJC sub-family could meet our criteria
for successful matching primate-like behavior.
Alternatively, it is possible-and we think likely-that future DCNNIC models
will also fail to capture primate-like image-level behavior, suggesting that either the
architectural limitations (e.g. convolutional, feed-forward) and/or the optimization
procedure (including the diet of visual images) that define this model sub-family are
fundamentally limiting. Thus, ANN model sub-families utilizing different architec-
tures (e.g. recurrent neural networks) and/or optimized for different behavioral goals
(e.g. loss functions other than object classification performance, and/or images other
than category-labeled ImageNet images) may be necessary to accurately capture pri-
mate behavior. To this end, we propose that testing even individual changes to the
DCNNJC models-each creating a new ANN model sub-family-may be the best way
forward, because DCNNIc models currently offer the best explanations (in a predic-
tive sense) of both the behavioral and neural phenomena of core object recognition.
To reach that goal of finding a new ANN model sub-family that is a better mech-
anistic model of the primate ventral visual stream, we propose that even larger-scale,
high-resolution behavioral measurements, such as expanded versions of the patterns
of image-level performance presented here, could serve as a useful top-down opti-
mization guide. Not only do these high-resolution behavioral signatures have the
statistical power to reject the currently leading ANN models, but they can also be ef-
ficiently collected at very large scale, in contrast to other guide data (e.g. large-scale
neuronal measurements). Indeed, current technological tools for high-throughput
psychophysics in humans and monkeys (e.g. Amazon Mechanical Turk for humans,
Monkey Turk for rhesus monkeys) enable time- and cost-efficient collection of large-
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scale behavioral datasets, such as the ~1 million behavioral trials obtained for the
current work. These systems trade off an increase in efficiency with a decrease in
experimental control. For example, we did not impose experimental constraints on
subjects' acuity and we can only infer likely head and gaze position. Previous work
has shown that patterns of behavioral performance on object recognition tasks from
in-lab and online subjects were equally reliable and virtually identical [Majaj et al.,
2015], but it is not yet clear to what extent this holds at the resolution of individ-
ual images, as one might expect that variance in performance across images is more
sensitive to precise head and gaze location. For this reason, we here refrain from
making strong inferences from small behavioral differences, such as the small dif-
ference between humans and monkeys. Nevertheless, we argue that this sacrifice in
exact experimental control while retaining sufficient power for model comparison is
a good tradeoff for efficiently collecting large behavioral datasets toward the goal of
constraining future models of the primate ventral visual stream.
3.4 Methods
3.4.1 Visual images
We examined basic-level, core object recognition behavior using a set of 24 broadly-
sampled objects that we previously found to be reliably labeled by independent human
subjects, based on the definition of basic-level proposed by [Rosch et al., 1976]. These
images are identical to those used in Chapter 2; Figure 2-1 shows the full list of 24
objects, with two example images of each object.
Because all of the images were generated from synthetic 3D object models, we
had explicit knowledge of the viewpoint parameters (position, size, and pose) for each
object in each image, as well as perfect segmentation masks. Taking advantage of this
feature, we characterized each image based on these high-level attributes, consisting
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of size, eccentricity, relative pose and contrast of the object in the image. The size
and eccentricity of the object in each image were computed directly from the corre-
sponding viewpoint parameters, under the assumption that the entire image would
subtend 64 at the center of visual gaze ( 30 in both azimuth and elevation; see be-
low). For each synthetic object, we first defined its "canonical" 3D pose vector, based
on independent human judgments. To compute the relative pose attribute of each
image, we estimated the difference between the object's 3D pose and its canonical 3D
pose. Pose differences were computed as distances in unit quaternion representations:
the 3D pose (rz, rz, r,) was first converted into unit quaternions, and distances be-
tween quaternions qi, q2 were estimated as cos-1 qi - q21 [Huynh, 2009]. To compute
the object contrast, we measured the absolute difference between the mean of the
pixel intensities corresponding to the object and the mean of the background pixel
intensities in the vicinity of the object (specifically, within 25 pixels of any object
pixel, analogous to computing the local foreground-background luminance difference
of a foreground object in an image). Figure 3-8A shows example images with varying
values for the four image attributes.
3.4.2 Core object recognition behavioral paradigm
Core object discrimination is defined as the ability to discriminate between two or
more objects in visual images presented under high view uncertainty in the central
visual field (- 100), for durations that approximate the typical primate, free-viewing
fixation duration ( 200 ms) [DiCarlo and Cox, 2007, DiCarlo et al., 2012]. As in
our previous work [Rajalingham et al., 2015], the behavioral task paradigm consisted
of a interleaved set of binary discrimination tasks. Each binary discrimination task
is an object discrimination task between a pair of objects (e.g. elephant vs. bear).
Each such binary task is balanced in that the test image is equally likely (50%) to
be of either of the two objects. On each trial, a test image is presented, followed
by a choice screen showing canonical views of the two possible objects (the object
that was not displayed in the test image is referred to as the "distractor" object, but
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note that objects are equally likely to be distractors and targets). Here, 24 objects
were tested, which resulted in 276 binary object discrimination tasks. To neutralize
feature attention, these 276 tasks are randomly interleaved (trial by trial), and the
global task is referred to as a basic-level, core object recognition task paradigm.
Testing human behavior
All human behavioral data presented here were collected from 1476 human subjects
on Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) performing the task paradigm described above.
Subjects were instructed to report the identity of the foreground object in each pre-
sented image from among the two objects presented on the choice screen (Fig 1B).
Because all 276 tasks were interleaved randomly (trial-by-trial), subjects could not
deploy feature attentional strategies specific to each object or specific to each binary
task to process each test image.
Figure 3-2A illustrates the time course of each behavioral trial, for a particular
object discrimination task (zebra versus dog). Each trial initiated with a central black
point for 500 ms, followed by 100 ms presentation of a test image containing one fore-
ground object presented under high variation in viewing parameters and overlaid on
a random background, as described above (see Visual images above). Immediately
after extinction of the test image, two choice images, each displaying a single object
in a canonical view with no background, were shown to the left and right. One of
these two objects was always the same as the object that generated the test image
(i.e., the correct object choice), and the location of the correct object (left or right)
was randomly chosen on each trial. After clicking on one of the choice images, the
subject was queued with another fixation point before the next test image appeared.
No feedback was given; human subjects were never explicitly trained on the tasks.
Under assumptions of typical computer ergonomics, we estimate that images were
presented at 6 - 8' of visual angle at the center of gaze, and the choice object images
were presented at 6 - 8' of eccentricity along the horizontal meridian.
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We measured human behavior using the online Amazon MTurk platform (see Fig-
ure 3-2B), which enables efficient collection of large-scale psychophysical data from
crowd-sourced "human intelligence tasks" (HITs). The reliability of the online MTurk
platform has been validated by comparing results obtained from online and in-lab
psychophysical experiments [Majaj et al., 2015, Rajalingham et al., 2015]. We pooled
927,296 trials from 1472 human subjects to characterize the aggregate human behav-
ior, which we refer to as the "pooled" human (or "archetypal" human). Each human
subject performed only a small number of trials (- 150) on a subset of the images
and binary tasks. All 2400 images were used for behavioral testing, but in some of the
HITs, we biased the image selection towards the 240 primary test images (1424 70
trials/image on this subsampled set, versus 271 93 trials/image on the remaining
images, mean SD) to efficiently characterize behavior at image level resolution.
Images were randomly drawn such that each human subject was exposed to each
image a relatively small number of times (1.5+2.0 trials/image per subject, mean
SD), in order to mitigate potential alternative behavioral strategies (e.g. "memoriza-
tion" of images) that could arise from a finite image set. Behavioral signatures at
the object-level (B.01, B.02, see Behavioral metrics and signatures) were measured
using all 2400 test images, while image-level behavioral signatures (B.I1n, B.12n, see
Behavioral metrics and signatures) were measured using the 240 primary test images.
(We observed qualitatively similar results using those metrics on the full 2400 test
images, but we here focus on the primary test images as the larger number of trials
leads to lower noise levels).
Five other human subjects were separately recruited on MTurk to each perform
a large number of trials on the same images and tasks (53,097 15,278 trials/subject,
mean + SD). Behavioral data from these five subjects was not included in the char-
acterization of the pooled human described above, but instead aggregated together to
characterize a distinct held-out human pool. For the scope of the current work, this
held-out human pool-which largely replicated all behavioral signatures of the larger
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archetypal human-served as an independent validation of our human behavioral
measurements.
Testing monkey behavior
Five adult male rhesus macaque monkeys (Macaca mulatta, subjects M, Z, N, P, B)
were tested on the same basic-level, core object recognition task paradigm described
above, with minor modification as described below. All procedures were performed
in compliance with National Institutes of Health guidelines and the standards of the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Committee on Animal Care and the American
Physiological Society. To efficiently characterize monkey behavior, we used a novel
home-cage behavioral system developed in our lab (termed MonkeyTurk, see Fig.
IC). This system leveraged a tablet touchscreen (9" Google Nexus or 10.5" Samsung
Galaxy Tab S) and used a web application to wirelessly load the task and collect the
data (code available at https://github.com/dicarlolab/mkturk). Analogous to the
online Amazon Mechanical Turk, which allows for efficient psychophysical assays of a
large number (hundreds) of human users in their native environments, MonkeyTurk
allowed us to test many monkey subjects simultaneously in their home environment.
Each monkey voluntarily initiated trials, and each readily performed the task a few
hours each day that the task apparatus was made available to it. At an average rate
of ~ 2000 trials per day per monkey, we collected a total of 836,117 trials from the
five monkey subjects over a period of - 3 months.
Monkey training is described in detail elsewhere [Rajalingham et al., 20151. Briefly,
all monkeys were initially trained on the match-test-image-to-object rule using other
images and were also trained on discriminating the particular set of 24 objects tested
here using a separate set of training images rendered from these objects, in the same
manner as the main testing images. Two of the monkeys subjects (Z and M) were
previously trained in the lab setting, and the remaining three subjects were trained
using MonkeyTurk directly in their home cages and did not have significant prior
lab exposure. Once monkeys reached saturation performance on training images, we
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began the behavioral testing phase to collect behavior on test images. Monkeys did
improve throughout the testing phase, exhibiting an increase in performance between
the first and second half of trials of 4% 0.9% (mean SEM over five monkey sub-
jects). However, the image-level behavioral signatures obtained from the first and the
second halves of trials were highly correlated to each other (B.I1 noise-adjusted corre-
lation of 0.85+0.06, mean SEM over five monkey subjects, see Behavioral metrics
and signatures below), suggesting that monkeys did not significantly alter strategies
(e.g. did not "memorize" images) throughout the behavioral testing phase.
The monkey task paradigm was nearly identical to the human paradigm (see Fig-
ure 3-2B), with the exccption that trials were initiated by touching a white "fixation"
circle horizontally centered on the bottom third of the screen (to avoid occluding
centrally-presented test images with the hand). This triggered a 100ms central pre-
sentation of a test image, followed immediately by the presentation of the two choice
images (Fig. 1B, location of correct choice randomly assigned on each trial, identical
to the human task). Unlike the main human task, monkeys responded by directly
touching the screen at the location of one of the two choice images. Touching the
choice image corresponding to the object shown in the test image resulted in the deliv-
ery of a drop of juice through a tube positioned at mouth height (but not obstructing
view), while touching the distractor choice image resulted in a three second timeout.
Because gaze direction typically follows the hand during reaching movements, we as-
sumed that the monkeys were looking at the screen during touch interactions with the
fixation or choice targets. In both the lab and in the home cage, we maintained total
test image size at ~ 6 of visual angle at the center of gaze, and we took advantage
of the retina-like display qualities of the tablet by presenting images pixel matched
to the display (256 x 256 pixel image displayed using 256 x 256 pixels on the tablet
at a distance of 8 inches) to avoid filtering or aliasing effects.
As with Mechanical Turk testing in humans, MonkeyTurk head-free home-cage
testing enables efficient collection of reliable, large-scale psychophysical data but it
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likely does not yet achieve the level of experimental control that is possible in the
head-fixed laboratory setting. However, we note that when subjects were engaged
in home-cage testing, they reliably had their mouth on the juice tube and their arm
positioned through an armhole. These spatial constraints led to a high level of head
position trial-by-trial reproducibility during performance of the task paradigm. Fur-
thermore, when subjects were in this position, they could not see other animals as
the behavior box was opaque, and subjects performed the task at a rapid pace 40
trials/minute suggesting that they were not frequently distracted or interrupted. The
location of the upcoming test image (but not the location of the object within that
test image) was perfectly predictable at the start of each behavioral trial, which likely
resulted in a reliable, reproduced gaze direction at the moment that each test image
was presented. The relatively short-but natural and high performing [Cadieu et al.,
2014]-test image duration (100 ms) ensured that saccadic eye movements were unlike
to influence test image performance (as they generally take - 200 ms to initiate in
response to the test image, and thus well after the test image has been extinguished).
Testing model behavior
We tested a number of different deep convolutional neural network (DCNN) models on
the exact same images and tasks as those presented to humans and monkeys. Impor-
tantly, our core object recognition task paradigm is closely analogous to the large-scale
ImageNet 1000-way object categorization task for which these networks were opti-
mized and thus expected to perform well. We focused on publicly available DCNN
model architectures that have proven highly successful with respect to this computer
vision benchmark over the past five years: AlexNet [Krizhevsky et al., 2012], NYU
[Zeiler and Fergus, 2014], VGG [Simonyan and Zisserman, 2014], GoogleNet [Szegedy
et al., 2013]), Resnet [He et al., 2016], and Inception-v3 [Szegedy et al., 2013]. As
this is only a subset of possible DCNN models, we refer to these as the DCNNJC (to
denote ImageNet-Categorization) visual system model sub-family. For each of the
publicly available model architectures, we first used ImageNet-categorization-trained
94
model instances, either using publicly available trained model instances or training
them to saturation on the 1000-way classification task in-house. Training took several
days on 1-2 GPUs.
We then performed psychophysical experiments on each ImageNet-trained DCNN
model to characterize their behavior on the exact same images and tasks as humans
and monkeys. We first adapted these ImageNet-trained models to our 24-way object
recognition task by re-training the final class probability layer (initially corresponding
to the probability output of the 1000-way ImageNet classification task) while hold-
ing all other layers fixed. In practice, this was done by extracting features from the
penultimate layer of each DCNNIC (i.e. top-most prior to class probability layer), on
the same images that were presented to humans and monkeys, and training back-end
multi-class logistic regression classifiers to determine the cross-validated output class
probability for each image. This procedure is illustrated in Figure 3-2C. To estimate
the hit rate of a given image in a given binary classification task, we renormalized the
24-way class probabilities of that image, considering only the two relevant classes, to
sum to one. Object-level and image-level behavioral metrics were computed based on
these hit rate estimates (as described in Behavioral metrics and signatures below).
Importantly, this procedure assumes that the model "retina" layer processes the cen-
tral 60 of the visual field. It also assumes that linear discriminants ("readouts") of the
model's top feature layer are its behavioral output (as intended by the model design-
ers). Manipulating either of these choices (e.g. resizing the input images such that
they span only part of the input layer, or building linear discriminates for behavior
using a different model feature layer) would result in completely new, testable ANN
models that we do not test here.
From these analyses, we selected the most human-consistent DCNNIC architec-
ture (Inception-v3, see Behavioral consistency below), fixed that architecture, and
then performed post-hoc analyses in which we varied: the input image sampling, the
initial parameter settings prior to training, the filter training images, the type of
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classifiers used to generate the behavior from the model features, and the classifier
training images. To examine input image sampling, we re-trained the Inception-v3
architecture on images from ImageNet that were first spatially filtered to match the
spatial sampling of the primate retina (i.e. an approximately exponential decrease
in cone density away from the fovea) by effectively simulating a fish-eye transfor-
mation on each image. These images were at highest resolution at the "fovea" (i.e.
center of the image) with gradual decrease in resolution with increasing eccentricity.
To examine the analog of "inter-subject variability", we constructed multiple trained
model instances ("subjects"), where the architecture and training images were held
fixed (Inception-v3 and ImageNet, respectively) but the model filter weights initial
condition and order of training images were randomly varied for each model instance.
Importantly, this procedure is only one possible choice for simulating inter-subject
variability for DCNN models, a choice that is an important open research direction
that we do not address here. To examine the effect of model training, we fine-tuned an
ImageNet-trained Inception-v3 model on a synthetic image set consisting of 6.9 mil-
lion images of 1049 objects (holding out 50,000 images for model validation). These
images were generated using the same rendering pipeline as our test images, but the
objects were non-overlapping with the 24 test objects presented here. As expected,
fine-tuning on synthetic images led to an overall increase in performance of 5%. We
tested the effect of different classifiers to generate model behavior by testing both
multi-class logistic regression and support vector machine classifiers. Additionally,
we tested the effect of varying the number of training images used to train those
classifiers (20 versus 50 images per class).
3.4.3 Behavioral metrics and signatures
To characterize the behavior of any visual system, we here introduce four behavioral
(B) metrics of increasing richness, requiring increasing amounts of data to measure
reliably. Each behavioral metric computes a pattern of unbiased behavioral perfor-
mance, using a sensitivity index: d' = Z(HitRate) - Z(FalseAlarmRate), where Z is
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the inverse of the cumulative Gaussian distribution. The various metrics differ in the
resolution at which hit rates and false alarm rates are computed. Table 1 summarizes
the four behavioral metrics, varying the hit-rate resolution (object-level or image-
level) and the false-alarm resolution (one-versus-all or one-versus-other). When each
metric is applied to the behavioral data of a visual system-biological or artificial-
we refer to the result as one behavioral "signature" of that system. Note that we do
not consider the signatures obtained here to be the final say on the behavior of these
biological or artificial systems-in the terms defined here, new experiments using new
objects/images but the same metrics would produce additional behavioral signatures.
Metric Equation J Hit Rate False Alarm Rate
% trials when images of % trials when any image
B.01 01(i) = Z(HRi) - Z(FARi) object i were correctly la- was incorrectly labeled as
beled as object i object i.
% trials when images of
object i were correctly la- % trials when images of
B.02 02 (i,j) = Z(HRI, 3 ) - Z(FARi,3 ) beled as object i when pre- object j were incorrectly
sented against distractor labeled as object i
object j
% trials when image ii was % trials when any image
B.I1 Ii(i) = Z(HRii) - Z(FARij) correctly classified as ob- was incorrectly labeled as
ject i object i.
% trials when image ii % trials when images of
B.12 I2 (i) = Z(HRii,) - Z(FARij) was correctly classified as object j were incorrectlyobject i, when presented labeled as object
against distractor object j
Table 3.1: Definition of behavioral performance metrics. The first column provides
the name, abbreviation, dimensions, and equations for each of the raw performance
metrics. The next two columns provide the definitions for computing the hit rate
(HR) and false alarm rate (FAR) respectively.
The four behavioral metrics we chose are as follows: First, the one-versus-all
object-level performance metric (termed B.01) estimates the discriminability of each
object from all other objects, pooling across all distractor object choices. Since we
here tested 24 objects, the resulting B.01 signature has 24 independent values. Sec-
ond, the one-versus-other object-level performance metric (termed B.02) estimates
the discriminability of each specific pair of objects, or the pattern of pairwise object
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confusions. Since we here tested 276 interleaved binary object discrimination tasks,
the resulting B.02 signature has 276 independent values (the off-diagonal elements
on one half of the 24x24 symmetric matrix). Third, the one-versus-all image-level
performance metric (termed B.I1) estimates the discriminability of each image from
all other objects, pooling across all possible distractor choices. Since we here focused
on the primary image test set of 240 images (10 per object, see above), the resulting
B.I1 signature has 240 independent values. Fourth, the one-versus-other image-level
performance metric (termed B.12) estimates the discriminability of each image from
each distractor object. Since we here focused on the primary image test set of 240
images (10 per object, see above) with 23 distractors, the resulting B.12 signature has
5520 independent values.
Naturally, object-level and image-level behavioral signatures are tightly linked.
For example, images of a particularly difficult-to-discriminate object would inherit
lower performance values on average as compared to images from a less difficult-to-
discriminate object. To isolate the behavioral variance that is specifically driven by
image variation and not simply predicted by the objects (and thus already captured
by B.01 and B.02), we defined normalized image-level behavioral metrics (termed
B.I1n, B.12n) by subtracting the mean performance values over all images of the same
object and task. This process is schematically illustrated in Figure 3-4A. We note
that the resulting normalized image-level behavioral signatures capture a significant
proportion of the total image-level behavioral variance in our data (e.g. 52%, 58%
of human B.I1 and B.12 variance is driven by image variation, independent of object
identity). In this study, we use these normalized metrics for image-level behavioral
comparisons between models and primates (see Results).
3.4.4 Behavioral Consistency
To quantify the similarity between a model visual system and the human visual system
with respect to a given behavioral metric, we used a measure called the "human-
98
consistency" as previously defined [Johnson et al., 2002]. Human-consistency (p) is
computed, for each of the four behavioral metrics, as a noise-adjusted correlation
of behavioral signatures [DiCarlo and Johnson, 1999]. For each visual system, we
randomly split all behavioral trials into two equal halves and applied each behavioral
metric to each half, resulting in two independent estimates of the system's behavioral
signature with respect to that metric. We took the Pearson correlation between
these two estimates of the behavioral signature as a measure of the reliability of that
behavioral signature given the amount of data collected, i.e. the split-half internal
reliability. To estimate the human-consistency, we computed the Pearson correlation
over all the independent estimates of the behavioral signature from the model (m)
and the human (h), and we then divide that raw Pearson correlation by the geometric
mean of the split-half internal reliability of the same behavioral signature measured
for each system:
m) = Phm
/Ph,h X Pm,m
Since all correlations in the numerator and denominator were computed using
the same amount of trial data (exactly half of the trial data), we did not need to
make use of any prediction formulas (e.g. extrapolation to larger number of trials
using Spearman-Brown prediction formula, as in Chapter 2). This procedure was
repeated 10 times with different random split-halves of trials. Our rationale for using
a reliability-adjusted correlation measure for human-consistency was to account for
variance in the behavioral signatures that arises from "noise," i.e., variability that
is not replicable by the experimental condition (image and task) and thus that no
model can be expected to predict [DiCarlo and Johnson, 1999, Johnson et al., 2002].
In sum, if the model (m) is a replica of the archetypal human (h), then its expected
human-consistency is 1.0, regardless of the finite amount of data that are collected.
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3.4.5 Characterization of Residuals
In addition to measuring the similarity between the behavioral signatures of primates
and models (using human-consistency analyses, as described above), we examined the
corresponding differences, termed "residual signatures." Each candidate visual sys-
tem model's residual signature was estimated as the residual of a linear least squares
regression of the model's signature on the corresponding human signature (with both
slope and intercept as free parameters). This procedure effectively captures the differ-
ences between human and model signatures after accounting for overall performance
differences. Residual signatures were estimated on disjoint split-halves of trials, re-
peating 10 times with random trial permutations. Residuals were computed with
respect to the normalized one-versus-all image-level performance metric (B.Iln) as
this metric showed a clear difference between DCNNIC models and primates, and the
behavioral residual can be interpreted based only the test images (i.e. we can assign
a residual per image).
To examine the extent to which the difference between each model and the
archetypal human is reliably shared across different models, we measured the Pear-
son correlation between the residual signatures of pairs of models. Residual simi-
larity was quantified as the proportion of shared variance, defined as the square of
the noise-adjusted correlation between residual signatures (the noise-adjustment was
done as defined in equation above). Correlations of residual signatures were always
computed across distinct split-halves of data, to avoid introducing spurious correla-
tions from subtracting common noise in the human data. We measured the residual
similarity between all pairs of tested models, holding both architecture and opti-
mization procedure fixed (between instances of the ImageNet-categorization trained
Inception-v3 model, varying in filter initial conditions), varying the architecture while
holding the optimization procedure fixed (between all tested ImageNet-categorization
trained DCNN architectures), and holding the architecture fixed while varying the
optimization procedure (between ImageNet-categorization trained Inception-v3 and
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synthetic-categorization fine-tuned Inception-v3 models). This analysis addresses not
only the reliability of the failure of DCNNIC models to predict human behavior (devi-
ations from humans), but also the relative importance of the characteristics defining
similarities within the model sub-family (namely, the architecture and the optimiza-
tion procedure). We first performed this analysis for residual signatures over the 240
primary test images, and subsequently zoomed in on subsets of images that humans
found to be particularly difficult. This image selection was made relative to the dis-
tribution of image-level performance of held-out human subjects (B.I1 metric from
five subjects); difficult images were defined as ones with performance below the 25th
percentile of this distribution.
To examine whether the difference between each model and humans can be ex-
plained by simple human-interpretable stimulus attributes, we regressed each DCNNIc
model's residual signature on image attributes (object size, eccentricity, pose, and
contrast). Briefly, we constructed a design matrix from the image attributes (using
individual attributes, or all attributes), and used multiple linear least squares regres-
sion to predict the image-level residual signature. The multiple linear regression was
tested using two-fold cross-validation over trials. The relative importance of each
attribute (or groups of attributes) was quantified using the proportion of explainable
variance (i.e. variance remaining after accounting for noise variance) explained from
the residual signature.
3.4.6 Primate behavior zone
In this work, we are primarily concerned with the behavior of an "archetypal human",
rather than the behavior of any given individual human subject. We operationally
defined this concept as the common behavior over many humans, obtained by pooling
together trials from a large number of individual human subjects and treating this
human pool as if it were acquired from a single behaving agent. Due to inter-subject
variability, we do not expect any given human or monkey subject to be perfectly
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consistent with this archetypal human (i.e. we do not expect it to have a human-
consistency of 1.0). Given current limitations of monkey psychophysics, we are not
yet able to measure the behavior of very large number of monkey subjects at high
resolution and consequently cannot directly estimate the human-consistency of the
corresponding "archetypal monkey" to the human pool. Rather, we indirectly es-
timated this value by first measuring human-consistency as a function of number
of individual monkey subjects pooled together (n), and extrapolating the human-
consistency estimate for pools of very large number of subjects (as n approaches
infinity). Extrapolations were done using least squares fitting of an exponential func-
tion p(n) = a + be-m (see Figure 3-6).
For each behavioral metric, we defined a "primate zone" as the range of human-
consistency values delimited by estimates M. and H. as lower and upper bounds
respectively. M. corresponds to the extrapolated estimate of human-consistency of
a large (i.e. infinitely many) pool of rhesus macaque monkeys; PH. is by definition
equal to 1.0. Thus, the primate zone defines a range of human-consistency values
that correspond to models that accurately capture the behavior of the human pool,
at least as well as an extrapolation of our monkey sample. In this work, we defined
this range of human-consistency values as the criterion for success for computational
models of primate visual object recognition behavior.
To make a global statistical inference about whether models sampled from the
DCNNIC sub-family meet or fall short of this criterion for success, we attempted
to reject the hypothesis that, for a given behavioral metric, the human-consistency
of DCNNIC models is within the primate zone. To test this hypothesis, we esti-
mated the empirical probability that the distribution of human-consistency values,
estimated over different model instances within this family, could produce human-
consistency values within the primate zone. Specifically, we estimated a p-value for
each behavioral metric using the following procedure: We first estimated an em-
pirical distribution of Fisher-transformed human-consistency values for this model
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family (i.e. over all tested DCNN1c models and over all trial-resampling of each
DCNNIC model). From this empirical distribution, we fit a Gaussian kernel density
function, optimizing the bandwidth parameter to minimize the mean squared error to
the empirical distribution. This kernel density function was evaluated to compute a
p-value, by computing the cumulative probability of observing a human-consistency
value greater than or equal to the criterion of success (i.e. the Fisher transformed j5 M.
value). This p-value indicates the probability that human-consistency values sampled
from the observed distribution would fall into the primate zone, with smaller p-values
indicating stronger evidence against the hypothesis that the human-consistency of
DCNN models is within the primate zone.
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Chapter 4
Reversible inactivation of different
millimeter-scale regions of primate IT
results in different patterns of core
object recognition deficits
Primate core visual object recognition - the ability to rapidly discriminate among
objects near the center of gaze in spite of naturally occurring identity-preserving image
variability - is thought to rely on the ventral visual stream. Decades of research
have shown that IT is a neural correlate of primate recognition behavior, but it is
still unclear if and how IT causally supports this general ability. Using reversible
inactivation of local regions in IT, we here provide direct causal evidence for the
role of IT in object recognition. We found that inactivating different millimeter-scale
regions of primate IT resulted in different patterns of object recognition deficits, each
predicted by the local region's neuronal selectivity. To the best of our knowledge,
this' is the first study to demonstrate the necessity of IT cortex for a wide range
of general core object recognition behaviors with behaviorally critical topographic
organization.
'The contents of this chapter are adapted from a journal article in preparation [Rajalingham and
DiCarlo, 2018].
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4.1 Introduction
Primate core visual object recognition - the ability to rapidly recognize objects
in spite of naturally occurring identity-preserving image variability - is thought to
rely on the ventral visual stream, a hierarchy of visual cortical areas [DiCarlo et al.,
2012]. In particular, decades of research suggest that inferior temporal (IT) cortex,
the highest level of the ventral stream hierarchy, is a necessary part of the brain's
neural network that underlies core recognition behavior [Logothetis and Sheinberg,
1996, Tanaka, 1996, Rolls, 2000, DiCarlo et al., 2012]. For example, it has been
shown that the population of neurons in IT not only matches overall primate behav-
ioral performance [Hung et al., 2005, Zhang et al., 20111 but also predicts primate
behavioral patterns [Sheinberg and Logothetis, 1997, de Beeck et al., 2001, Majaj
et al., 2015], suggesting that IT is a good neural correlate of primate recognition be-
havior. These observations are consistent with the causal dependency of core object
recognition behavior on IT, but could also reflect epiphenomenal mechanisms [Katz
et al., 2016, Liu and Pack, 2017]. For clarity, we adopt the terminology of [Jazayeri
and Afraz, 2017], whereby causal dependencies link a dependent variable to an ex-
perimentally controlled variable, in contrast to correlational dependencies which are
associations that we measure but do not control (e.g. associations between neural ac-
tivity and behavior measured as visual stimuli are experimentally controlled). Thus,
to infer a causal link between activity in IT and behavior, it is necessary to directly
manipulate activity in IT (e.g. via the application of pharmacological agents into IT
to silence neurons, etc.) while measuring behavior.
To date, the most successful direct manipulations of IT have exclusively targeted
at millimeter-scale clusters of face-selective neurons in IT [Afraz et al., 2006, Afraz
et al., 2015, Moeller et al., 2017, Sadagopan et al., 2017]. These results suggest that
these IT sub-regions are necessary for at least some basic- and subordinate-level face
recognition behaviors. However, results from direct manipulations of IT in general
visual recognition behavior have been equivocal at best. Lesions of IT sometimes
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suggest the necessity of IT and visual behaviors [Cowey and Gross, 1970, Manning,
1972, Holmes and Gross, 1984, Biederman et al., 1997, Buffalo et al., 2000] but
the resulting behavioral deficits are often contradictory (with often no lasting visual
deficits) [Dean, 1974, Huxlin et al., 2000] and at best modest (e.g. 10-15% drop in
performance for large-scale bilateral removal of IT when a complete loss of perfor-
mance would have been 40%) [Horel et al., 1987, Matsumoto et al., 2016]. Thus, it is
still unclear if IT is necessary for general core object recognition behavior. Moreover,
even if IT cortex is indeed necessary for all core object recognition tasks, it is unclear
if that assumed causal role is spatially organized. For example, the current literature
on monkey IT is not inconsistent with the hypothesis that every square millimeter of
IT cortex outside of the fMRI-defined face patches is equally involved in all (non-face)
object discriminations.
To investigate these open questions, we here reversibly inactivated individual, ar-
bitrarily sampled millimeter-scale regions of IT via local injection of muscimol while
monkeys performed a battery of binary core object discrimination tasks, interleaved
trial-by-trial. Our results show that inactivation of even single, millimeter-scale re-
gions of IT resulted in reliable contralateral-biased behavioral deficits. Interestingly,
these deficits were highly selective over recognition tasks - inactivating a small re-
gion of IT produced deficits in only a subset of tasks. Furthermore, inactivating
different millimeter-scale regions of primate IT resulted in different patterns of ob-
ject recognition deficits. Moreover, the effect of inactivation was topographically
organized in that the pattern of behavioral deficit was most similar at anatomically
neighboring (within 2mm) injection sites. We also found that the pattern of task
deficits was well predicted by the local region's neuronal selectivity. Taken together,
these results demonstrate the necessity of IT cortex for a wide range of general core
object recognition behaviors, and that - even outside of face patches - IT cortex
has behaviorally-critical topographic organization for visual features as previously
suggested [Wang et al., 1998, Tsunoda et al., 20011.
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4.2 Results
Binary object
discrimination tasks
(interleaved trial-by-trial)
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Elephant
Dog
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Figure 4-1: : (a) Behavioral paradigm. The list shows all tested pairwise object
discrimination tasks between five objects, interleaved trial-by-trial. Each trial was
initiated when the monkey acquired and held gaze fixation on a central fixation point
for 200ms, after which a test image (8x8 degrees of visual angle in size) appeared at the
center of gaze for 100ms. After extinction of the test image, two choice images, each
displaying a single object in a canonical view with no background, were immediately
shown to the left and right. One of these two objects was always the same as the
object that generated the test image (i.e. the correct choice), and its location (left
or right) was randomly chosen on each trial. The monkey was allowed to freely
view the choice images for up to 10OOms, and indicated its final choice by holding
fixation over the selected image for 700ms. Animals were rewarded with small juice
rewards for successfully completing each trial. After the end of each trial, another
fixation point before the next test image appeared. (b) Visual images. Two (out of
hundreds) example images per object, for each of the five objects and for both image
sets, are shown. Stimuli consisted of naturalistic synthetic images of 3D objects
rendered under high view-uncertainty and overlaid on a naturalistic background. We
additionally generated a dataset consisting of texture-less images of the same objects.
For the purpose of the current work, we treat both of these image sets as equivalent,
namely as images of the same five objects under study. (c) Control behavior. Each
matrix shows the control behavioral performance over binary object recognition tasks,
for each monkey and image set type. To reliably measure performance for each task
within a single behavioral session, we sub-selected six of these ten tasks for most
experiments. For a subset of experiments in one animal (monkey P, experiment 2),
we tested all 10 binary tasks.
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As stated in the introduction, our primary goal was to determine if IT causally sup-
ports object recognition, and whether any such causal role is functionally specific at
the millimeter-scale. To investigate this, we reversibly inactivated individual, arbi-
trarily sampled millimeter-scale regions of IT via injection of muscimol while monkeys
performed a battery of binary core object discrimination tasks. Figure 4-1 shows the
behavioral paradigm used for testing monkeys' core object recognition behavior. We
tested several (6 or 10) pairwise object discrimination tasks between five objects, in-
terleaved trial-by-trial (see Figure 4-1 A for task list, and C for control behavior on
these tasks). To enforce true invariant recognition, stimuli consisted of naturalistic
synthetic images of 3D objects rendered under high view-uncertainty (see 4-1 B for
example images).
Figure 4-2A shows the behavioral data for an example inactivation experiment,
for each of six tasks. Each panel shows the relative behavioral performance (mean
SE, obtained by bootstrap resampling over trials) for a given binary task, for each
of three consecutive behavioral sessions (pre-control, inactivation, and post-control;
see Methods). Performance is shown relative the average of pre- and post-control
performances, which we use as a measure of control behavior (see Methods); the dark
and light shaded areas correspond to one and two SE of this measure, respectively.
We observed a strong and significant deficit for some tasks (i.e. chair versus dog,
chair versus plane, and dog versus bear) but not others (elephant versus bear, dog
versus elephant). The resulting pattern of behavioral deficits for this one example
inactivation site in IT is shown in Figure 4-2B, with the corresponding anatomical
location shown in the inset. Figure 4-2C shows the pattern of behavioral deficits for
eight more example inactivation sites in IT from both monkeys (monkey M, P in the
first and second row, respectively). We qualitatively observe that inactivating each
local region resulted in strong task-specific behavioral deficits. Together, these results
suggest that inactivating different millimeter-scale regions of primate IT resulted in
different patterns of task deficits. This inference is directly and quantitatively tested
in the following analyses.
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Figure 4-2: (a) Example inactivation experiment. For an example inactivation exper-
iment, the behavioral performance for each of six tasks is shown. Each panel shows
the relative behavioral performance (mean SE, obtained by bootstrap resampling
over trials) for each of three consecutive behavioral sessions (pre-control, inactivation,
and post-control; see Methods). Performance is shown relative the average of pre-
and post-control performances, which we use as a measure of control behavior (see
Methods); the dark and light shaded areas correspond to one and two SE respectively
of this measure. We observe a strong and significant deficit for some tasks (i.e. chair
versus dog, chair versus plane, and dog versus bear) but not others (elephant versus
bear, dog versus elephant). (b) For the example inactivation site in IT in (a), the
behavioral deficits are summarized relative to the average control performance on the
right panel (mean SE over trials). (c) N more example inactivation sites in IT in
both monkeys, each with their anatomical locations and resulting behavioral deficits
over tasks. Formatting as in 2A.
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Figure 4-3: : (a) Behavioral deficits for all inactivation sites and all tasks in both
monkeys as a scatter of control performance and inactivation performance, showing
a significant decrease in performance corresponding to points under the unity line
(dashed line). (b) Summary of behavioral deficits. The red bars show the magni-
tude of inactivation deficit, for all tasks and for all inactivation sites. The blue bars
correspond to otherwise identical experiments but without muscimol inactivation. In-
activation of local regions of IT resulted in highly reliable behavioral deficits, which
were selective over visual space (i.e. contralateral-biased) and selective over tasks
(red bars).
Figure 4-3 shows the behavioral deficits for all inactivation sites and all tasks in both
monkeys as a scatter of control performance versus inactivation performance (4-3A).
We observed a significant decrease in performance, corresponding to points under
the unity line; on average, this amounted to a global deficit of A6 = -0.2 0.02 in
units of d' (p = 1.23 * 101, one-tailed exact test; see Figure 4-3B, red bar under
global deficit). We observed no such behavioral deficit on otherwise identical experi-
ments but without inactivation, (ps = 0.02 0.03, p = 0.78; one-tailed exact test; see
blue bar). Consistent with the known lateralization of IT [Op De Beeck and Vogels,
2000], this deficit was more pronounced for contralateral stimuli (A6 = -0.26 0.03,
p = 1.28e - 16) than for ipsilateral stimuli (pb = -0.17 0.03, p = 3.82 * 10-12) and
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this difference was significant (p = 0.0128, one-tailed exact test; ipsi vs. contra). Note
that all images were presented foveally (-4 to 4 deg), and contralateral stimuli refers
to images where the center of the object was located on the side of the image that
corresponds to the contralateral visual hemifield, while potentially still overlapping
with both hemifields.
Next we asked whether the inactivation deficits were task-specific. Rather than
examine each task individually, we assigned a weight (wi E [0, 1]) to each task
to characterize its deficit, resulting in a weight vector for each inactivation exper-
iment. Weights were obtained by non-negative least squares linear optimization with
Tikhonov regularization, enforcing that the sum of all weights over tasks equals one.
Intuitively, a weight of zero corresponds to no deficit at all, and a weight of one corre-
sponds to a unique deficit (i.e. only this task was affected). Crucially, the task weights
were optimized on held-out data; we split our data into two disjoint halves of trials,
optimized the task weights from one split-half, and applied the optimized weight
vector on the second split-half (see Methods). Using this procedure, we observed a
significantly greater deficit when task are optimally re-weighted (ps = -0.31 + 0.04,
p = 1.63 * 10-16), indicating that behavioral deficits are not uniform over tasks
(p 7.09 * 10-3, one-tailed exact test; weighted task average vs. global). We re-
peated this procedure with an indicator weight vector, which has a value of one for
the most affected task and zero for all others; again, the weight vector was opti-
mized on held-out data (split-half of trials). Applying this re-weighting resulted in
the average deficit for the most affected task (Ij = -0.38 0.07, p = 1.90 * 10-16),
which was also significantly more pronounced than the global deficit (p = 9.62 *10-
one-tailed exact test; most affected vs. global). As expected, we observed even larger
deficits for the maximally affected task than for the task-weighted average, but did
not have sufficient power to distinguish between these two (p > 0.05, exact test).
Finally, the conjunction of task-selective and contralateral selective effects is shown
on the right most bars; we observed even greater deficits for contralateral stimuli
when reweighting across tasks ([t = -0.38 0.06, p = 2.12 * 10-16) or selecting the
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maximally affected task (ps = -0.46 0.10, p = 6.31 * 10-9) than for the global
deficit (p = 0.032,0.031 for global contra vs. task-reweight contra and most affected
contra, respectively). For each of the analyzed conditions, we observed no significant
behavioral deficits on otherwise identical experiments without musciniol inactivation
(p > 0.05; Figure 4-3B, blue bars). Furthermore, the patterns of deficits across these
analyzed conditions were similar for both animals. In summary, inactivation of local
regions of IT resulted in highly reliable behavioral deficits, which were selective over
visual space (i.e. contralateral-biased) and selective over tasks.
4.2.2 Task-selectivity of deficits
Planevs. Bear- -B*-
Plane vs. Elephant- Task weight
Chair vsBear - o1
Chairvs. Elephant-
Elephant vs. Bear-
Dog vs. Bear -
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Individual injection sites Average over injection sites
Figure 4-4: (a) The heat map shows the task weight vectors for each of the 25 in-
activation sites, with brighter colors corresponding to larger relative task deficits,
highlighting that inactivation of different sites resulted in different non-uniform, or
relatively sparse, deficit weight pattern. The average weight pattern over all inacti-
vation sites (right column) is largely uniform. (b) Inactivation of local regions in IT
leads to significantly non-uniform deficits (SI = 0.71 0.05; mean SE over sites), as
quantified by the sparsity of task weight vectors.
As described above, we characterized each behavioral deficit pattern with a task
weight vector w. Figure 4-4 shows the task weight vectors for each inactivation sites
as a heat map, where brighter colors correspond to larger relative task deficits for
contralateral stimuli. Consistent with the inferred task-selectivity from Figure 4-3,
we observed that each inactivation resulted in a non-uniform, or relatively sparse,
deficit weight pattern (Figure 4-4A). Importantly, inactivation of different sites led to
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different deficit weight patterns (Figure 4-4A, left) while the average weight pattern
over all sites is largely uniform (Figure 4-4A, right), indicating that the non-uniformity
of task deficits is not tied to specific tasks. Moreover, the task deficit weights were
not significantly correlated with task difficulty (r = 0.06, p = 0.39). Together, these
suggest that inactivation of IT results in task-specific behavioral deficits.
We quantified this task-selectivity by computing a sparsity index from each inac-
tivation's behavioral deficit pattern. This index has a value of 0 for uniform deficit
patterns, and a value of 1 for a perfectly task-specialized or one-hot deficit pattern.
Figure 4-4B shows that inactivation of local regions in IT leads to highly non-uniform
deficits (SI = 0.71 0.05; mean SE over sites); this degree of task selectivity is
greater than expected for a uniform deficit (p = 2.42 * 10-16; relative to simulated
uniform, see Figure 4-4B, Methods) but significantly less than expected for a one-hot
deficit pattern (p = 5.28 * 10-; relative to simulated one-hot, see Figure 4-4B, Meth-
ods). This inference holds even when computing the sparsity index from a normalized
deficit pattern vector (SI = 0.74 0.06; p = 2.21 * 10-6, p = 0.02 relative to sim-
ulated uniform and one-hot, respectively), ensuring again that this non-uniformity
does not simply reflect non-uniformity in the behavioral difficulty across tasks. Thus,
inactivating local regions in IT results in highly task-selective patterns of behavioral
deficits.
4.2.3 Tissue-selectivity of deficits
Figure 4-4A suggests that the patterns of task deficits are also tissue-specific; i.e.
inactivating different anatomical regions of IT resulted in different patterns of task
deficits. To directly test this, we compared the contralateral deficits of pairs of in-
activation; pairwise deficit pattern similarity was quantified using a noise-adjusted
correlation ( , see Methods). We considered all pairs of deficits, measured within
the same animal and image-set, that had split-half internal reliability greater than
a threshold 0 (n = 62 pairs for 0 = 0.1), but results did not depend on the choice
of the threshold 0. We measured the dependence of pairwise deficit similarity on
the anatomical distance between the inactivation sites, where anatomical distance
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(d) was computed as the Euclidean distance between the injection site locations esti-
mated via high-resolution micro-focal stereo x-ray reconstruction (see Methods). We
first observed that inactivation deficits are highly replicable across experiments; the
noise-adjusted correlation between behavioral deficit patterns of neighboring inacti-
vation sites was near ceiling (3 = 0.92 0.03 for d < 1mm, Figure 4-5). We further
observe that this similarity between the inactivation deficits of two injection sites was
monotonically related to the anatomical distance between (Figure 4-5). A simple ex-
ponential decay model (half-max-full-width HMFW = 3.29 1.19mm) significantly
explained this relationship (R2 = 0.36 t 0.12, p = 8.04* 10~-4). Given that computing
the noise-adjusted correlation required splitting the data into disjoint halves, we did
not further split the data (into train and test splits) for cross-validated testing of this
model. Instead, we verified that this model correlation is not expected by chance, by
fitting the model on randomly shuffled data (R2 = 0.00 0.13, p = 0.50). Together,
these results suggest that behavioral deficits are tissue-specific, i.e. the effect of inac-
tivation is different for different inactivation sites, and most similar at anatomically
neighboring injection sites.
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Figure 4-5: (a) Topographical organization. The similarity of behavioral deficit pat-
terns, quantified as a noise-adjusted correlation, between pairs of injection sites is
plotted as a function of the anatomical distance between sites. This relationship
shows that inactivation deficits are highly replicable; the noise-adjusted correlation
between behavioral deficit patterns of neighboring inactivation sites was at ceiling.
Moreover, the similarity between any two inactivation deficits was monotonically re-
lated to their anatomical distance. Light blue points scatter all pairs. Binned values,
with log-spaced sampling of tissue distance, are shown in dark blue (mean i SE). A
simple exponential model significantly explained this relationship (see inset).
4.2.4 Neuronal readout models
Given the observed tissue specificity, we asked to what extent the observed behavioral
deficits could be predicted by the local neuronal activity. The central panel in Figure
4-6A shows the location of an example muscimol inactivation site, co-registered with
local electrophysiology sites, overlaid on a coronal MRI slice. For this example site
in IT, we recorded the activity of eight multi-unit sites (shown in cyan) in close
proximity to the injection site (shown in red). Multi-unit activity was recorded in
response to the same images as those used in behavioral testing, in a passive viewing
paradigm (see Methods). Each sub-panel shows a multi-unit site's stimulus-locked
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firing rate responses for each of the five objects, averaged over images. We note that
neuronal sites, while heterogeneous, each exhibit reliable object preferences. Based on
local neuronal responses such as this, we constructed and tested a number of decoder
models, which each map the firing rate image response patterns of local neuronal sites
to a predicted behavioral deficit.
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Figure 4-6: (a) Local neurophysiology. For an example muscimol inactivation site,
the location of injection co-registered with local electrophysiology recording sites is
shown overlaid on a coronal MRI slice. For each the eight neighboring physiology
sites, the mean multi-unit visual response aligned to stimulus onset is shown. The
stimulus consisted of images of each of the five object categories, and the stimulus
duration (0-100ms) is shown with a gray bar. Neuronal sites, while heterogeneous,
each exhibit reliable object preferences. (b) To determine whether the observed be-
havioral deficits are predicted by local neuronal activity, we constructed and tested
a number of decoder models that transform these response patterns into predictions
of behavioral deficits. The predictions from each of these models, as well as the true
(measured) behavioral deficit, are shown for the example inactivation site in (a). The
two columns correspond to two variants of decoding models within each class. Note
that larger deficits correspond to more negative (i.e. smaller) values of Ad'. (c) The
predictive power of each of these readout models is shown as the noise-adjusted cor-
relation between predicted and actual behavioral deficits, for all relevant sites (with
available local physiology on the same images). Of the models that we tested, the
most consistent readout model was the local neuronal selectivity.
The tested decoder models roughly correspond to three taxonomical categories:
local neural response models, local neural selectivity models, and local population
selectivity models. For each category, we tested multiple model instances, varying in
the precise details of how neural activity is mapped to the prediction of behavioral
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deficits (see Methods). The local neural response models predict largest deficits for
tasks with images that yielded largest response from the local neuronal sites. This
model class is based on multi-stage readout models (see Methods, Discussion) that
predict that neurons that respond highly to particular stimulus classes (e.g. dogs,
planes and bears for the example in Figure 4-6A), regardless of whether they ex-
plicitly encode differences between them, serve as a domain-specific gates for later
discrimination between them (e.g. plane versus dog, or dog versus bear). In contrast,
the neural selectivity and population selectivity models predict largest deficits for
tasks for which the local neural sample was most discriminative, as measured by a
linear classifier. This model class is based on population readout models of IT [Majaj
et al., 2015].
We qualitatively observe that the selectivity models better capture the true be-
havioral deficit pattern than the response models, for this example inactivation site
(see 4-6B). This is quantified in Figure 4-6C as a noise-adjusted correlation between
predicted and actual behavioral deficits, over all inactivation sites with local neural
recordings (n=10 sites for d<lmm). All selectivity models significantly predict the
inactivation deficits (p < 0.001 for local neuronal and population selectivity models,
respectively), while the response models failed to do so (p > 0.05 for local response
models). In summary, inactivation of millimeter-scale regions of IT results in behav-
ioral deficits that are predicted by the local neuronal activity, and furthermore, the
causal link constrains the specific mapping from neurons to behavior.
4.3 Discussion
In this work, we sought to investigate if and how neural activity in IT causally sup-
ports core object recognition behavior. To answer this, we reversibly inactivated in-
dividual, arbitrarily sampled millimeter-scale regions of IT while monkeys performed
a battery of object discrimination tasks. The conceptual advance of this work is
two-fold. First, we provide direct causal evidence for the role of IT in core object
recognition, which was largely lacking - especially beyond the specific case of face-
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selective sub-regions of IT. Second, we uncovered that the causal role of IT in object
recognition is topographically organized and predicted by the local neuronal selectiv-
ity. These phenomena -namely, the magnitude and sparsity of behavioral deficits
from millimeter-scale inactivations, their pairwise similarity as a function of anatom-
ical distance, and the consistency to some but not all neural decoding models- are
strong constraints for computational models of the ventral stream and its role in core
object recognition behavior.
4.3.1 Direct causal evidence for the role of IT in core object
recognition
To fix terminology, we first define the following decoding hypothesis: IT cortex is a
necessary part of the brain's neural network that underlies core recognition behavior
or, stated in other words, core object recognition behavior causally depends on
IT cortex. To test this decoding hypothesis, we adopt the terminology of [Jazayeri
and Afraz, 2017], whereby causal dependencies can be inferred by linking a depen-
dent variable to an experimentally controlled variable, in contrast to correlational
dependencies which are associations between variables that are measured but not
experimentally controlled. Thus, to infer a causal link between activity in IT and be-
havior, it is necessary to directly manipulate activity in IT (e.g. via the application
of pharmacological agents into IT to silence neurons, etc.) while measuring behavior.
Related correlational dependencies (e.g. via direct manipulation of visual input to
the retinae while measuring variations from both IT activity and behavior) are consis-
tent with causal dependencies but could also reflect epiphenomenal mechanisms; i.e.
correlation does not imply causation. Recently, research in other behavioral domains
has exposed potential epiphenomenal mechanisms [Katz et al., 2016, Liu and Pack,
2017], highlighting the need to test directly causal dependencies.
With respect to our stated decoding hypothesis, decades of neurophysiological
and neuropsychological research have uncovered correlational dependencies between
activity in IT cortex and primate object recognition behavior [Logothetis and Shein-
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berg, 1996, Tanaka, 1996, Rolls, 2000, DiCarlo et al., 2012]. Individual neurons in
IT cortex are selective to complex visual features in images, and exhibit remarkable
tolerance to changes in viewing parameters [Kobatake and Tanaka, 1994, Ito et al.,
1995, Logothetis et al., 1995, Booth and Rolls, 1998, Rust and DiCarlo, 2010]. More-
over, a simple readout from the population of neurons in IT not only matches overall
primate behavioral performance [Hung et al., 2005, Zhang et al., 20111 but also reli-
ably predicts the behavioral error patterns [Majaj et al., 2015]. Taken together, these
results are consistent with our decoding hypothesis, but could also reflect epiphenom-
enal mechanisms. Direct causal evidence is still largely lacking for this hypothesis. To
this end, our first major contribution in this work is to provide direct causal evidence
for the role of IT in core object recognition behavior.
Prior to this, causal evidence for the role of IT in core object recognition has been
both scarce and equivocal. Lesions of IT suggest a coarse causal link between this
area and visual behaviors [Cowey and Gross, 1970, Manning, 1972, Holmes and Gross,
1984, Weiskrantz and Saunders, 1984, Buffalo et al., 1998, Huxlin et al., 2000, Mat-
sumoto et al., 2016] but the resulting behavioral deficits are often contradictory [Dean,
1974, Huxlin et al., 2000] and at best modest [Horel et al., 1987, Matsumoto et al.,
2016]. For example, recent work showed that near complete ablation of IT (bilateral
removal of anterior IT) resulted in only mild (10-15%) deficits in object categoriza-
tion [Matsumoto et al., 2016]. Similar modest behavioral deficits on visual recognition
tasks were also observed with large-scale reversible inactivation via cooling of the tem-
poral lobe [Horel et al., 1987]. It is unclear to what extent these modest behavioral
deficits can be explained by limitations of the methodologies and the behavioral as-
says, which may not be robust to alternative (potentially compensatory) behavioral
strategies. Several other (higher-resolution) methodologies using focal reversible neu-
ral perturbation methods (e.g. electrical, pharmacological, optogenetic and chemo-
genetic perturbations) have been successfully used in testing decoding hypotheses in
other behavioral domains [Salzman et al., 1990, Recanzone et al., 1992, Celebrini and
Newsome, 1995, Britten and van Wezel, 1998, DeAngelis et al., 1998, Romo et al.,
1998, Thier and Andersen, 1998, Romo et al., 2000, Bisley et al., 2001, Nichols and
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Newsome, 2002, Zhang et al., 2011, Jazayeri et al., 2012, Dai et al., 2014, Eldridge
et al., 2016] (we note that these methods likely do not completely rule out the pos-
sibility of dynamic downstream compensation [Fetsch et al., 2018]). Only a handful
of studies have reported using focal reversible neural perturbation tools to test the
stated decoding hypothesis in IT. Interestingly, these studies exclusively targeted
spatial clusters of face-selective neurons in IT, testing the causal role of these regions
in basic- and subordinate-level face recognition behaviors [Afraz et al., 2006, Afraz
et al., 2015, Moeller et al., 2017, Sadagopan et al., 2017] (beyond object recognition,
one study tested the causal role of spatial clusters of disparity selective neurons in a
disparity discrimination task [Verhoef et al., 2012]). Thus, our results provide much
needed direct causal evidence for the general decoding hypothesis.
4.3.2 The causal role of IT in object recognition is topograph-
ically organized
While faces are an especially behaviorally relevant stimulus class for primates [Tsao
and Livingstone, 2008], the experimental bias towards face-selective spatial clusters
in IT is likely related to the spatial resolution limitations of current neural perturba-
tion tools, which operate on groups of spatially contiguous neurons at approximately
millimeter-scale. Given this limitation, the known millimeter-scale spatial clusters of
face selective regions in IT [Tsao et al., 2003, Tsao et al., 2006, Tsao and Livingstone,
2008] form an intuitively optimal candidate for testing causal dependencies related
to our decoding hypothesis. We note that similar spatial clustering has been re-
ported for a small number of stimulus domains [Conway et al., 2007, Kornblith et al.,
2013, Lafer-Sousa and Conway, 2013, Verhoef et al., 2015]. Given that these regions
respond preferentially to images of faces over other objects, previous studies targeting
these regions have tested their causal role in basic- and subordinate-level face recog-
nition behaviors [Afraz et al., 2006, Afraz et al., 2015, Moeller et al., 2017, Sadagopan
et al., 20171. Importantly, the topographic organization of neurons in IT is largely
unknown and assumed by many to be functionally random and heterogeneous be-
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yond these discrete clusters. To support a general inference, we here tested arbitrary
sampled millimeter-scale regions of ventral IT, rather than functionally target inac-
tivation sites. Interestingly, we found that inactivation of different regions in ventral
IT led to different task-specific deficits, suggesting some functional specificity for ar-
bitrarily sampled millimeter-scale regions. Based on our data, it is unclear whether
this topographic organization is stereotyped, as is the case with previously reported
discrete clusters [Tsao et al., 20061, or highly variable across different subject. This
topographical organization is consistent with previously reported sub-millimeter scale
columnar organization of neurons in IT [Fujita et al., 1992, Tanaka, 1996, Wang et al.,
1996, Wang et al., 1998]. We speculate that this topographic organization reflects a
general principle of global cortical layout, whereby neuronal selectivities are optimized
in the face of metabolic constraints (e.g. minimization of connection wiring length
[Chklovskii et al., 20021). These phenomena could guide computational models of the
ventral stream and its role in core object recognition behavior.
4.3.3 The causal role of IT in object recognition is predicted
by the local neuronal selectivity
Finally, we found that behavioral deficits from inactivating millimeter scale regions
of IT are consistent with predictions from a spatially distributed readout of neurons
in IT, as evidenced by the ability of particular local neural selectivity readout mod-
els to predict inactivation deficits. In contrast, inactivation deficits were not well
predicted by particular local neural response readout models. These models are one
possible instantiation of a class of multi-stage readout models that frame detection
and discrimination as separate, sequential stages; such models have been proposed
for a number of putative specialized domains [Tsao and Livingstone, 2008, Chang and
Tsao, 2017]. Multi-stage readout models predict that neurons that respond highly to
particular stimulus classes (e.g. dogs and planes), without explicitly encoding the dif-
ferences between them, serve as domain-specific gates for later discrimination between
them. Thus, one might expect that inactivating these neurons should result in large
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behavioral deficits for such discriminations (i.e. for discriminating between dogs and
planes). Previously, it was difficult to discriminate between these two model classes,
as detection and discrimination ability were highly correlated within face-selective
neurons [Afraz et al., 20151, but our data here are sufficiently powerful to make this
distinction. In summary, our data are consistent with at least one readout model,
and provide constraints for discriminating between alternative readout models that
link neural responses to object recognition behaviors.
4.4 Methods
4.4.1 Subjects and surgery
Two adult male rhesus macaque monkeys (Macaca mulatta, subjects M, P) were
trained on the core object recognition paradigm described below. For each animal, a
surgery using sterile technique was performed under general anaesthesia to implant a
titanium head post to the skull using titanium screws, and a steel cylindrical record-
ing chamber (19 mm inner diameter; Crist Instruments) over a craniotomy targeting
the temporal lobe in the left hemisphere from the top of the skull (Monkey M, +13
mm posterior-anterior, +16.3 mm medial-lateral, 150 medial-lateral angle; Monkey P,
+13 mm posterior-anterior, +14.75 mm medial-lateral, 15' medial-lateral angle). All
procedures were performed in compliance with National Institutes of Health guide-
lines and the standards of the MIT Committee on Animal Care and the American
Physiological Society.
4.4.2 Core object recognition behavioral paradigm
Core object discrimination is defined as the ability to discriminate between two or
more objects in visual images presented under high view uncertainty in the central
visual field (- 10), for durations that approximate the typical primate, free-viewing
fixation duration (- 200 ms) [DiCarlo and Cox, 2007, DiCarlo et al., 2012]. As in
our previous work [Rajalingham et al., 2015, Rajalingham et al., 2018], we investigate
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this behavior using an interleaved set of binary match-to-sample discrimination tasks.
The behavioral paradigm is described below. Behavioral data was collected under
head fixation, and subjects reported their choices using their gaze. We monitored
eye position by tracking the position of the pupil using a camera-based system (SR
Research Eyelink 1000). Images were presented on a 27" LCD monitor (1920 x 1080
at 60 Hz; Samsung S27A850D) positioned 44 cm in front of the animal. At the
start of each training session, subjects performed an eye-tracking calibration task by
saccading to a range of spatial targets and maintaining fixation for 800ms. Calibration
was repeated if drift was noticed over the course of the session.
Figure 4-1A illustrates the behavioral paradigm. Each trial was initiated when
the monkey acquired and held gaze fixation on a central fixation point for 200ms,
after which a test image (8 x 8' of visual angle in size) appeared at the center of gaze
for 100ms. Trials were aborted if gaze was not held within 2'. After extinction of
the test image, two choice images, each displaying a single object in a canonical view
with no background, were immediately shown to the left and right (each centered
at 8' of eccentricity along the horizontal meridian; see Fig. 1B). One of these two
objects was always the same as the object that generated the test image (i.e. the
correct choice), and its location (left or right) was randomly chosen on each trial.
The object that was not displayed in the test image is referred to as the distractor
object, but note that objects are equally likely to be distractors and targets. The
monkey was allowed to freely view the choice images for up to 10OOms, and indicated
its final choice by holding fixation over the selected image for 700ms. The monkey
was rewarded with small juice rewards for successfully completing each trial. After
the end of each trial, another fixation point appeared, cueing the next trial. Each
trial consisted of a different randomly selected binary task. Real-time experiments
for monkey psychophysics were controlled by open-source software (MWorks Project
http://mworks-project.org/).
Both animals were previously trained on other images of other objects, and were
proficient in discriminating between over 35 object categories. In this study, five new
objects were tested, which resulted in ten possible binary object discrimination tasks
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(see Figure 4-1A for complete list). To reliably measure performance for each task
within a single behavioral session, we sub-selected six of these ten tasks for most
experiments. For a subset of experiments in one animal (monkey P, experiment 2),
we tested all 10 binary tasks. For each session, monkeys were tested for several hours
(until satiation) and performed a large number of trials (monkey M: 3442 1097, mon-
key P: 4430 942; mean SD). Figure 4-iC shows the control behavioral performance
for each monkey and image set.
4.4.3 Visual images
We examined basic-level object recognition behavior using naturalistic synthetic im-
ages of a set of five objects. The image generation pipeline is described in detail
elsewhere. Briefly, each image was generated by first rendering a 3D model of the
object with randomly chosen viewing parameters (2D position, 3D rotation and view-
ing distance), and then placing that foreground object view onto a randomly chosen,
natural image. Object models spanned basic-level object categories (bear, elephant,
dog, airplane, and chair). Background images were sampled randomly from a large
database of high-dynamic range images of indoor and outdoor scenes obtained from
Dosch Design (www.doschdesign.com). This image generation procedure enforces in-
variant object recognition, rather than image matching, as it requires the animal to
tackle the invariance problem, the computational crux of object recognition [Ullman
and Humphreys, 1996, Pinto et al., 20081.
The majority of the behavioral data presented here was collected in response to a
base image set of five objects rendered with the image generation pipeline described
above (40 images/object, 200 images in total). We additionally generated a variant
of this dataset consisting of texture-less images of the same objects. These images
were targeted to both titrate the task difficulty and further remove potential low-
level confounds (e.g. luminance and contrast). For this image set, new images of the
same objects with the same generative parameters were generated on each behavioral
session, while holding a portion of images (20%) fixed across sessions. For the purpose
of the current work, we treat both of these image sets as equivalent, namely as
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images of the same five objects under study differing only in their precise generative
parameters. Figure 4-1B shows example two images for each object, from both image
sets.
4.4.4 Physiology and pharmacology
In each animal, we first recorded multi-unit activity (MUA) from randomly sampled
sites on the ventral surface of IT (monkey M: 57 multi-unit sites, monkey P: 43
multi-unit sites). Recordings were made using glass-coated tungsten microelectrodes
(impedance, 0.3-0.5MQ; outer diameter, 310um; Alpha Omega). A motorized micro-
drive (Alpha Omega) was used to lower electrodes through a 26-gauge stainless-steel
guide tube inserted into the brain (5 mm) and held by a plastic grid inside the
recording chamber (CRIST). We recorded MUA responses from IT while monkeys
passively fixated images in a rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) protocol (10
images/trial, 100ms on, 100 ms off). To ensure accurate stimulus presentation, eye
position was tracked and trials were aborted if gaze was not held within 1.5. To
ensure accurate stimulus locking, spikes were aligned to a photodiode trigger attached
to the display screen. Multi-unit responses were amplified (lx head-stage), filtered
(250Hz cutoff), digitized (sampling rate of 40kHz) and sorted (Plexon MAP system,
Plexon Inc.). Firing rates were computed as the total number of spikes in two post-
stimulus windows (70-170ms, 170-270ms).
Following this mapping stage, we performed inactivation experiments using focal
microinjections of muscimol, a potent GABA agonist [Andrews and Johnston, 19791.
We varied the location of microinjections to randomly sample the ventral surface
of IT. Given the relatively long half-life of muscimol, inactivation sessions were in-
terleaved over days with control behavioral sessions. Each inactivation experiment
consisted of three behavioral sessions: the baseline or pre-control session (1 day prior
to injection), the inactivation session, and the recovery or post-control session (2 days
after injection). Each inactivation session began with a single focal microinjection of
lul of muscimol (5mg/ml, Sigma Aldrich) at a slow rate (100nl/min) via a 30-gauge
stainless-steel cannula at the targeted site in ventral IT. Injections were made with
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through a simple microinjection circuit consisting of a three-way valve (Labsmith)
and marker line (similar to [Noudoost and Moore, 20111), enabling precise monitor-
ing of the flow and volume of muscimol injected. In pilot experiments, we verified
complete neural suppression at the location of injection using custom-built single-use
injectrodes [Noudoost and Moore, 2011]. Given this volume of muscimol, we estimate
strong neural suppression within a local region of 2.5mm in diameter (with partial
suppression within a 4mm diameter region) for up to six hours after injection [Arikan
et al., 2002]. Immediately after injection, we waited 10-20 minutes before measuring
the monkey's behavior on a battery of object recognition tasks for up to 3 hours
post-injection.
To ensure accurate targeting of IT, all electrophysiological recordings and phar-
macological injections were made under micro-focal stereo x-ray guidance [Cox et al.,
2008]. Briefly, monkeys were fitted with a plastic frame (3 x 4 cm) positioned near
the temporal lobe using a plastic arm anchored in the dental acrylic implant. The
frame contained six brass fiducial markers (1mm diameter) of known geometry, mea-
sured using micro-CT. The fiducial markers formed a fixed 3D skull-based coordinate
system for registering all physiological recordings and pharmacological injection sites.
At each site, two x-rays were taken simultaneously at near orthogonal angles, and
the 3D location of the electrode/cannula tip was reconstructed relative to the skull
using stereo-photogrammetric techniques. This procedure enables high-resolution re-
construction (<200um error) of electrode and cannula locations across experimental
sessions [Cox et al., 2008, Issa et al., 2013].
In total, we collected data for 25 inactivation experiments in two monkeys (mon-
key M: n = 10 experiments, monkey P: n = 15 experiments). Throughout the
experimental data collection period, we additionally interleaved control experiments
of three consecutive control behavioral sessions each, with the same images and tasks
but with no injections. These data (n = 18 experiments), matching the three-session
design of inactivation experiments, form a control condition against natural inter-
session variability.
127
4.4.5 Analysis
Behavioral metrics
We previously introduced several metrics to characterize behavior in this binary
match-to-sample paradigm [Rajalingham et al., 20181. Here, we focus on the high-
est resolution behavioral metric that can be reliably measured in a single behavioral
session, the one-versus-other object level performance metric (termed B.02). Briefly,
this metric is a pattern of pairwise object discrimination performances. For each
pairwise object discrimination task, performance was estimated using a sensitivity
index d' [Macmillan, 1993]: d' = Z(hit rate) - Z(false alarm rate), where Z(.) is the
inverse of the cumulative Gaussian distribution. All d' estimates were constrained to
a range of [0,5].
Recall that each inactivation experiment consisted of three behavioral sessions.
We first equated the number of trials per session by selecting the first N trials of each
session, where N was the minimum number of trials across the three sessions. For
each of these three behavioral sessions, we then computed a pattern of performances
across tasks (b). To measure the behavioral deficit from inactivation, we estimated
a behavioral deficit pattern (6) as the difference between inactivated and control
performance over tasks: 6 V)inactivated - control. The control behavioral performance
was defined as the average of the pre-control and post-control performances: Ocontrol
(4precontroi + I)postcontroi)/2.
Task weight
For each behavioral deficit pattern 6, we estimated a task weight vector w to charac-
terize the deficit task-selectivity. To do so, we first calculated a matrix D where each
row is an estimate of 6 obtained via bootstrap resampling of trials. w was obtained
by non-negative least squares optimization with Tikhonov (or ridge) regularization
to minimize the weighted deficit lID -wil. We then enforced that weights sum to 1
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over tasks by normalizing by the sum:
i> = argminw.>O(-IID -w| + A2 |w||)
W = W/||1V||
Intuitively, a task weight (wi) of zero corresponds to no deficit on task i, and a weight
of one corresponds to a unique deficit (i.e. only task i was affected). Task weight
vectors were used to re-weight the task deficit pattern to compute a weighted average
deficit, rather than global deficit. Crucially, task weights were optimized on held-out
data to avoid double-dipping [Kriegeskorte et al., 20091. To do, we split our data into
two disjoint halves of trials, optimized the task weights from the behavioral deficit
patterns estimated from one split-half, and applied the optimized weight vector on
the second split-half.
We repeated this procedure with an indicator weight vector, which has a value of
one for the most affected task and zero for all others. Applying this weight results in
the average deficit for the most affected task. Again, the weight vector was optimized
on held-out data (split-half of trials).
Sparsity of deficit
We quantified the non-uniformity of the behavioral deficits using a sparsity index
SI(x) [Vinje and Gallant, 2000] as follows:
A(x) = E[x]2/(E[x2]),
SI(x) = (1 - A(x))/(1 - 1/N)
When applied to a behavioral deficit pattern, SI(6), this index has a value of 0 for
uniform deficit patterns, and a value of 1 for a one-hot deficit pattern. To ensure
that the sparsity of the behavioral deficit did not purely reflect non-uniformity in
the behavioral difficulty across tasks, we additionally computed this index from a
normalized deficit pattern vector: - Pinactivatedkcontrol
29inactivated Ocontro
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We compared the resulting SI estimate to those expected by simulated uniform
and one-hot deficit patterns, respectively. For each site, we first obtained a matrix of
deficit pattern estimates, with rows corresponding to different estimates obtained by
bootstrap resampling over trials, and columns corresponding to different tasks. To
simulate the uniform deficit pattern, we shuffled this matrix (across both dimensions),
thus removing any task specific structure while ensuring that the global deficit was
left unchanged. To simulate the one-hot deficit pattern, we replaced each row of this
matrix with a one-hot pattern, by setting all but the minimum value to zero. In all
cases, we first averaged this matrix over bootstrap estimates before computing the
SI. By estimating one SI value for each injection site, we obtained a distribution over
injection sites.
Neuronal readout models
To investigate the link between neuronal activity and inactivation deficits, we con-
structed and tested a number of decoding models. Each of these models predicts an
inactivation pattern from the activity of neurons recorded in close anatomical proxim-
ity (within 2mm) to the injection site. As described above, multi-unit neuronal activ-
ity was measured in response to the same images under a passive viewing paradigm.
For each recorded multi-unit site, we estimated a vector of firing rate responses over
images. The tested decoder models, which map these firing rate response vectors
to behavioral deficit predictions, roughly correspond to three taxonomical categories:
local neural response models, local neural selectivity models, and local population
selectivity models. For each category, we tested two model instances, varying in
the precise details of how neural activity is mapped to the prediction of behavioral
deficits, described in detail below.
The local neural response models predict largest deficits for tasks with images
that yielded largest response from the local neuronal sites. In practice, task deficit
predictions were computed as the negative of the average response for images in the
task, averaged over all multi-unit sites in the local population (i.e. all sites within 2mm
of the inactivation site). Variants of this model class differ in how neural response
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vectors were normalized (z-score versus midrange normalization) prior to averaging
across units. This model class is inspired from multi-stage readout models that predict
that neurons that respond highly to particular stimulus classes, regardless of whether
they explicitly encode differences between them, serve as domain-specific gates for
later discrimination between them [Tsao and Livingstone, 20081.
In contrast, the local neural selectivity and local population selectivity models
predict largest deficits for tasks for which the local neural population was most dis-
criminative, as measured by a linear classifier. We implemented the local neural
selectivity model predictions by training linear classifiers (binary linear SVMs) to
discriminate between objects from the mean neural response vector, averaged over
units. Again, variants of this model class differ in how neural response vectors were
normalized (z-score versus midrange normalization) prior to averaging across units.
We additionally implemented the local population selectivity model predictions by
training linear classifiers (binary linear SVMs) from the entire population of local
neuronal sites. In the first variant, we independently mapped each unit's response
vector to a behavioral deficit (as in the local neural selectivity model), and estimated
the average behavioral deficit prediction. In the second variant, we concatenated the
response vectors of all units in the local population to construct a feature matrix, and
trained linear classifiers on this matrix. For each of these four models, the predicted
deficit for a binary task was estimated as the negative of the cross-validated binary
discrimination performance for that task, in units of d'. The local neural selectivity
and local population selectivity models were loosely inspired from population readout
models of IT [Majaj et al., 2015]. Note, however, that the current implementations
do not include the remaining (non-local) IT population as inputs, as we did not have
access to a larger sample of IT.
Noise-adjusted correlations
We measured the similarity between two behavioral deficit patterns 61,62 (e.g. be-
tween true deficit patterns and predictions from a model) using a noise-adjusted
correlation [DiCarlo and Johnson, 1999, Johnson et al., 2002]. For each behavioral
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deficit pattern, we split all independent raw observations (e.g. behavioral trials) into
two equal halves and computed the behavioral deficit pattern from each half, resulting
in two independent estimates of the deficit pattern. We took the Pearson correlation
between these two estimates as a measure of the reliability of that behavioral deficit
pattern, given the data, i.e. the split-half internal reliability. To estimate the noise-
adjusted correlation between two deficit patterns, we compute the Pearson correlation
over all the independent estimates of deficits from each, and we then divide that raw
Pearson correlation by the geometric mean of the split-half internal reliability of each
deficit:
p(6 1,) 2 ) P6 1,6 2
fpa,31 X P62
Since all correlations in the numerator and denominator were computed using the
same amount of trial data (exactly half of the trial data), we did not need to make
use of any prediction formulas (e.g. extrapolation to larger number of trials using
Spearman-Brown prediction formula). This procedure was repeated 10 times with
different random split-halves of trials. Our rationale for using a reliability-adjusted
correlation measure was to account for variance in the behavioral deficit that is not
replicable by the task condition. If two behavioral deficits are identical, then their
expected noise-adjusted correlation is 1.0, regardless of the finite amount of data
that are collected. The noise-adjusted correlation was used to compute the similarity
between observed and predicted behavioral deficit patterns (e.g. for testing neural
readout models), as well as for the similarity between two different behavioral deficit
patterns arising from two different inactivation sites.
Statistical testing
Unless otherwise specified, we estimated the uncertainty in delta measurements via
bootstrap resampling of trials, repeated 100 times. The standard error of delta mea-
surements was estimated as the standard deviation of this bootstrap distribution.
For statistical tests, we performed one-tailed exact tests, by computing the empiri-
cal probability of observing a sample below zero. To compute this probability from
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the empirical bootstrap distribution, we fit a Gaussian kernel density function to the
empirical distribution, optimizing the bandwidth parameter to minimize the mean
squared error (kde.m on MATLAB file exchange). This kernel density function was
evaluated to compute a p-value, by computing the cumulative probability of observing
a positive behavioral delta.
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Chapter 5
Towards a chronically implantable
LED arrays for optogenetic
experiments in primates.
In this work, we sought to develop a novel neural perturbation tool to increase the
scale and throughput of current neural perturbation experiments in primates. To this
end, we tested a chronically implantable LED array for optogenetic perturbation in
primates in two different experiments, each testing the causal role a visual cortical
area in an established behavioral task. Our data do not support strong inferences
about the utility of this tool, in its current form, for neural perturbation experiments
in primates. Rather, these results provide a report of preliminary findings with guides
for improvements, both technological and experimental.
5.1 Introduction
Neural perturbation tools - pharmacological, electrical and optogenetic - have
helped establish detailed causal links between neural activity and a behavior of inter-
est for many behavioral domains [Salzman et al., 1990, Recanzone et al., 1992, Cele-
brini and Newsome, 1995, Britten and van Wezel, 1998, DeAngelis et al., 1998, Romo
et al., 1998, Thier and Andersen, 1998, Romo et al., 2000, Bisley et al., 2001, Nichols
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and Newsome, 2002, Zhang et al., 2011, Jazayeri et al., 2012, Dai et al., 2014, Afraz
et al., 2006, Afraz et al., 2015, Moeller et al., 2017, Sadagopan et al., 2017, Verhoef
et al., 2012]. Moreover, they are necessary in order to directly test decoding hypothe-
ses, i.e. to infer causal dependencies between neural activity and behaviors with
high confidence [Jazayeri and Afraz, 2017]. In particular, optogenetic perturbations,
whereby light-sensitive ion channels are embedded in the membrane of genetically
targeted neurons in order to modulate their activity via delivery of light [Deisseroth,
2011], has shown remarkable promise in many systems neuroscience applications. The
key advantage of optogenetic silencing over other perturbation tools is the ability to
inhibit neural activity with precise temporal delimitation (10-200ms) and cell-type
specificity [Han et al., 2011, Deisseroth, 2011]. However, the optogenetic toolbox is
still relatively under-developed for the primate compared to the rodent model, with
only a handful of studies showing behavioral effects of optogenetic perturbation, across
diverse behavioral domains [Gerits et al., 2012, Jazayeri et al., 2012, Cavanaugh et al.,
2012, Ohayon et al., 2013, Dai et al., 2014, Afraz et al., 2015, Fetsch et al., 2018].
In this work, we sought to improve the utility of optogenetic perturbations in
primates by modifying the method of light delivery. We tested a novel, custom de-
veloped (Blackrock Microsystems), chronically implantable array of LEDs for optoge-
netic experimentation in primates. Our primary motivation was to develop a chronic
perturbation tool, as this could enable experimental measurements over weeks and
months, thus increasing the scale and throughput of current causal experiments. For
example, current perturbation experiments are limited to inferences over collections
of images (e.g. several images of the same object), for a small set of such collec-
tions; a chronic tool, if successful, could enable the collection of large-scale datasets
at individual image resolution, for thousands of images. In addition to this main mo-
tivation, this particular tool offers the promise of precise spatial and temporal control
for neural perturbation. In this regard, time-delimited perturbation at the resolution
of tens of milliseconds could be useful for examining the dynamics of the neural code.
Analogously, large spatial tiling at fine resolution could enable tackling questions of
topographic organization of neural codes.
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To this end, we here applied this novel tool in two experimental studies, each
testing the causal role of a visual cortical area in an established behavioral task.
Our first experimental condition tested the causal role of primary visual (VI) cortex
in a simple luminance discrimination task, while the second experimental condition
tested the causal role of interior temporal (IT) cortex in core object recognition.
Our preliminary results suggest that, in each case, neural suppression using this tool
may result in reliable behavioral effects, at least transiently. However, in its current
implementation, this chronic tool is far from reliable or high-throughput, as compared
to alternative methods. We suggest possible technological improvements that may
increase its utility for our systems neuroscience goals.
5.2 Results
As stated in the Introduction, we aimed to test a novel chronically implantable LED
array for optogenetic experiments in primates, shown in Figure 5-1A. Briefly, each
LED array consists of a 5x5 printed circuit board grid with 24 LEDs and one thermal
sensor for monitoring tissue heating from light power. Each LED is 0.5mmx0.5mm,
with 1mm spacing between LEDs. The PCB and LEDs are encapsulated within a thin
(< 0.5mm) translucent silicone cover. The LED array is designed to be chronically
implanted directly on the cortical surface, by suturing the silicone encapsulation onto
the dura mater.
We first measured the photometric properties of the LED array for direct compar-
ison with an alternative light delivery method for optogenetic perturbation (optrodes,
consisting of an optic fiber, coupled to LASER, that is acutely inserted into the cor-
tical tissue). Figure 5-1B shows the total light power output of a given LED, as
a function of applied voltage plotted as percentage of the maximum voltage. Mea-
surements were made with a power-meter in tight proximity (< 0.5mm) to the LED
arrays, averaging the power output over a detector of 9mm in diameter and over
a 500ms duration window. We note that an individual LED operating at 30% can
match the power output of optrodes that have successfully yielded behavioral effects
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in monkeys (~ 10 - 15mW). Naturally, much more power can be delivered via an
optrode by optimizing the LASER coupling.
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Figure 5-1: (a) The top panel shows a photograph of LED array, a 5x5 grid with
24 LEDs and one thermal sensor. The LED array is designed to be chronically im-
planted directly onto the cortical tissue, by suturing the thin silicone encapsulation
onto the dura mater, as illustrated in the bottom panel. (b) Light power output for
individual LEDs as a function of the input intensity (controlled via input voltage).
The horizontal line corresponds to average power output of optrodes that have suc-
cessfully yielded behavioral effects in monkeys. (c) Spatial density of light power on
the horizontal plane, at a transverse distance of < 1mm from the surface of the LED.
Given that light delivered from LEDs is not collimated, the spatial spread of light
power over the horizontal plane is relatively large (- 2.5mm)
However, this power output is delivered in a spatially non-uniform manner. Figure
5-1C shows the spatial density of light power on the horizontal plane, at a transverse
distance of < 1mm from the surface of the LED. Even without accounting for tissue
absorption of light, the measured values are several orders of magnitude smaller than
the corresponding irradiance estimates for acute optrodes in cortical tissue [Chow
et al., 2010]. Given that light delivered from LEDs is not collimated, the spatial spread
of light power over the horizontal plane is relatively large (- 2.5mm). Thus, while
individual LEDs are sub-millimeter in size (0.5mm x 0.5mm), the effective spatial
resolution of this tool is several millimeters. Together, these results suggests that the
total light power to impinge on individual spatially targeted neurons is significantly
lower than for current acute light delivery methods.
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5.2.1 Perturbation of V1
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Figure 5-2: (a) Behavioral paradigm for luminance discrimination task. Each trial
of the behavioral task consisted of a fixation period, during which one (or none) of
the LEDs were preemptively activated on a random proportion of trials. Following
fixation, two sample stimuli (Gaussian blob of 10 size, varying in luminance) were
briefly presented at random radially opposite locations in the visually field. The
task required the subject to make a saccade to a target location defined by the
brighter of the two sample stimuli. The location and relative luminance of the stimuli
was randomly assigned for each trial. By varying the relative luminance of the two
sample stimuli, we systematically varied the task difficulty. (b) The time course of
the behavioral paradigm. The LED activation was timed to completely overlap the
stimulus-related activity in V1. (c) Each of the four discs correspond to the part of
the peripheral visual field that was tested with this behavioral paradigm. The color of
a given location (x,y) corresponds to the proportion of choices into a 10 pooling region
centered at (x,y). Each panel corresponds to the relative stimulus luminance (also
called signal) in a 10 pooling region centered at (x,y). As expected, the proportion
of choices into a spatial region increases with increasing signal. (d) Photo of surgical
implantation of two LED arrays over V1 cortex on the right hemishere.
Next we tested the efficacy of this tool for neural perturbation experiments that aim
to constrain decoding models, i.e. perturbation for behavioral effects. We trained
monkeys on a two-alternative-forced-choice (2AFC) luminance discrimination task
(see Methods, Figure 5-2A,B). Briefly, each trial of the behavioral task consisted of a
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central visual fixation period, followed by the simultaneous brief (50ms) presentation
of two sample stimuli (Gaussian blob of 1 degree size, varying in luminance) in the
periphery, at radially opposite locations in the visually field. The task required the
subject to make a saccade to a target location defined by the brighter of the two
sample stimuli. By varying the relative luminance of the two sample stimuli, we
systematically varied the task difficulty. Stimuli were presented at randomly selected
locations in the visual field within eccentricities of 3' to 100 of visual angle (resulting
in a disc of tested visual space), only enforcing that the two stimuli were always
radially opposite in position. As shown in Figure 5-2C, monkeys rapidly learned
this task, and performed as expected (i.e. with increased choices into regions with
increased signal).
We injected AAV8-CAG-ArchT on the right hemisphere of dorsal Vi in one mon-
key. Prior to implanting the LED arrays, we did not observe significant epifluorescence
over the putatively transfected VI cortex, suggesting poor viral expression. Thus, we
first performed a small number of acute optrode experiments to verify viral expression
and provide a baseline for comparison across methodologies. Figure 5-3 shows the
behavioral effects in the two alternative forced choice luminance discrimination task
described above, for an example optrode session. The colored disc corresponds to all
tested regions of the visual space, where the center of the disc corresponds to the
center of gaze, and each bin (x,y) corresponds to a location in the peripheral visual
field where visual targets were presented; note that the foveal regions (eccentricity
less than 3 degrees) were not tested. The color of each bin (x,y) indicates the change
in psychophysical criterion when targets were near this location in the visual field
(i.e. within a pooling zone of 3' diameter centered at this location), as a result of
optogenetic suppression. Negative values indicate that the animal was biased away
from this region (i.e. an increase in psychophysical threshold).
Given the anatomy of the perturbed cortical region (dorsal VI, right hemisphere),
we expect behavioral effects to be spatially constrained to a target region of interest
(target ROI) consisting of the contralateral lower visual field. Note that, given the
symmetry of the task, this criterion change will also be present -with equal magnitude,
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but opposite sign- in the radially opposite position in the visual field. The insets on
the left show the psychometric curve fits for all trials sampled from the target ROI
and a control ROI (contralateral upper visual field). Thus, the significant observed
behavioral effects form this optrode experiment are consistent with the known causal
role of VI in the perception of luminance across the visual field. To localize putative
effects, we optimized a Gaussian model with free parameters for the location, size
and amplitude of a psychometric shift (see Methods). This model imposes a prior
on spatially contiguous behavioral effects, consisting with the retinotopy of Vi. The
right-most panel of Figure 5-3 shows the Gaussian model fit for this psychometric
shift map, with a localized effect in the contralateral lower visual field, and a negative
but equal magnitude effect in the radially opposite region of visual space.
Control ROI
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Figure 5-3: (a) Behavioral effects, corresponding to shifts of the subjects' psychomet-
ric curve, on luminance discrimination task from optogenetic suppression using acute
optrodes (example session). Psychometric curves for the Behavioral effects were lo-
calized in a target ROJ (contralateral lower visual field) by fitting a Gaussian model.
For the
Next, we implanted two LED arrays over the transfected cortical tissue and re-
peated the same behavioral experiments, but with light delivery via the chronically
implanted LEDs. For the first set of experiments, we activated groups of four neigh-
bouring LEDs simultaneously to increase both the spatial spread and power of light.
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We interleaved four such groups, each consisting of four corners of arrays. Given the
chronic nature of this tool, we collected behavioral data over several sessions while
activating LEDs on a small portion of trials (duty cycle = 20%). For an example
activation condition of four neighbouring LEDs, Figure 5-4 shows the resulting psy-
chometric shift maps; the inset shows the anatomical locations of each of the four
activated LEDs, and the white circle overlaid on the effect map outlines to the local-
ized effect, from fitting a Gaussian model. Plotting format is identical to Figure 5-3,
except that pooling regions were significantly smaller in size (10), given the larger
number of trials. For this example LED condition, we observe a small putative shift
in the psychometric curve, localized in the target ROI.
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Figure 5-4: (a) Behavioral effects on luminance discrimination task from optogenetic
suppression using chronically implanted LED array, for an example LED condition.
The grid schematic (top right) shows which LEDs were activated for this condition.
The white circle overlaid on the effect map corresponds to the localized effect, from
fitting a Gaussian model. (b) Over all tested LED conditions, the amplitude of
the localized effect, computed as the gain parameter of a Gaussian model fit, is
significantly greater when localized effects are optimized within a target region of
interest (ROI) as compared to a control region.
In total, we tested four such conditions (four simultaneously activated LEDs) and
an additional eight conditions of activating individual LEDs. We collected these data
over a large number of sessions, interleaving LED conditions within each of the two
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subsets.
Over all tested LED conditions, the amplitude of the localized effect, computed
as the gain parameter of a Gaussian model fit, is significantly greater when localized
effects are optimized within a target ROI as compared to a control ROI (p < 0.001,
exact test on distribution of median difference of effect amplitude between target
and control ROI, estimated with bootstrap resampling over trials). From these data,
we infer that neural suppression of VI via activation of chronically implanted LEDs
caused a localized change in the behavior of the animal and that this effect, over all
tested LEDs, was reliable across trials. However, these data do not support inferences
about the effects of activating individual LED activations, nor any dependences across
LEDs (e.g. topographic organization of V1). We discuss these shortcomings in the
Discussion, and refrain from making strong inferences about the success of this tool
based on this data.
5.2.2 Perturbation of IT
Next we tested the efficacy of this tool to constrain decoding models of IT in core
object recognition. We tested one monkey on a binary match-to-sample object recog-
nition task (see Methods, Figure 5-5A). Briefly, each trial was initiated when the
monkey acquired and held gaze fixation on a central fixation point for 200ms, after
which a test image (6x6 degrees of visual angle in size) appeared at the center of gaze
for 100ms. After extinction of the test image, two choice images, each displaying a
single object in a canonical view with no background, were immediately shown to
the left and right. One of these two objects was always the same as the object that
generated the test image (i.e. the correct choice), and its location (left or right) was
randomly chosen on each trial. The monkey was allowed to freely view the choice
images for up to 10OOms, and indicated its final choice by holding fixation over the
selected image for 700ms. Animals were rewarded with small juice rewards for suc-
cessfully completing each trial. On each trial, one of ten binary object recognition
tasks (listed in Figure 5-5A) was randomly selected.
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Binary object
discrimination tasks B
(interleaved trial-by-trial)
Rhino vs. Tank
Tank vs. Bird
Hanger vs. Pen
Hanger vs. Hammer SI
Fixation (200ms) Tank vs. Guitar
Leg vs. Bear
Shorts vs. Watch
Test image presentation Rhino vs.Dog
(200ms) Truck vs. Gun
Choice saeen (<1 OOms) House vs. Face
Figure 5-5: (a) Behavioral paradigm for object discrimination task. The list shows
all ten tested pairwise object discrimination tasks, interleaved trial-by-trial. Each
trial was initiated when the monkey acquired and held gaze fixation on a central
fixation point for 200ms, after which a test image (6x6 degrees of visual angle in
size) appeared at the center of gaze for 100ms. After extinction of the test image, two
choice images, each displaying a single object in a canonical view with no background,
were immediately shown to the left and right. One of these two objects was always
the same as the object that generated the test image (i.e. the correct choice), and its
location (left or right) was randomly chosen on each trial. The monkey was allowed
to freely view the choice images for up to 10OOms, and indicated its final choice by
holding fixation over the selected image for 700ms. Animals were rewarded with small
juice rewards for successfully completing each trial. On each trial, one (or none) of the
LEDs were preemptively activated on a random proportion of trials, timed to overlap
with the feed-forward visual response in IT. (b) Photo of surgical implantation of
one LED arrays over IT cortex on the left hemishere; STS corresponds to superior
temporal sulcus.
We injected AAV8-CAG-ArchT on the lateral surface of IT on the left hemisphere
of one monkey. After visualizing fluorescence, we implanted one LED array over this
transfected tissue, as shown in Figure 5-5B. During experimental data collection, we
first tested a large activation pattern consisting of every other LED (i.e. resembling
a checkerboard), and activated this pattern on a random subset (30%) of trials for a
total of seven sessions. Following this condition, we additionally tested seven individ-
ual LEDs, and activated one randomly assigned LED conditions on a random subset
of trials (30% of trials were activation trials).
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Figure 5-6: (a) Focusing on the first half of trials, the pattern of contralateral behav-
ioral deficits (in units of d') over ten core object recognition tasks, for the checkerboard
LED condition. The shaded region corresponds to the null distribution (obtained by
randomly shuffling stimulation and control trials), while the colored dot corresponds
to the observed deficit. (b) For the LED condition in (a), the global deficit (averaged
over all tasks) for all, ipsilateral and contralateral stimuli. We report a significant
global deficit for contralateral stimuli, but don't have the power to infer significant
deficits on ipsilateral stimuli, or a difference in the deficit magnitude between ipsilat-
eral and contralateral stimuli. (c) Patterns of deficits over ten core object recognition
tasks, for each of the tested LED conditions. Each pattern is plotted as a heat maps
where darker colors correspond to larger deficits, averaged over trials. The insets on
the left of each heat map indicate which LED was activated. As in (a), these data
correspond to the first half of trials for each behavioral session. (d) Corresponding
to the deficit patterns shown in (c), the global deficit, averaged over all tasks and all
LED conditions, is shown on the left panel. In contrast, the right panel shows the
corresponding global deficit for the second half of trials for each behavioral session.
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Over all trials, we observed no significant deficit in core object recognition perfor-
mance resulting from neural suppression (p > 0.05, exact test on distribution of Ad'
averaged over all tasks and all tested LED conditions). This negative result could be
due to many different potential factors, which are expanded upon in the Discussion.
One such potential factor is the role of compensatory mechanisms on relatively fast
time-scales (e.g. over tens of minutes, as observed in [Fetsch et al., 2018]). To investi-
gate this possibility, we conducted post-hoc analyses by measuring behavioral deficits
over trials in the first and second halves of trials within each behavioral session sepa-
rately. Here, the first half of trials refers to pooled data from all behavioral sessions,
including only the first half of trials from each session. Focusing on the first half of
trials, we found significant task-selective deficits (see Figure 5-6A for contralateral
behavioral deficits (in units of d') for the checkerboard LED condition). The shaded
region corresponds to the null distribution (obtained by randomly shuffling stimula-
tion and control trials), while the colored dot corresponds to the observe deficit. The
inset on the left shows the pattern of activated LEDs. Contralateral stimuli refers
to images where the center of the object was located on the side of the image that
corresponds to the contralateral visual hemifield, while potentially still overlapping
with both hemifields. Averaging over all tasks, there is a significant global contralat-
eral deficit (see Figure 5-6B, p < 0.01). Note however that these data don't have the
power to infer significant deficits on ipsilateral stimuli, or a difference in the deficit
magnitude between ipsilateral and contralateral stimuli.
Figure 5-6C shows the patterns of deficits for each of the eight tested LED condi-
tions as individual heat maps where darker colors correspond to larger deficits (mean
over trials). These data do not have the power to support inferences about deficits
over individual tasks and individual LEDs. However, the global deficit, averaged over
all tasks and all LEDs, is shown in Figure 5-6D. Focusing on the first half of trials,
we observe a significant global deficit for contralateral stimuli (p < 0.01, Figure 5-6,
left panel). However, in the second half of trials within sessions, which pools all data
from all behavioral sessions but including only the latter half of trials within each
session, we observe no such deficit. These results are consistent the hypothesis of
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transient behavioral effects which are attenuated over the course of the behavioral
session. However, they could also reflect any number of sources of variability, includ-
ing sampling variability from the null hypothesis, i.e. that LED activation led to no
change in behavior. We expand on these possibilities in the Discussion.
5.3 Discussion
Motivated to increase the scale and throughput of current neural perturbation ex-
periments in primates, we here tested a novel neural perturbation tool, a chronically
implantable LED array for optogenetic perturbation. The data presented here do not
support strong inferences about the utility of this tool, in its current form, for neu-
ral perturbation experiments in primates. Rather, these results provide a report of
potentially promising preliminary findings with guides for improvements, both tech-
nological and experimental.
First, our photometric measurements suggest that this tool, when operated at a
safe input intensity level, does not provide much light power to cortical neurons, and
furthermore delivers light in a spatially diffuse manner. To the first point, computa-
tional models of light dispersion in cortical tissue [Chow et al., 2010] could provide
insights into the necessary light power to match existing light delivery tools. Given
that a major failure mode for this tool was electronic in nature (solder bond failure),
simple electronic modifications could also drastically increase the safe operating input
intensity. The coarse effective spatial resolution can likely be improved by focusing
the light output of LEDs via miniaturized objectives. We speculate that the weak and
unreliable putative behavioral effects observed in both sets of behavioral experiments
stem primarily from this technical limit.
Specifically, in the first set of experiments (perturbing V1 while measuring lumi-
nance discrimination behavior), we observed behavioral effects consistent with an al-
ternative method (acute optrodes), but with significant more variability. This "noise"
may be due in part to additional behavioral variability (e.g. non-stationarity in the
animal's behavior, captured by measuring behavior over several sessions) or even
147
include non-stationarity in the induced behavioral effects (e.g. due to long term com-
pensation to the neural perturbation). In the second set of experiments (perturbing
IT while measuring core object recognition behavior), we observed no significant be-
havioral deficits, in contrast to reliable, contralateral, relatively large deficits when
neurons are suppressed with an alternative method (muscimol). Post-hoc analyses
suggest the presence of transient behavioral deficits, which are attenuated over the
course of each behavioral session. This phenomenology, similar to what was observed
with optical stimulation of MT [Fetsch et al., 2018], is consistent with rapid down-
stream compensation. Importantly, we did not replicate this phenomenology in a
second animal. Thus, this could also reflect any number of sources of variability,
including sampling variability from the null hypothesis that LED activation led to no
change in behavior.
However, we speculate that, in addition to the aforementioned technical limits,
questions of causality may be fraught due to limitations of our current models of the
neural phenomena under study, including aspects of plasticity, learning and compen-
sation. For example, research in the domain of motion perception has shown that
animal's training regime can directly alter the necessity of a brain region (MT) for
a given task [Liu and Pack, 2017]. Moreover, such compensatory changes can even
occur within a single behavioral session, and even within a single trial [Fetsch et al.,
20181. These phenomena are likely not specific to optogenetic perturbations, but the
time-course of compensation may depend directly on the strength of the perturbation:
weeks for lesions, days for potent pharmacological suppression, and minutes to hours
for weaker perturbations (e.g. electrical, optogenetic). In addition to stronger pertur-
bations, designing experiments that are robust to such changes- e.g. with very low
proportion of perturbed trials, or with explicit behavioral washouts, or with pertur-
bations aligned with "natural" neural activity-may be the key to obtain large-scale
behavioral datasets with neural perturbation.
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5.4 Methods
5.4.1 Subjects and surgery
Data presented were collected from two adult male rhesus macaque monkeys (Macaca
mulatta, subjects Y, M). In both animals, a surgery using sterile technique was per-
formed under general anaesthesia to implant a titanium head post to the skull using
titanium screws.
Monkey Y was trained on a two-alternative forced-choice luminance discrimina-
tion task (see Figure 5-2). Following this, we injected AAV8-CAG-ArchT on the right
hemisphere of primary visual (V1) cortex, covering a region of 15mmx7mm with over
18 injection sites. Over this transfected tissue, we first implanted a steel recording
chamber (Crist) for acute optrode experiments, and confirmed weak viral expression
by recording weak neural modulation by light. In a second surgery, we removed the
chamber and implanted two 5x5 LED arrays over the transfected tissue. Arrays were
held in place via dura sutures.
Monkey M was trained on a binary match-to-sample object discrimination task
(see Figure 5-5), and previously implanted with a steel recording chamber (Crist) for
acute electrophysiology experiments. We then injected AAV8-CAG-ArchT on the left
hemisphere of IT cortex, covering a surface of 7mmx7mm with over 9 injection sites.
We confirmed viral expression by visualizing epifluorescence. A single 5x5 LED array
was implanted over the transfected tissue, and arrays were held in place via dura
sutures.
All procedures were performed in compliance with National Institutes of Health
guidelines and the standards of the MIT Committee on Animal Care and the Amer-
ican Physiological Society.
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5.4.2 Behavioral paradigm and analysis
Luminance discrimination
The luminance discrimination behavioral task (see Figure 2B, 2C) was designed to
probe the role of millimeter scale regions of VI [Schiller and Tehovnik, 2003], which
encode local features of the visual field. We trained two monkeys on this task, but
here present data from one animal with sufficient number of trials per LED condition.
Stimuli were presented on a 24" LCD monitor (1920 x 1080 at 60 Hz; Acer GD235HZ)
and eye position was monitored by tracking the position of the pupil using a camera-
based system (SR Research Eyelink 1000). At the start of each training session, the
subject performed an eye-tracking calibration task by saccading to a range of spatial
targets and maintaining fixation for 800 ms. Calibration was repeated if drift was
noticed over the course of the session.
Each trial of the behavioral task consisted of a fixation period, during which one
(or none) of the LEDs were preemptively activated on a random proportion of trials.
Following fixation, two sample stimuli (Gaussian blob of 1' size, varying in luminance)
were briefly presented at random radially opposite locations in the visually field. The
LED activation was timed to completely overlap the stimulus-related activity in V1.
The task required the subject to make a saccade to a target location defined by the
brighter of the two sample stimuli. By varying the relative luminance of the two
sample stimuli, we systematically varied the task difficulty.
To assess behavioral effects from stimulation, we first estimated psychometric
curves from the animal's behavioral data, separately for each LED condition, and
for each tested position in visual field. In other words, for each tested location
(x, y), we pooled all trials within a 1' diameter zone centered at (x, y), and fitted
a psychometric curve for each LED condition using logistic regression with two pa-
rameters: logit(choiceif) = bo + b1 -signali, where bo, b1 are the fitted parameters,
and choicein, signali, correspond to the dependent and experimentally controlled vari-
ables. For each psychometric curve, we defined the psychometric criterion as -bo/bl.
To assess the effect of LED activation, we estimated the change in psychometric cri-
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terion (i.e. corresponding to shifts in the psychometric curves) via the difference in
estimated criterion between the corresponding curve fits. Repeating this procedure
for each tested location in the visual field, we obtained a 2D map of psychometric
shift estimates I(x, y). Rather than test each of these estimates independently, we
fitted the entire 2D map I(x, y) via a Gaussian model:
(X-9X)2 +(Y-I1Y) 2  (X+AX) 2 +(Y+PY)
2
IF(x, y; A, 1= (e 2 -e a2
We constrained the variables px, py to reside inside a region of interest, thus imposing
a prior on the effect of optogenetic suppression of V1. To infer whether LED activation
led to any behavioral changes, we compared the distribution over trial-resampling of
fitted amplitude parameters JAl when the Gaussian model was constrained to localize
an effect in the target ROI (contralateral lower visual field) versus a control ROI
(contralateral upper visual field). To obtain a global statistic, we computed the
median difference in model parameters over all LEDs.
Core object recognition
We examined basic-level, core object recognition behavior using a set of 25 broadly-
sampled objects that we previously found to be reliably labeled by independent human
subjects, based on the definition of basic-level proposed by [Rosch et al., 1976]. These
images are identical to those used in Chapter 2; Figure 2-1 shows the list of 24 objects,
with two example images of each object; we included one additional object (a face) for
this set of experiments. From 300 possibly binary tasks, we tested a subsampled set of
10 tasks for these experiments. The images were sized so that they subtended 6 x 6' for
each monkey. Realtime experiments for all monkey psychophysics were controlled by
open-source software (MWorks Project http://mworks-project.org/). Animals were
rewarded with small juice rewards for successfully completing each trial, and received
time-outs of 1.5 to 2.5 seconds for incorrect choices.
Monkey M was previously trained on a match-to-sample paradigm under head
fixation and using gaze as the reporting effector. Eye position was monitored by
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tracking the position of the pupil using a camera-based system (SR Research Eyelink
II). Images were presented on a 27" LCD monitor (1920 x 1080 at 60 Hz; Samsung
S27A850D) positioned 44 cm in front of the animal. At the start of each training
session, subjects performed an eye-tracking calibration task by saccading to a range
of spatial targets and maintaining fixation for 800ms. Calibration was repeated if
drift was noticed over the course of the session.
Figure 5-5A illustrates the behavioral paradigm. Each trial was initiated when the
monkey acquired and held gaze fixation on a central fixation point for 200ms, after
which a test image appeared at the center of gaze for 100ms. Trials were aborted
if gaze was not held within t2'. After extinction of the test image, two choice
images, each displaying a single object in a canonical view with no background, were
immediately shown to the left and right (each centered at 6' of eccentricity along the
horizontal meridian; see Fig. 1B). One of these two objects was always the same as
the object that generated the test image (i.e. the correct choice), and its location
(left or right) was randomly chosen on each trial. The monkey was allowed to freely
view the choice images for up to 10OOms, and indicated its final choice by holding
fixation over the selected image for 700ms.
We computed behavioral deficits by measuring the difference in performance with
respect to the one-versus-other object level performance metric (B.02). Briefly, this
metric is a pattern of pairwise object discrimination performances. For each pairwise
object discrimination task, performance was estimated using a sensitivity index d'
[Macmillan, 1993]: d' = Z(hit rate) - Z(false alarm rate), where Z(.) is the inverse of
the cumulative Gaussian distribution. All d' estimates were constrained to a range
of [0,5]. We additionally computed this deficit metric when restricting to contralat-
eral/ipsilateral stimuli, i.e. images where the center of the object was located on the
side of the image that corresponds to the contralateral/ipsilateral visual hemifield,
while potentially still overlapping with both hemifields. Finally, to investigate the
possibility of compensatory mechanisms on relatively fast time-scales (e.g. over tens
of minutes, as observed in [Fetsch et al., 2018]), we also computed this metric when
restricting to the first and second halves of trials within each behavioral session. Here,
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the first half of trials refers to pooled data from all behavioral sessions, including only
the first half of trials from each session.
Statistical testing
Unless otherwise specified, we estimated the uncertainty in delta measurements via
bootstrap resampling of trials, repeated 100 times. The standard error of delta mea-
surements was estimated as the standard deviation of this bootstrap distribution.
For statistical tests, we performed one-tailed exact tests, by computing the empiri-
cal probability of observing a sample below zero. To compute this probability from
the empirical bootstrap distribution, we fit a Gaussian kernel density function to the
empirical distribution, optimizing the bandwidth parameter to minimize the mean
squared error (kde.m on MATLAB file exchange). This kernel density function was
evaluated to compute a p-value, by computing the cumulative probability of observing
a positive behavioral delta.
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Chapter 6
Discussion
This thesis aims to provide quantitative insights into how the brain, in particu-
lar the highest level of ventral visual stream, causally supports basic-level core ob-
ject recognition behavior. To date, a significant body of research suggests that IT
cortex is a good candidate for the neural substrate of this behavior [Holmes and
Gross, 1984, Horel et al., 1987, Biederman et al., 1997, Logothetis and Sheinberg,
1996, Tanaka, 1996, Rolls, 2000, DiCarlo et al., 2012, Kobatake and Tanaka, 1994, Ito
et al., 1995, Logothetis et al., 1995, Booth and Rolls, 1998, Hung et al., 2005, Zhang
et al., 2011, Sheinberg and Logothetis, 1997, de Beeck et al., 2001, Majaj et al.,
2015]. Extending on this research program, we here sought to uncover if and how
neuronal activity in IT causally supports basic-level core object recognition behavior.
In addition to answering this qualitative question, we aim to provide new quanti-
tative constraints for computational models of the ventral stream and core object
recognition behavior. In Chapter 1, we defined quantitative understanding as uncov-
ering computational models that quantitatively recapitulate all relevant phenomena,
behavioral and neural, at a relevant level of abstract in the domain of core object
recognition. Importantly, this process is iterative, as leading models strive to capture
and synthesize all available and relevant observations, and make "predictions" within
this domain of phenomena. In turn, new domains of phenomena (such as the ones
presented in this work) enforce new constraints for future leading models. With this
in mind, we here present the following advances towards this overarching goal.
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6.1 Quantitative models of core object recognition
Our first subgoal can be stated as uncovering quantitative explanations for primate
behavior in the domain of core object recognition. To this end, Chapters 2 and 3 es-
tablished a scalable behavioral paradigm for testing the object recognition abilities of
humans, monkeys and state-of-the-art models on hundreds of different object discrim-
ination tasks. In Chapter 2, we systematically benchmarked the macaque monkey as
a model of human visual processing in the domain of basic-level core object recog-
nition. In Chapter 3, we applied these behavioral experiments to test the limits of
state-of-the-art DCNNs. Using previously unattainable high-resolution behavioral
metrics, we found that these models significantly diverged from primate behavior.
These results suggest that new ANN models are needed to more precisely capture the
neural mechanisms underlying primate object vision.
To this end, one strategy could be to use even larger-scale, high-resolution be-
havioral measurements, such as expanded versions of the patterns of image-level per-
formance presented here, as useful top-down optimization guides. Not only do these
high-resolution behavioral signatures have the statistical power to reject the currently
leading ANN models, but they can also be efficiently collected at very large scale, via
high-throughput psychophysical tools in humans and monkeys (e.g. Amazon Mechan-
ical Turk for humans, Monkey Turk for rhesus monkeys), in contrast to other guide
data (e.g. large-scale neuronal measurements, which are still under development).
To be clear, we propose replacing or augmenting the model optimization procedure,
which currently consists of optimizing for categorization performance on large scale
image-sets, with optimization for a match between model and primate behavioral
response patterns. As with current categorization-optimized models, claims of "gen-
eralization" to primate behavior and underlying neural responses in the ventral stream
could be tested on held-out measurements, i.e. on new images or new images of new
objects.
We intuit that models in a large space architectures can all approximate a given
optimized target function, with differences in architectures corresponding to differ-
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ences in sample efficiency. Thus, the success of such models, with respect to our
neuroscience goals, may depend wholly on the similarity between the optimized tar-
get function and the neuroscientists' target function (e.g. ventral neuronal response
patterns and behavioral patterns). The proposal can then be viewed as tightening the
similarity between optimized target functions and neuroscience target functions by di-
rectly optimizing for neuroscience target functions. This strategy is complementary to
approaches involving sampling over model architectures with a fixed optimization pro-
cedure [Zoph et al., 2017, Yamins et al., 2014, Rajalingham et al., 2018, Jozwik et al.,
2016, Kheradpisheh et al., 2016, Kubilius et al., 2016, Cadieu et al., 2014, Khaligh-
Razavi and Kriegeskorte, 2014]. Based on our current-albeit preliminary- results,
we speculate that this strategy is less likely to quickly yield primate-like models, as
compared to sampling over optimization procedures. This speculation is grounded by
the intuition stated above, and supported in part by observations that the precise set
of images and labels used for model training significantly impact the resulting model
features and corresponding behavioral responses (see Figure 3-4, where training a
fixed model architecture on different choices of image sets leads to vastly different
pattern of residuals relative to humans). In contrast, choices of architectures within
this model class have little effect (see Figure 3-4). An important caveat is that com-
parisons between variations in model architecture and variations in model training
data cannot be matched ("apples to apples'), and furthermore that models sampled
from a larger space of architectures may show greater differences.
6.2 The causal role of IT cortex in core object recog-
nition
Our second subgoal can be stated as obtaining direct causal evidence for the role of
IT in core object recognition behavior. As discussed in Chapter 1, inferring causal
dependencies between different phenomena relies on experimental control of one these
phenomena. More precisely, the confidence of inferred causal dependencies between
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measured phenomena X', Y depends on the (estimated) equivalence between the ex-
perimentally controlled variable X and the inferred causal variable X'. In Chapter
4, we used a well established neural suppression agent (muscimol) to reversibly in-
activate individual, arbitrarily sampled millimeter-scale regions of IT while monkeys
performed a battery of binary core object discrimination tasks, interleaved trial-by-
trial. Our results results provide much needed direct causal evidence for the general
decoding hypothesis and, importantly, are the first to demonstrate the necessity of IT
cortex for a wide range of general core object recognition behaviors with behaviorally
critical topographic organization.
Moreover, our results provide rich constraints for computational models of the
neural mechanisms underlying primate behavior in the domain of core object recog-
nition. To date, leading ANN models of the ventral stream have been tested largely on
the available quantitative phenomena, consisting of neural and behavioral responses
to images. Importantly, our goal is not simply to produce a model that captures image
responses at various levels, but rather to produce a model that captures all relevant
phenomena. As such, perturbations with quantitative measures of the resulting neu-
ral and behavioral responses are a rich new domain of constraints for computational
models. In this work, we first measured the impact of millimeter-scale perturbations
on a battery of core object recognition tasks, both in terms of global magnitude of
deficit and finer-grained characteristics, such as the magnitude of deficits over various
subsets of images (see Figure 4-3, e.g. contralateral stimuli) and sparsity of deficits
over tasks (see Figure 4-4). Second, we observed that effects of inactivation were
topographically organized and measured the spatial auto-correlation of the read-out
of IT for behavior. Finally, we quantitatively compared several read-out models that
map the neuronal activity patterns at local regions to predicted inactivation effects
on behavior, and found that behavioral deficits are predicted by the local neuronal
selectivity, rather than response - a new constraint for the mapping from neurons
to behavior.
Importantly, these results are powerful constraints for constructing new ANN
models of the primate ventral visual stream and core object recognition behavior.
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Given that current ANN models do not capture the vast majority of these phenom-
ena (not shown), this motivates constructing new ANNs with precise mapping of
computational layers and features to anatomical mechanisms in the primate brain,
which we refer to as "topographic deep artificial neural networks" (TDANNs). Pre-
liminary work suggests that a first generation of TDANNs recapitulate some but not
all first-order experimental phenomena better than current deep ANN models. This
research establishes a new class of experimental constraints for computational models
of core object recognition.
6.3 Future goals
In Chapter 5, we tested a novel chronically implantable array of LEDs for optoge-
netic experiments in primates. Chronic tools such as this one are promising avenues
for high-throughput behavioral experiments with time-delimited perturbation of neu-
ral activity, which could enable the collection of a new class of large-scale behavior
datasets and corresponding powerful constraints for models of object recognition.
While this particular tool is far from high-throughput in its current implementation,
there are clear possible technological improvements that may increase its utility for
our systems neuroscience goals.
As observed in Chapter 5, questions of causality may be fraught due to limitations
of our current models of the phenomena under study, including aspects of plasticity,
learning and compensation. For example, research in the domain of motion perception
has shown that animal's training regime can directly alter the necessity of a brain
region (MT) for a given task [Liu and Pack, 2017]. Moreover, such compensatory
changes can even occur within a single behavioral session, and even within a single
trial [Fetsch et al., 2018]. In the domain of visual object recognition, direct manipu-
lations of IT in general visual recognition behavior have also largely been equivocal.
Lesions of IT sometimes suggest the necessity of IT and visual behaviors [Cowey and
Gross, 1970, Manning, 1972, Holmes and Gross, 1984, Biederman et al., 1997, Buffalo
et al., 2000] but the resulting behavioral deficits are often contradictory (with often
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no lasting visual deficits) [Dean, 1974, Huxlin et al., 2000] and at best modest (e.g.
10-15% drop in performance for large-scale bilateral removal of IT when a complete
loss of performance would have been 40%) [Horel et al., 1987, Matsumoto et al.,
20161. This is in stark contrast to relatively large effects for relatively small (- 2mm
diameter) perturbations of IT [Afraz et al., 2006, Afraz et al., 2015, Moeller et al.,
2017, Sadagopan et al., 2017], as well to the current work. Additionally, we previously
observed that a medium-scale (- 9mm diameter) inactivation of face-selective regions
in IT resulted in complete deficit for contralateral face discrimination behavior (not
shown). What explains these discrepancies across studies?
It is thought that this variability could be due to differences in the behavioral tasks
that were tested, and corresponding available alternative strategies [DiCarlo et al.,
2012]. To this end, a key future goal would be to formalize and test this intuition by
constructing a single model, including not only the topographic mapping of features
but also the mechanisms underlying compensation and learning across a wide range
of behavioral tasks, that synthesizes all available observations from perturbations of
IT. Concretely, such a model would not only predict the magnitude/sparsity/etc. of
behavioral deficits as a function of the inactivation size, but also reflect the dynamics
of compensatory mechanisms, which can subtend from milliseconds to tens of trials to
weeks. While this may seem like an ambitious goal, it is possible that modifications to
current models, e.g. topographic ANN models with reinforcement learning, capture
a large portion of the observed phenomena.
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